Wright v The State of Western Australia
[2010] WASCA 14
•29 JANUARY 2010
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: WRIGHT -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2010] WASCA 14
CORAM: McLURE P
OWEN JA
WHEELER JA
HEARD: 2 DECEMBER 2009
DELIVERED : 29 JANUARY 2010
FILE NO/S: CACR 90 of 2009
BETWEEN: JAMES PATRICK WRIGHT
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :McKECHNIE J
File No :INS 147 of 2008
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Sentencing - Arson and other offences - Whether sufficient allowance given for plea of guilty and voluntary disclosures - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Application for an extension of time refused
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Mr D Dempster
Solicitors:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Histon v The Queen (Unreported, WASCA, Library No 970197, 1 May 1997)
Newton v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 247
R v Catts (1996) 85 A Crim R 171
Ryan v The Queen [2001] HCA 21; (2001) 206 CLR 267
The State of Western Australia v Bennett [2009] WASCA 93
The State of Western Australia v Warburton [2004] WASCA 228
Wimbridge v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196
McLURE P: I agree with Owen JA.
OWEN JA: This is an appeal against a sentence of immediate imprisonment of 3 years and 3 months for the offence of criminal damage by fire on the ground that it is manifestly excessive. The appellant was sentenced for other offences and the total term imposed was 6 years and 3 months.
The appellant applies for an extension of time within which to appeal and leave to appeal. The appellant and the respondent both seek leave to rely on new evidence in the appeal. The applications for leave to appeal, for an extension of time within which to appeal and for leave to rely on new evidence were referred through to be heard with the appeal.
Offences and sentences
The appellant was charged in an indictment dated 29 October 2008 with five offences. The indictment alleged that:
(1)On 21 May 2006 at Gosnells [the appellant], while in the place of Stalker Engineering Pty Ltd trading as Stalker Pumps without its consent, committed the offence of criminal damage.
(2)On the same date and at the same place [the appellant] wilfully and unlawfully damaged a building and its contents the property of Stalker Engineering Pty Ltd.
And that the property was damaged by fire.
(3)On 5 August 2006 at Maddington [the appellant] stole from [AD‑B] with threats of violence, a sum of money the property of White Gum Petroleum Pty Ltd trading as Peak Maddington.
And that [the appellant] was armed with a dangerous weapon namely a semi-automatic pistol.
(4)On or about 1 February 2008 at Maddington [the appellant] stole a motor vehicle, namely a BMW sedan… the property of [SDS].
(5)On 1 February 2008 at Maddington [the appellant] wilfully and unlawfully destroyed a motor vehicle namely a BMW sedan…
And that the motor vehicle was destroyed by fire.
The appellant was also charged with six offences set out in a notice issued under s 32 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). The notice contained two counts of stealing a motor vehicle (charge numbers 49160/08 and 49161/08), two counts of burglary (charge numbers 49165/08 and
48305/08), one count of burglary on a dwelling (charge number 49167/08) and one count of stealing (charge number 48304/08).
The appellant pleaded guilty to all the offences in the indictment and all of the offences in the s 32 notice except the stealing charge. The prosecution discontinued the stealing charge and accepted the guilty pleas in full satisfaction of the indictment and of the s 32 notice. The appellant was sentenced by McKechnie J on 15 January 2009. Details of the counts, charges and individual sentences are set out in the Schedule. The practical effect of the sentencing was the imposition of cumulative terms of 3 years and 3 months for count 2 and 3 years for count 3 and concurrent terms each of 2 years or less on each other count or charge.
This yielded a total effective sentence of 6 years and 3 months' immediate imprisonment. The sentence was backdated to 14 August 2008, the date the appellant was taken into custody. The appellant was made eligible for parole.
Relevant facts
Although the appeal relates solely to the sentence for count 2 on the indictment; namely criminal damage by fire at the premises of Stalker Pumps, I will need to say something about the facts relating to the other charges in the indictment and in the s 32 notice. I will deal first with counts 1 and 2 and then relate the facts for the other offences in the date order in which they occurred.
On 21 May 2006 at around 2.00 am the appellant entered the premises of Stalker Pumps in company with another or others. He removed a safety vest from an unlocked vehicle parked in the compound and smashed the glass of the office manager's window. He then walked to a second building, the main office, and smashed the rear window before climbing inside (count 1). The appellant searched the office, opening drawers and cupboards looking for money. A shelf holding lever arch files was located and combustible material on the shelf was ignited causing damage (count 2).
According to the appellant someone else lit the fire although he acknowledges he was present at the time. The appellant then ran off after exiting through the smashed window. The prosecutor stated, and the sentencing judge accepted, that the damage caused by the fire was in excess of $100,000, but that finding is challenged in this appeal. This is the matter to which I return shortly.
Between 6 December 2005 and 7 December 2005 the appellant entered the yard of Access Office Industries in Kenwick with the intention of stealing a car, apparently for the purpose of providing transport to his home. The appellant located a panel van in the yard and found that it was unlocked with the keys in the ignition. He started the vehicle and drove it out of the compound, damaging the metal gate as he left (charge 49160/08). He abandoned the car in Gosnells and walked the short distance to his home.
On 11 December 2005 at around 3.00 am the appellant was walking through the car park of Burswood Casino after having spent the night in the casino with some friends. He saw a vehicle which was stationary with its engine running. He sat in the driver’s seat and drove out of the car park, crashing through a closed boom gate (charge 49161/08). The appellant then became aware that there was a female passenger sitting in the back seat. He stopped the car with the intention of running off, but instead the passenger got out and the appellant drove off. He drove the car to Gosnells where he abandoned it and walked the short distance to his home.
Sometime between 10.00 am on 29 September 2006 and about 2.00 pm on 3 October 2006 the appellant went to a dwelling in Gosnells with the intention of breaking in to steal money. He entered the house by sliding open the front bedroom window which was slightly ajar. Once inside, the appellant searched the house for items to steal. In the master bedroom he found a safe on the floor of a wardrobe. He forced open the safe, which contained $4,500 in cash. He stole the money and left the house through the front bedroom window (charge 49167/08).
On 10 June 2006 at about 10.30 pm the appellant was at the premises of a business called WA Guns and Ammo in Maddington. He walked to the rear of the premises, climbed onto the roof, smashed a hole in the asbestos ceiling and lowered himself into the workshop area. He stole a double-barrel shotgun and a semi-automatic pistol, together worth $1,500 (charge 49165/08). He was later to use one of these weapons in a robbery.
On 5 August 2006 at about 7.00 pm the appellant entered a service station in Maddington. He walked up to the counter and asked for a packet of cigarettes. As the shop-attendant turned to obtain the cigarettes the appellant pulled a semi-automatic pistol from his jumper and pointed it at her, demanding money (count 3). When the cash tray was placed on the counter the appellant reached in with one hand and removed notes while still pointing the pistol at the shop-attendant with the other. The appellant then ran off, after telling the shop‑attendant not to move. He used the money to buy drugs.
Between 11.00 pm on 31 January 2008 and 2.30 am on 1 February 2008 the appellant entered the commercial premises of Mark Regional Sealander in Maddington by jumping a wire fence. His intention was to steal money from cars. He opened an unlocked BMW sedan and looked through the glove-box and central console. He located the keys in the driver's foot well and decided to steal the car. The appellant drove the car from the yard, ramming through the front gates and smashing the headlights and indicators (count 4).
The appellant drove around in the car for a short time before picking up a friend. After they had driven around together for some time, the friend suggested that they burn the car so they would not be identified as the offenders. The appellant parked the car at an intersection in Maddington. He then used the vehicle's cigarette lighter to ignite large bundles of paper on the rear seat. The fire took hold and quickly engulfed the car, causing $10,000 worth of damage (count 5). The appellant and his friend fled on foot from the scene.
On 13 May 2008 the police spoke to the appellant after a beanie with his DNA on it was found near the location where the armed robbery (count 3) had occurred. The appellant denied all knowledge of the offence and was released.
On 6 August 2008 at approximately 7.20 pm the appellant climbed onto the roof of business premises in Osborne Park. He damaged a glass skylight-type window to gain access to the building. Once inside, the appellant stole $320 in cash from the cash register, a gram of cannabis from the office and a stun gun (charge 48304/08). Later in the evening the appellant smoked the cannabis and used the money to buy amphetamines. He also sold the stun gun for $100.
On 11 August 2008 the police again spoke to the appellant after his fingerprints were identified on glass from the Stalker Pumps premises. He was also re-questioned about the robbery. He denied all knowledge and was released. Later that day he contacted the police and indicated that he wanted to clear up the matters about which he had been questioned.
On 14 August 2008 the appellant attended the arson squad office and participated in a video record of interview. He made full admissions about his offending. The appellant was taken into custody and charged with the offences which I have outlined.
Damage done to Stalker Pumps
During the appellant's sentencing, counsel both for the prosecution and the defence, as well as the judge, seemed to proceed on the basis that the damage the subject of count 2 was in excess of $100,000.
In the statement of material facts dated 18 August 2008 it was said in relation to the damage the subject of count 2:
The building suffered significant damage in excess of $100,000 to the wall and roof as well as other contents.
During the sentencing hearing the prosecutor read out the material facts, including reference to the damage amount. Counsel for the appellant did not take issue with the estimate of the damage, saying at the beginning of his address 'Your Honour, the facts in essence are admitted'. The only matter which counsel disputed was whether the appellant had started the fire.
In his remarks the sentencing judge said:
Counts 1 and 2, you were looking for money but you set fire to business premises and caused over $100,000 worth of damage.
The appellant now argues that the damage done to the property was significantly less than $100,000.
