X v State of South Australia

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X v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2003] SASC 343

Civil

  1. BESANKO J         X has brought an action in this Court against the State of South Australia (“the State”).  He claims damages for the injury, loss and damage he suffered as a result of being sexually assaulted by two men.  X claims that he was sexually assaulted by Lawrence John Edward O’Shea (“O’Shea”) between 14 April 1990 and July 1991.  He claims that he was sexually assaulted by Colin Humphrys (“Humphrys”) between April and July 1991.  The sexual assaults involving O’Shea were acts of sexual intercourse and fellatio and those involving Humphrys included acts of indecency and attempted homosexual intercourse.  It is unnecessary to discuss the details of the injury, loss and damage which X claims he suffered.

  2. X’s claim against the State is based on the tort of negligence.  He claims that certain bodies and persons owed him a duty of care and that they breached the duty of care which they owed him.  He claims that the State is liable for the negligence of those bodies and persons.  In relation to the sexual assaults alleged to have been committed by O’Shea, he claims that the Parole Board (“the Board”), Geoffrey Cordingley (“C”), the Department of Family and Youth Services (“FAYS”), Phyllis Howes (“H”) and Francesca Seith (“S”) were negligent.  The Board is a body established under the Correctional Services Act 1982 (“CSA”) and it has various powers and functions under that Act and other legislation, including the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (“CLSA”). By reason of s 60A of the CSA, any liability that would otherwise attach to a member of the Board in relation to the exercise of powers or functions or the discharge of duties under the Act shall lie against the Crown.  C was a probation and parole officer employed by the Department of Correctional Services.  He was given certain powers and functions under the conditions of licence issued under the CLSA.  Any liability that would otherwise lie against C in relation to the exercise of powers under the CSA lies against the Crown (s 86A CSA).  FAYS or its predecessor is said to be the State Government Department which was responsible for the welfare of children in this State.  It is unnecessary to trace the history of the Department which was responsible for the administration of the Community Welfare Act 1972 (renamed in 1993 the Family and Community Services Act).  For present purposes I can describe the relevant department as FAYS.  H was a senior social worker employed by FAYS and S was an employee of FAYS.  Any liability that would otherwise lie against H and/or S in relation to the exercise of powers under the Family and Community Services Act lies against the Crown (s 235A of the Family and Community Services Act 1972).

  3. In relation to the assaults alleged to have been committed by Humphrys, X claims that C and Ann Johnson (“J”) were negligent.…

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Details
Case
[2003] SASC 343
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of X v State of South Australia involved a claim by the plaintiff against the State of South Australia regarding the alleged sexual assaults committed by O’Shea. The plaintiff was born on 26 July 1980, and the alleged assaults occurred between 14 April 1990 and July 1991 at a place identified as Z and at the R Centre, an incorporated association in the State of South Australia. The legal issues before the court centred on whether the State of South Australia owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, and if so, whether this duty was breached, leading to the alleged damages.

The court had to determine whether the State of South Australia owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, considering the historical sexual offences committed by O’Shea. It was also necessary to assess if the State breached any duty of care by failing to prevent the alleged assaults. The court examined the relationship between O’Shea and the R Centre, as well as the measures, if any, the State had in place to prevent such incidents. The court further considered the foreseeability of the harm and the proximity between the parties involved.

In its decision, the court found that certain allegations and paragraphs of the Statement of Claim were not substantiated or relevant to the issues at hand. Specifically, paragraphs 37 to 43 and the allegations of breach in paragraphs 44 and 45 were struck out. The court reasoned that these parts of the claim lacked sufficient factual basis or relevance to the duty of care owed by the State. The court also noted that the plaintiff might be allowed to re-plead some of the struck-out allegations, subject to further discussion with the parties.

The court concluded with an order to strike out the specified paragraphs and allegations. The parties were invited to discuss further amendments, leave to re-plead, costs, and any other consequential orders. The court aimed to ensure that the proceedings were fair and focused on the relevant issues at hand.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In the discussion which follows, I will refer to the legislation as it was at the time of the alleged incidents. I will refer to the allegations of fact as if they are the facts which have been proved.The Facts and the Allegations of Negligence The Statement of Claim is not as clear as it might be. On occasions the facts are not set out in a logical fashion and a fact, which may be relevant to whether a duty of care exists, is found in an allegation of breach. On at least one occasion, particulars of knowledge of a fact are contained in the allegations of breach. Doing the best I can, I set out below what I understand to be the relevant facts. I also set out the relevant allegations of negligence. I start with the facts and allegations of negligence relating to the unlawful conduct of O’Shea. The plaintiff was born on 26 July 1980. The sexual assaults of the plaintiff by O’Shea took place between 14 April 1990 and July 1991 at a place identified as Z and at the R Centre. The R Centre was an incorporated association in the State of South Australia. It conducted a number of activities on premises. The aim of those activities was to provide a social focus for the surrounding area where people could meet and share common interests. The programmes conducted at the premises included child care, children’s school holiday programmes and classes for children under 16 years of age. O’Shea had a long history of sexual offences. On 31 October 1960 O’Shea was convicted of three counts of indecent assault upon a nine year old girl contrary to s 56 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (“CLCA”). O’Shea was given a sentence of two years’ imprisonment and was released on 20 February 1962. On 3 July 1967 O’Shea pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent assault upon three young boys contrary to s 56 of the CLCA. He asked the sentencing Judge (Hogarth J), when imposing sentence, to take into account three other offences of a similar nature which he had committed on a boy aged 10 years and a girl aged 11 years. On 26 July 1967 Hogarth J ordered that O’Shea be detained in an institution for a period of three years pursuant to s 77A of the CLCA and to enter into the following recognisance:“TAKE NOTICE that the conditions of the bond with which you are required to comply after your release are as follows:1. That you shall remain at the said institution after the completion of the said period of three years detention until the Medical Superintendent (for the time being) shall have given his consent and approval in writing to your leaving the institution.2. That you shall be under the supervision of a Probation Officer during the said period.3. That during the said period after your release from the institution you shall obey the directions of the Probation Officer as to your residence and medical treatment, including residence and medical treatment in an institution.”Hogarth J also ordered that if O’Shea committed a breach of his bond he would be liable to forfeit the sum of $500 or to be imprisoned for any term up to 12 months.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BESANKO J
I would strike out paragraphs 37 to 43 (inclusive) and the allegations of breach in paragraphs 44 and 45 and the relevant allegations of loss and damage.Conclusion I would make the following orders:1. Paragraphs 25, 33, 36, 37, 37A, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51 are struck out.2. That part of paragraph 32 which reads “and/or Cordingley” is struck out. I will hear the parties as to whether any other paragraphs need to be amended or should be struck out as a result of these orders and as to whether the plaintiff should be given leave to re-plead some or all of the allegations struck out. I will also hear the parties as to costs and any other consequential orders.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BESANKO J