Wrightson v State of Queensland

The appeal in Wrightson v State of Queensland was heard by the Queensland Court of Appeal. The respondent, a former covert police operative, had developed a psychiatric disorder and applied for medical retirement on 4 October 2000. The appellant, the State of Queensland, granted the respondent’s application for retirement from 9 March 2001. The respondent subsequently commenced a personal injuries claim against the appellant on 20 December 2001. The appellant contended that the claim was barred by limitation periods under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The respondent applied for an extension of time to bring the claim, which the trial judge granted, finding that material facts decisive to the respondent’s cause of action were not known to the respondent until after the limitation period had expired.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the appellant's acceptance of the respondent's retirement application constituted a new "material fact of a decisive character" that justified extending the limitation period. The court examined whether the respondent's cause of action accrued when the respondent first became aware of the material facts or whether the cause of action accrued at a later date. The court also considered the meaning of "material facts of a decisive character" and whether the acceptance of the retirement application could be considered a new material fact that was not within the respondent's means of knowledge until the acceptance date.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondent’s cause of action accrued when the respondent became aware of the material facts leading to the psychiatric disorder, not when the appellant accepted the retirement application. The court held that the acceptance of the retirement application was not a new material fact of a decisive character that could justify an extension of the limitation period. The court concluded that the respondent had knowledge of the material facts sufficient to bring the claim within the limitation period, and thus, the trial judge erred in granting an extension of time. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal.