WWZ v State of Queensland

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

WWZ v State of Queensland [2023] QDC 62

PARTIES:

WWZ

(applicant/plaintiff)

v

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

(respondent/defendant)

FILE NO/S:

2937 of 2020

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane District Court

DELIVERED ON:

21 April 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

23 August 2022

JUDGE:

Byrne KC DCJ

ORDERS:

1.   Within seven calendar days, the parties are to file an agreed form of order in the nature of the order proposed by the respondent or, if agreement cannot be reached, both parties are to exchange and file submissions limited to three pages concerned with the same subject matter, and additionally draft orders, within seven calendar days.

2.   Within seven calendar days, each party is to exchange and file submissions, limited to three pages, as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEEDURE RULES 1999 - SERVICE - personal service – where a solicitor indicates that she is authorised to accept service – where service is effected by email on the solicitor – where the solicitor later asserts an inability to accept service given the nature of the material served – whether service was properly effected.

COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEEDURE RULES 1999 – ADMISSIBILITY – where objection is taken to the admissibility of certain parts of an affidavit on the basis that it relates to information and belief only – where it is said that the application is for final relief – whether the application is in fact for final relief.

TORTS – DAMAGES – ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT – CONSTRUCTION - where the parties entered into a settlement agreement including payment of money – where the respondent declines to pay under the agreement and asserts a right to set-off that amount against liability in a different proceedings where the applicant has been joined as a third-party – whether the agreement should be enforced or the applicant required to plead a statement of claim for the amount owed in lieu of the present application.

LEGISLATION:

Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld), s 194.

District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 68.

Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) s 6, s 7.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 14, r 31, r 105, r 115, r 191, r 371, r 430, r 658.

CASES:

Ex parte Britt [1987] 1 Qd R 221.

Gallagher v Boylan [2013] 1 Qd R 204.

Westpac Banking Corporation v Zilzie Pty Ltd [2017] 2 Qd R 214.

COUNSEL:

Mr. M. Eliades for the applicant/plaintiff.
Mr C. Coulsen for the respondent/defendant.

SOLICITORS:

Shine Lawyers for the applicant/plaintiff.
Crown Solicitor for the respondent/defendant.

Introduction

  1. On 19 October 2020 the applicant[1] commenced a claim in this Court against the respondent for damages for personal injuries suffered while under the care of the respondent.

    [1]These reasons have been anonymised in order to ensure compliance with s. 194(1) of the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld).

  2. On 20 April 2022 the parties participated in a mediation, the result of which was a…

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Details
Case
[2023] QDC 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of WWZ v State of Queensland, involved the plaintiff, WWZ, seeking enforcement of a settlement agreement against the State of Queensland. The dispute centred on whether WWZ was entitled to immediate payment of $240,000 under the settlement agreement, or if the application should be dismissed and an amended statement of claim filed instead. The State of Queensland argued that the settlement figure could be set off against any liability in separate proceedings (the NW proceedings), and therefore, the application for immediate payment should be denied. Additionally, the State raised objections to certain paragraphs in WWZ's affidavit, arguing they were based on information and belief and therefore inadmissible.

The legal issues before the court included whether service on WWZ's solicitor was properly effected, the admissibility of certain parts of the affidavit, and whether the settlement agreement could be enforced or if WWZ should be required to plead a statement of claim instead. The court found that service was properly effected as the solicitor had indicated authority to accept service, despite later asserting a conflict of interest. Regarding the affidavit, the court ruled that certain paragraphs were admissible as they related to the expected disbursements from the settlement figure and were not solely based on information and belief.

The court also considered whether the settlement agreement should be enforced or if WWZ should be required to plead a statement of claim. It determined that while the settlement agreement appeared to grant an indemnity, it was not clear that the State of Queensland would be entitled to rely on it as an equitable set-off in the present proceedings. The court found that the settlement agreement did not specifically refer to the NW proceedings, and the third-party proceedings had been initiated well before the settlement agreement was executed. Consequently, the court did not make a final determination but noted that it might be unfair to allow the set-off in those circumstances.

In conclusion, the court ordered that within seven days, the parties were to file an agreed form of order in the nature of the order proposed by the respondent or, if agreement could not be reached, exchange and file submissions limited to three pages and draft orders. Additionally, each party was to exchange and file submissions limited to three pages on the subject of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Within seven calendar days, the parties are to file an agreed form of order in the nature of the order proposed by the respondent or, if agreement cannot be reached, both parties are to exchange and file submissions limited to three pages concerned with the same subject matter, and additionally draft orders, within seven calendar days.

