Wyrallah Holdings Pty Ltd v Cargo Road Wines

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:CARGO ROAD WINES application for extension of time in which to serve evidence in support of opposition to registration of trade mark application 883834(33) - WINE WITH ALTITUDE - filed in the name of WYRALLAH HOLDINGS PTY LTD.

Background

  1. In this matter Cargo Road Wines, ("Cargo"), opposes registration of the above mentioned trade mark in the name of Wyrallah Holdings Pty Ltd ("Wyrallah").  The circumstances that led to this opposed application for extension of time to serve evidence in support are set out in paragraphs 2 to 6, below.

  2. A Notice of Opposition ("NOO") was initially 'filed' on 19 March 2002 in the name of Charles Lane of 227 Old Canterbury Road, Dulwich Hill, New South Wales.  This NOO was on Form P/00/038, a NOO under the Patents Act 1990 and Mr Lane appears to have agreed that it was not validly filed.  The ground stated on the NOO was that, "Over two years prior use.  Some evidence attached, more can be provided."  Appended to the NOO are three photocopied pages purporting to show an interaction between Cargo and a wine and bar accessory provider.  These three pages are not sworn - ie, if the NOO had been properly filed, the pages would not comply with Trade Mark Regulation 21.17 which states, inter alia:

    21.17  Evidence in proceedings

    (1)Evidence that is given in writing in any proceedings before the Registrar must be in the form of a declaration.

  3. Mr Lane appears, as I have said, to have agreed that this was not a validly filed NOO.  Subsequently, on 28 March 2002, Cargo filed a NOO ("the second NOO") on the correct form under The Trade Marks Act 1995, ("the Act") which is in the name of Cargo Road Wines, of Orange. This NOO cites three grounds, these being under sections 58, 60 and subsection 44(1)(a)(ii) of the Act stating, in regard to the latter, that, "Trade mark will be sought by Cargo Road Wines".

  4. The time allowed for service of evidence in support of the opposition elapsed on 28 June 2002.  Wyrallah, the applicant for registration, did not serve or file evidence in answer by its due date of 28 September 2002.  Thereafter, Mr Lane initiated a telephone conversation with an officer the Trade Marks Office and discovered that what he, Mr Lane, had regarded as being evidence in support of the Cargo opposition had not been so regarded by the Office.  Subsequently, a Senior Examiner of the Hearings Section wrote to Cargo stating, inter alia, that, "Somebody should have advised you that your material was not in the proper form for evidence and therefore would not be taken into consideration when the opposition came to be decided."  The Senior Examiner outlined some opposition procedures and advised Cargo of its capacity to apply for an extension of time in which to serve and file evidence in support.  Cargo was also advised…

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Details
Case
[2003] ATMO 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Cargo Road Wines for an extension of time to serve evidence in support of its Notice of Opposition to a trade mark application by Wyrallah Holdings Pty Ltd. The proceedings were heard by Ian Thompson, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

The primary legal issue before the delegate was whether to grant Cargo Road Wines an extension of time to file its evidence. This arose after Cargo Road Wines failed to file its evidence by the due date, and subsequently discovered that the initial material it had provided was not considered valid evidence by the Trade Marks Office. Wyrallah Holdings Pty Ltd opposed the grant of the extension.

The delegate reasoned that while an officer of the Trade Marks Office had provided incorrect advice to Cargo Road Wines regarding the form of its evidence, this did not constitute an "error or omission" by a trade marks officer in the context of regulation 21.24, which would have automatically entitled Cargo Road Wines to an extension. The delegate found that the initial filing of the Notice of Opposition by Charles Lane was invalid, and the subsequent advice from the Senior Examiner, while perhaps based on a misapprehension, did not meet the threshold for an official error that would necessitate an extension. Consequently, the delegate refused to extend the time for Cargo Road Wines to serve its evidence.

Regarding costs, the delegate declined to order costs against Cargo Road Wines. This decision was based on the fact that the hearing itself arose from an arguable official error, and it would be unfair to penalise Cargo Road Wines for acting on errant official advice. Wyrallah Holdings Pty Ltd was advised that it might equitably seek a refund of its hearing fee from the Trade Marks Office.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 19 March 2002, Charles Lane filed a Notice of Opposition ("NOO") on Form P/00/038 under the Patents Act 1990, opposing the registration of a trademark by Wyrallah Holdings Pty Ltd. Lane cited a ground of opposition based on prior use over two years, attaching photocopied pages of an interaction between Cargo Road Wines and a wine and bar accessory provider. However, the attached pages were not sworn, violating Trade Mark Regulation 21.17 which requires written evidence to be in the form of a declaration. Lane later acknowledged that the NOO was not validly filed. Subsequently, on 28 March 2002, Cargo Road Wines filed a proper NOO under The Trade Marks Act 1995, citing grounds under sections 58, 60, and subsection 44(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. The deadline for Cargo to serve evidence in support of its opposition passed on 28 June 2002, and Wyrallah did not serve any evidence by its due date of 28 September 2002.

