X v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2003] SASC 343
Civil
BESANKO J X has brought an action in this Court against the State of South Australia (“the State”). He claims damages for the injury, loss and damage he suffered as a result of being sexually assaulted by two men. X claims that he was sexually assaulted by Lawrence John Edward O’Shea (“O’Shea”) between 14 April 1990 and July 1991. He claims that he was sexually assaulted by Colin Humphrys (“Humphrys”) between April and July 1991. The sexual assaults involving O’Shea were acts of sexual intercourse and fellatio and those involving Humphrys included acts of indecency and attempted homosexual intercourse. It is unnecessary to discuss the details of the injury, loss and damage which X claims he suffered.
X’s claim against the State is based on the tort of negligence. He claims that certain bodies and persons owed him a duty of care and that they breached the duty of care which they owed him. He claims that the State is liable for the negligence of those bodies and persons. In relation to the sexual assaults alleged to have been committed by O’Shea, he claims that the Parole Board (“the Board”), Geoffrey Cordingley (“C”), the Department of Family and Youth Services (“FAYS”), Phyllis Howes (“H”) and Francesca Seith (“S”) were negligent. The Board is a body established under the Correctional Services Act 1982 (“CSA”) and it has various powers and functions under that Act and other legislation, including the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (“CLSA”). By reason of s 60A of the CSA, any liability that would otherwise attach to a member of the Board in relation to the exercise of powers or functions or the discharge of duties under the Act shall lie against the Crown. C was a probation and parole officer employed by the Department of Correctional Services. He was given certain powers and functions under the conditions of licence issued under the CLSA. Any liability that would otherwise lie against C in relation to the exercise of powers under the CSA lies against the Crown (s 86A CSA). FAYS or its predecessor is said to be the State Government Department which was responsible for the welfare of children in this State. It is unnecessary to trace the history of the Department which was responsible for the administration of the Community Welfare Act 1972 (renamed in 1993 the Family and Community Services Act). For present purposes I can describe the relevant department as FAYS. H was a senior social worker employed by FAYS and S was an employee of FAYS. Any liability that would otherwise lie against H and/or S in relation to the exercise of powers under the Family and Community Services Act lies against the Crown (s 235A of the Family and Community Services Act 1972).
In relation to the assaults alleged to have been committed by Humphrys, X claims that C and Ann Johnson (“J”) were negligent.…
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- Case
- [2003] SASC 343
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the State of South Australia owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, considering the historical sexual offences committed by O’Shea. It was also necessary to assess if the State breached any duty of care by failing to prevent the alleged assaults. The court examined the relationship between O’Shea and the R Centre, as well as the measures, if any, the State had in place to prevent such incidents. The court further considered the foreseeability of the harm and the proximity between the parties involved.
In its decision, the court found that certain allegations and paragraphs of the Statement of Claim were not substantiated or relevant to the issues at hand. Specifically, paragraphs 37 to 43 and the allegations of breach in paragraphs 44 and 45 were struck out. The court reasoned that these parts of the claim lacked sufficient factual basis or relevance to the duty of care owed by the State. The court also noted that the plaintiff might be allowed to re-plead some of the struck-out allegations, subject to further discussion with the parties.
The court concluded with an order to strike out the specified paragraphs and allegations. The parties were invited to discuss further amendments, leave to re-plead, costs, and any other consequential orders. The court aimed to ensure that the proceedings were fair and focused on the relevant issues at hand.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BESANKO J