Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 642

MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) – meaning of ‘special need relative’ – whether encompasses normal parent/child relationship – whether medical evidence disclosing only minor matters sufficient to justify classification as ‘special needs relative’

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476
Migration Regulations 1994 r 1.03

Shan E Huang v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (Jenkinson, Hill and Lehane JJ, 29 November 1996, unreported)

GUI RENG WU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1137 of 1999

BRANSON J
SYDNEY
17 MAY 2000

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1137 of 1999

BETWEEN:

GUI RENG WU
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MAY 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The decision of the Migration Review Tribunal be affirmed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1137 of 1999

BETWEEN:

GUI RENG WU
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

17 MAY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. By an application dated 5 October 1999 the applicant (“Ms Wu”) has sought review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) whereby the Tribunal affirmed a decision to refuse Ms Wu a subclass 806 – Family, (Class AG) Change in circumstances (Residence) visa or any other subclass of visa in the same class.  The applicant claims to be a “special need relative” of one or other or both of her de facto husband, Mr Weng, or their infant son, Norris Weng.

  2. No grounds of review under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) are identified by the application which appears to have been completed without legal assistance. However the respondent did not move for the summary disposal or stay of the proceeding. At the hearing Mr Weng, who is not a legal practitioner, was granted leave to appear on behalf of Ms Wu.

    STATUTORY PROVISIONS

  3. Ms Wu applied for a subclass 806 – Family (Class AG) Change in circumstances (Residence) visa on 5 December 1997. The critical criterion so far as her application was concerned was that she was a “special need relative” of an settled Australian citizen usually resident in Australia or a settled Australian permanent resident usually resident in Australia (Schedule 2, Migration Regulations 1994). Each of Mr Weng and Norris Weng is a citizen of Australia. At the time of Ms Wu’s application, “settled” and “special need relative” were defined in regulation 1.03 of the Migration Regulations 1994 as follows:

    ‘… “settled”, in relation to an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen, means lawfully resident in Australia for a reasonable period;

    …

    … “special…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 642
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Wu was the applicant in the case of Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant sought a review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal, which had dismissed her application for a partner visa on the grounds that she did not meet the criteria for a "special needs relative." The applicant argued that she should be granted a partner visa to remain in Australia to care for her son, who she claimed had serious health issues.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's interpretation of the definition of "special needs relative" was correct. The applicant contended that the Tribunal had misinterpreted the definition by failing to consider the health issues of her son as a "serious circumstance" that would qualify her as a special needs relative. The court had to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and whether it was based on a correct interpretation of the relevant legislation.

The court found that the Tribunal's decision was correct and that the applicant did not meet the definition of a special needs relative. The court noted that the Tribunal had considered the evidence presented by the applicant and found that there was no evidence of serious health issues in the child that would warrant assistance under the definition. The court also found that the applicant's desire to remain in Australia to care for her son was not sufficient to qualify her as a special needs relative. The court held that the definition of special needs relative required evidence of a disability or other serious circumstance affecting the nominator or a member of their family unit, which was not present in this case.

The court affirmed the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was based on a correct interpretation of the relevant legislation and that there were no grounds for review. The court also found that the applicant's arguments were without merit and that the Tribunal's decision was supported by the evidence before it.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Migration Review Tribunal be affirmed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, who is 41 years old, is living in a de facto relationship and has one child. She attended a hearing on 29 July 1999 without her nominator, who is the child's father. The father did not attend the hearing because he was at home caring for the child. The Tribunal asked for evidence that the father was an Australian citizen, which was produced in the form of his passport. The files contained evidence of certain health problems of the nominator, but the applicant could not establish that any follow up treatment or examinations of the child were undertaken for some considerable time since the first claims of medical problems were made. The applicant conceded that she wanted to stay in Australia to care for her son, as she did not trust the father to care for the child on a correct and proper basis. The medical evidence disclosed only minor matters, which have not been supported by medical evidence that would bring the applicant within the definition of a special care relative.

The matter was initially heard by the Migration Review Tribunal, which dismissed the applicant's application for an entry permit as a special needs relative. The applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Court of Australia. The application for judicial review was dismissed by the primary judge of the Federal Court, who affirmed the decision of the Tribunal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J
Issues
1. Whether the Tribunal erred in finding that the definition of special need relative is not met.
2. Whether the Tribunal's decision reveals a ground of review under s 476 of the Act.

Held
1. Whether the Tribunal erred in finding that the definition of special need relative is not met. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not err in finding that the definition of special need relative was not met. The applicant's desire to stay in Australia to care for her son did not constitute a "serious circumstance" under the definition of a special need relative.
2. Whether the Tribunal's decision reveals a ground of review under s 476 of the Act. The court concluded that there was no ground of review under s 476 of the Act. The applicant's argument that the Tribunal's decision was erroneous was not successful.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J

The Tribunal at paras 7-11 of its decision stated:“7.The only evidence presented in support of this application is to the following effect:The Applicant is 41 years of age, living in a defacto relationship with 1 child. The applicant attended a hearing on 29 July 1999 without the nominator. The father of the nominator did not attend the hearing, as he was at home caring for the child. The Tribunal asked for evidence that the father was an Australian citizen and his passport was produced. The files contained evidence of certain health problems of the nominator, but under questioning the Applicant could not establish that any follow up treatment or examinations of the child were undertaken for some considerable time since the first claims of medical problems were made. Claims were made, in the file and at the hearing, as to the health problems of the father of the child. The evidence given by the Applicant confirmed that the father was well enough to travel to China during April/May 1997. The Applicant conceded that she wanted to stay in Australia to care for her son, as she did not trust the father to care for the child on a correct and proper basis. The medical evidence discloses only minor matters, which have not been supported by medical evidence that would bring the Applicant within the definition of a special care relative.8.The mere fact that the Applicant is the mother of an Australian citizen child, is not sufficient, in itself, for the Applicant to have grounds to apply for an entry permit “as a special needs relative”. The Tribunal has previously held that childhood alone is not a “disability” or “other serious circumstance” giving rise to a need for assistance within the definition of a “special need relative”. There must be evidence that the child has some illness or disability beyond merely being a child and there is no such evidence in this case.9.The above is essentially the evidence.10.Based on the evidence, I find that the definition of special need relative is not met.11.The only evidence of assistance which is needed in this case is for domestic assistance and for babysitting. Such need for assistance does not satisfy the relevant part of the definition of special need relative as set out earlier, because it does not arise from death, disability or other serious circumstances effecting the Nominator or a member of his family unit.”CONSIDERATION As the application identifies no grounds of review under s 476 of the Act, it has been necessary to give consideration to the matters raised by Mr Weng for the purpose of determining whether they give rise to a ground of review under s 476 of the Act. I have also considered whether the written reasons of the Tribunal reveal the existence of a ground of review under s 476 of the Act having regard to the evidence and other material before the Tribunal. In Shan E Huang v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (Jenkinson, Hill and Lehane JJ, 29 November 1996, unreported) Hill J, with whom Jenkinson and Lehane JJ agreed on this point, held that the definition of “‘special need relative’ … should not be construed so as to include every case involving a child of tender years unable to care for himself or herself.” His Honour observed that “[i]t is hardly conceivable that the expression “serious circumstances” should reflect merely the tender age of a person.”