Following this, Lane contacted the Trade Marks Office and discovered that the evidence he believed supported Cargo's opposition had not been considered by the Office. A Senior Examiner then informed Cargo that the material was not in proper form for evidence and outlined procedures for opposition, including the possibility of applying for an extension of time to serve evidence. Cargo applied for an extension, submitting a statutory declaration by Lane explaining the delay, and fees for the extension were waived due to an alleged error by a trade marks officer. Wyrallah opposed the extension and the matter was heard on 14 March 2003, with Wyrallah represented by Mr. James Swift, a principal of the company. Cargo did not appear or submit written submissions, and the relationship between Lane and Cargo was not disclosed.

The procedural history of the case Wyrallah Holdings Pty Ltd v Cargo Road Wines commenced when a Notice of Opposition (NOO) was filed on 19 March 2002 by Charles Lane in relation to a trade mark application made by Wyrallah Holdings Pty Ltd. This initial NOO, which cited prior use as a ground for opposition, was not filed in compliance with the relevant regulations and was subsequently acknowledged as invalid. On 28 March 2002, Cargo Road Wines filed a valid NOO citing multiple grounds for opposition under the Trade Marks Act 1995. Despite the deadline for serving evidence in support of the opposition passing on 28 June 2002, Wyrallah failed to serve any evidence by the extended due date of 28 September 2002. Following this, Cargo Road Wines sought an extension of time to serve evidence in support of its NOO, citing errors in advice from the Trade Marks Office. Wyrallah opposed this application for an extension of time. The matter was heard by a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks on 14 March 2003 in Canberra. Cargo Road Wines did not appear or submit written submissions, and the application for an extension of time was ultimately refused. In the decision, the Hearing Officer noted that while there was an official error in the advice provided by the Trade Marks Office, this did not warrant an extension of time. Additionally, the Hearing Officer declined to award costs against Cargo Road Wines, finding it unfair to do so given the error originated from official advice.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

A Notice of Opposition ("NOO") was initially 'filed' on 19 March 2002 in the name of Charles Lane of 227 Old Canterbury Road, Dulwich Hill, New South Wales. This NOO was on Form P/00/038, a NOO under the Patents Act 1990 and Mr Lane appears to have agreed that it was not validly filed. The ground stated on the NOO was that, "Over two years prior use. Some evidence attached, more can be provided." Appended to the NOO are three photocopied pages purporting to show an interaction between Cargo and a wine and bar accessory provider. These three pages are not sworn - ie, if the NOO had been properly filed, the pages would not comply with Trade Mark Regulation 21.17 which states, inter alia:21.17 Evidence in proceedings(1)Evidence that is given in writing in any proceedings before the Registrar must be in the form of a declaration. Mr Lane appears, as I have said, to have agreed that this was not a validly filed NOO. Subsequently, on 28 March 2002, Cargo filed a NOO ("the second NOO") on the correct form under The Trade Marks Act 1995, ("the Act") which is in the name of Cargo Road Wines, of Orange. This NOO cites three grounds, these being under sections 58, 60 and subsection 44(1)(a)(ii) of the Act stating, in regard to the latter, that, "Trade mark will be sought by Cargo Road Wines". The time allowed for service of evidence in support of the opposition elapsed on 28 June 2002. Wyrallah, the applicant for registration, did not serve or file evidence in answer by its due date of 28 September 2002. Thereafter, Mr Lane initiated a telephone conversation with an officer the Trade Marks Office and discovered that what he, Mr Lane, had regarded as being evidence in support of the Cargo opposition had not been so regarded by the Office. Subsequently, a Senior Examiner of the Hearings Section wrote to Cargo stating, inter alia, that, "Somebody should have advised you that your material was not in the proper form for evidence and therefore would not be taken into consideration when the opposition came to be decided." The Senior Examiner outlined some opposition procedures and advised Cargo of its capacity to apply for an extension of time in which to serve and file evidence in support. Cargo was also advised by the Senior Examiner that a statutory declaration should be provided explaining why it had not applied for an extension of time before the final date of 28 June 2002 had passed and that fees in respect of the extension of time would be waived as the need for an extension of time was the result of an error or omission by a trade marks officer. Cargo elected to apply for an extension of time in which to serve evidence in support and Wyrallah has opposed allowance of the extension. I heard the matter as a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, in Canberra on 14 March 2003. Mr James Swift, a principal of Wyrallah, appeared for Wyrallah. Cargo did not appear, was not represented and did not put in written submissions. The statutory declaration put in, in support of the application for extension of time, is by Charles Lane and his relationship with Cargo is not stated.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Inasmuch as regulation 21.24 might have applied to the circumstances before me, there has been no error or omission on the part of a trade marks officer.Decision I refuse to extend the period of time in which to serve evidence in support.Costs Wyrallah requested its costs should it be successful in these proceedings. I explained to Mr Swift at the hearing that most costs relate to professional expenses incurred in relation to proceedings, as set out in Schedule 8 to the regulations. Wyrallah has, in essence, represented itself and has not incurred professional expenses and might, subject to my comments in paragraph 29, below, therefore, only claim its costs in relation to Division 2 of Schedule 8 to the regulations which provides:Division 1 Expenses1. A person who has paid a fee prescribed in these regulations in relation to proceedings before the Registrar may be paid the amount of the fee. 2. A person attending proceedings before the Registrar must be paid: (a)a reasonable amount for allowances for transport between the usual place of residence of the person and the place that he or she attends for that purpose; and (b)if the person is required to be absent overnight from his or her usual place of residence — a reasonable amount for allowances up to a daily maximum of $405 for meals and accommodation. However, the need for a hearing resulted from, inter alia, an officer's incorrect conclusion that an office error had arisen, consequent to a misapprehension that material irrelevant to these proceedings did, in fact, form a part of them. This factor, combined with a misattribution of responsibilities, vis-à-vis the conformity of evidence with the regulations, may constitute, in the circumstances of this matter, an official error and the issue before me has directly resulted from this. It would further compound that error were I to order costs against Cargo since an arguable error which gave rise to the hearing was an official one: it would be manifestly unfair to Cargo if it were ordered to pay Wyrallah's costs in circumstances which arguably resulted from Cargo's actions in acting upon errant official advice. An order as to costs is, in terms of section 221 of the Act, a discretionary power of the Registrar and the word 'must', used in item 2 of Div 1 to Schedule 8, above, thus refers only to what may be claimed and must be paid after an order as to cost has been made. I do not, therefore, order costs against Cargo. Wyrallah might, in all of these circumstances, equitably seek a refund of the hearing fee from the Trade Marks Office and, if it applies for the refund, it will be refunded. There is no mechanism provided under the Act or regulations by which Wyrallah may seek recompense for its other expenses.Ian ThompsonHearing OfficerTrade Marks Hearings8 May 2003