2. Within seven calendar days, each party is to exchange and file submissions, limited to three pages, as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondent’s position is that the application should be dismissed, and instead orders made requiring the filing of an amended statement of claim in the present action, and a timetable set for the filing of material, including any application for summary judgment by the applicant on the amended statement of claim.[13] That is said to be justified because:1)The applicant purports to make the present application under r 31 of the UCPR but has not pleaded an actual entitlement to the sum of $240,000, nor has he applied for summary judgment in the present action in reliance on the settlement agreement.2)The respondent has an arguable - it says strongly arguable - case for a set-off against the applicant, whether it be a statutory set-off or one based in equity.3)The terms of the settlement agreement do not preclude the respondent setting off the settlement figure against any liability it incurs in the NW proceedings. As such, and given the amended defence in the present proceeding includes a claim for an indemnity to set-off any liability in the NW proceedings which has not been responded to, the present application for an order requiring immediate payment of the settlement figure must be refused. The appropriate order is to provide a timetable for the filing of documents, including any application for summary judgment by the applicant on the counterclaim.[13]Although not expressly stated, I understood the essence of that submission to be based on the powers provided by r 14 of the UCPR.Admissibility of evidence – a preliminary issue The applicant has read an affidavit on this application of a solicitor, Ms Nicole Miethke, sworn 22 August 2022. The respondent objects to paragraphs 3, 6, 9 and 10 on the basis that the applicant’s application is for final relief and those paragraphs are based on information and belief, and thereby inadmissible.[14] The applicant contends that the present application “is an interlocutory application in a pending claim”[15] and so assertions based on information and belief are admissible.[14]Rule 430(2) of the UCPR.[15]Ts 1-7, ll 33-36. Paragraphs 3, 6 and 10 are self-evidently assertions based on information and belief. Paragraph 9 is not unambiguously such, but it (along with paragraphs 7 and 8 to which objection is not taken) deals with expected disbursements from the settlement figure. The respondent has not satisfied me that the contents of that paragraph are based on information and belief, as opposed to the deponent’s own knowledge of the state of those affairs as the solicitor with carriage of the matter. With respect, the admissibility of paragraphs 3, 6 and 10 is not resolved by a determination of whether the application is interlocutory in nature, or not. Although that was previously the test,[16] r 430 of the UCPR introduced a change. In Gallagher v Boylan[17] Fraser JA held:“The rule’s predecessor, O 41, r 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, allowed hearsay in “interlocutory motions or applications”. In Ex parte Britt, McPherson J (as he then was) analysed authorities which drew a distinction between “interlocutory” and “final” applications for various purposes and held that an application was final rather than interlocutory for the purposes of O 41, r 3 if “… the decision of the application will finally dispose of the rights of the parties, not merely as to the subject-matter of the particular application in question but also as to the ultimate dispute between the parties …”. The terms of UCPR r 430(2) differ from O 41, r 3 because the former focuses upon the nature of the relief sought in the application, rather than upon the nature of the application itself. Allowing for that textual change, I would state the applicable test as being that hearsay evidence is not made admissible by r 430 if the grant of the relief claimed in the application would finally dispose of the rights of the parties as to the ultimate dispute between the parties, rather than merely as to the subject matter of the application itself.” (footnote omitted)[16]Ex parte Britt [1987] 1 Qd R 221.[17][2013] 1 Qd R 204, [15].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In those circumstances, it is open to consider that the authority was held by the solicitors to accept service, but upon the realisation there was a conflict of interest, the applicant was given the documentation personally and advised to get other legal representation. Given the view that I have taken, the material was properly served. The applicant has not demonstrated the contrary to be the case.Consideration of the determinative issues The respondent contends that as the present application is neither an application for summary judgment[31] nor in truth an interlocutory application, the applicant should be required to plead its claim and thereby allow the exchange of pleadings, including the raising of the counterclaim and indemnity. That, it is said, would also allow an application for summary judgment to be brought by the applicant plaintiff, if he wished.[31]Rule 292 of the UCPR. While it is true that the applicant could not point to any power to award judgment on the application in its present form, other than the general power under s 68 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967, a power does in fact exist at r 658 of the UCPR provided that “the nature of the case requires” that the order be made. In that sense the applicant is entitled to proceed as he has, but it does require an assessment of whether the settlement agreement is immediately enforceable against the respondent. That is an issue of construction of the settlement agreement. Clause 4.1(b) of the settlement agreement appears at face value to grant the indemnity that the respondent now relies on. However it is, in my view, not clear that the respondent would be entitled to in fact rely on that indemnity as an equitable set-off in the present proceedings, as its submissions suggest it is more soundly entitled to. While there seems to be an indemnity granted in the settlement agreement, and there is an absence of a “no set-off clause” in that agreement[32] and there would seem to be the necessary connection required to establish an entitlement to an equitable set-off,[33] there are some features that tend against allowing the reliance on that equitable set-off. Notably, they include the fact that the settlement agreement does not specifically refer to the NW proceedings, nor that the third-party proceedings had been commenced, and served, well prior to whatever date the settlement agreement was finally executed. [32]Westpac Banking Corporation v Zilzie Pty Ltd [2017] 2 Qd R 214, [45]-[47].[33]Forsyth v Gibbs [2008] QCA 103, [9]-[10]. While I make no final determination, it may, after full argument, be considered to be fundamentally unfair to allow reliance on the counter- claim and indemnity as a set-off in those circumstances, and where the respondent effectively seeks to quarantine the settlement amount to call upon in the event that both the applicant’s and respondent’s liability are each established in the NW proceedings when that quarantining is not recognised for in the settlement agreement itself. On the other hand, I have accepted that the applicant was personally aware of the third-party proceedings well before the execution of the settlement agreement and he might be thought to have been aware of a risk that the sum would be “quarantined” when he entered into the settlement agreement. Also there has been no application for a freezing order over the proceeds of the settlement. That is another feature which might be relevant to the reliance on an equitable set-off, if that is what is to be relied upon.