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court commenced its analysis by assessing the validity of the initial Notice of Opposition filed on 19 March 2002. The Notice was filed on Form P/00/038, which pertains to the Patents Act 1990, rather than the appropriate form under the Trade Marks Act 1995. This misstep rendered the Notice invalid as it did not comply with Trade Mark Regulation 21.17, which mandates that written evidence must be in the form of a declaration. Additionally, the attached evidence was not sworn, further invalidating the Notice. The implications of this invalidity are significant; it underscores the necessity for strict compliance with procedural requirements in opposition proceedings. Given that the invalid Notice did not trigger the statutory timelines for subsequent actions, it did not prejudice Wyrallah, the applicant for registration.

The court further deliberated on whether the Trade Marks Office had a responsibility to advise Cargo Road Wines that the evidence provided was not in the proper form. The Senior Examiner acknowledged that someone should have informed Cargo that their material was not considered proper evidence. This admission suggests a procedural lapse on the part of the Office, which may have misled Cargo regarding the acceptability of their evidence. The court found that while the Office has an obligation to guide applicants on procedural compliance, this lapse did not constitute an official error warranting an extension of time.

Addressing the sufficiency of the statutory declaration provided by Charles Lane, the court scrutinized the explanation for why Cargo Road Wines did not apply for an extension of time before the final date of 28 June 2002. The declaration was insufficient as it did not adequately explain why Cargo had not acted sooner, particularly given the earlier, albeit invalid, Notice of Opposition. The court's scrutiny of the declaration's sufficiency highlights the necessity for clear and comprehensive explanations in such contexts to justify extensions.

The court then considered whether the period of time in which to serve evidence in support should be extended. Given the absence of an official error and the insufficiency of the statutory declaration, the court refused to extend the time period. The decision underscores the importance of procedural correctness and the consequences of failing to adhere to prescribed timelines.

In the context of costs, the court assessed whether Wyrallah Holdings Pty Ltd should be awarded costs for the proceedings. The court found against awarding costs to Wyrallah, noting that the proceedings arose from an official error. Awarding costs to Wyrallah in such circumstances would be unfair, given that the error was attributable to the Trade Marks Office. Instead, the court suggested that Wyrallah might seek a refund of the hearing fee, reflecting a measure of equitable relief.

Finally, the court examined whether there is a mechanism under the Trade Marks Act 1995 or the Trade Mark Regulations 1995 for Wyrallah to seek recompense for other expenses incurred due to the proceedings. The court concluded that no such mechanism exists, emphasizing the limitations of the statutory provisions in addressing additional costs beyond those prescribed in the regulations.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that strict compliance with procedural requirements in opposition proceedings is essential, and while the Trade Marks Office has an obligation to guide applicants, failure to do so does not necessarily warrant extensions of time. Additionally, the court's discretionary power to award costs is circumscribed by considerations of fairness, particularly where proceedings arise from official errors.