Sentencing comments
The sentencing judge began by noting the seriousness of the offences with which the appellant had been charged. He noted that armed robbery, stealing guns, stealing cars and wilfully destroying property are all serious matters. In relation to count 2 his Honour said:
It is bad enough for a property owner to come to work and find the place smashed and generally broken into and maybe money stolen. It's disruptive, but to have the premises then burnt down must be devastating for the property owner. Records are lost, business is disrupted and you did that. Whether you did it alone or with others I cannot determine in view of your inconsistent answers but you knew. That is an offence of considerable seriousness.
In his Honour's view, the fact that the offences were committed over a three year period until shortly before he was charged indicated a serious and continuing criminality on the appellant's part.
The sentencing judge considered the appellant's personal circumstances. The appellant was almost 22 at the time of sentencing, but only 18 when the first of these offences were committed. He came from a loving and supportive family but had become involved in criminal activity through the use of drugs. The pre‑sentence, psychological and psychiatric reports disclosed that the appellant suffered from depression. Whether the appellant's depression precipitated his drug abuse or his drug abuse caused the depression was uncertain. Other symptoms of mental illness which he had suffered, such as a psychotic episode, were probably related to his drug use.
The sentencing judge noted that after being questioned about several of the offences, the appellant had contacted police, made confessions about his crimes and pleaded guilty to the charges. He said:
Your plea of guilty is of particular weight because it does indicate genuine remorse. You eventually came clean to the police and have pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity.
…
I also take into account your plea of guilty, the remorse and the other personal factors including your depression. All of those factors significantly moderate the sentences.
His Honour also took into account the appellant's youth, saying:
You started offending when you were still 18. Youth is always a mitigating factor, and a substantial mitigating factor. It enables judges to do things in relation to youths that they would not do in relation to mature people and I take full account of the fact that you were very young when these offences started and are still very young.
…
Your youth will have an effect because the sentence that I am about to impose on you is about half of that which I would have imposed on you if you were an adult.
After balancing the seriousness of the appellant's offending and the need to protect the community against the mitigating factors, including the appellant's youth, guilty plea and depression, the sentencing judge imposed a term of 3 years and 3 months on count 2 and a total effective sentence of 6 years and 3 months' imprisonment.
The ground of appeal
There is a single ground of appeal; namely, that the sentence imposed for the offence of wilfully destroying property by fire was, in all the circumstances, manifestly excessive. The 'circumstances', as particularised, are:
(a)the appellant's age;
(b)the plea of guilty; and
(c)the circumstances of the offence, in particular new evidence indicating that the monetary value of the property destroyed was less than that for which the appellant was sentenced.
As I have already indicated the appellant does not appeal against the effective overall sentence of 6 years and 3 months and nor does he challenge any of the individual sentences other than that for count 2: namely, criminal damage by fire at the Stalker Pumps premises. However, it must be assumed that the appellant's intent is to argue that the sentence on count 2 should be reduced and therefore, the total effective sentence would be reduced accordingly.
It seems that the appellant's real argument is that the sentence of 3 years and 3 months for count 2 is manifestly excessive because:
(a)the sentence proceeded on an incorrect fact; namely that the damage was in excess of $100,000 when it was only $20,000;
(b)the sentencing judge gave no, or no sufficient, weight to the appellant's youth and plea of guilty; and
(c)the sentence is outside the range of a proper sentence given the range of sentences commonly offered for offences of this type.
Application to rely on new evidence
It is convenient to deal first with the new evidence on which the parties seek to rely. The Fire and Emergency Authority (FESA) attended at the premises of Stalker Pumps on 21 May 2006 to contain and extinguish the blaze. On 21 May 2006 an officer of FESA created an incident report containing a lot of information about the premises and the fire and including these entries:
Estimated property loss: $10,000
Estimated contents loss: $10,000
Estimated total loss: $20,000
The appellant obtained a copy of the report in April 2009 and seeks to rely on it to support his contention that the value of the property damage was $20,000 rather than $100,000.
The property was insured and the State seeks to rely on an affidavit from an officer of the insurance company to the effect that a total of $111,445 was paid out on the claim.
There is no evidence as to the basis on which the estimates contained in the FESA incident report were prepared. No evidence was led as to the identity of the officer who made the estimate or as to her or his qualifications as a loss adjuster. The appellant did not challenge the veracity of the evidence that an amount of $111,445 was actually paid out on the insurance claim. The appellant did not argue, for example, that the claim had been lodged (either innocently or fraudulently) on an incorrect basis and accepted on that basis. It seems to me, therefore, that there is no foundation for the argument that the appellant was sentenced on a factual basis (relating to the value of the property damaged) that was wrong.
Appellant's youth and plea of guilty
It is apparent from the sentencing remarks that his Honour did have regard to the appellant's age, the plea of guilty and his expressions of remorse. He also had regard to the appellant's personal circumstances.
The appellant's youth
I have already mentioned something of what the sentencing judge said about the appellant's age. He also said that the sentence he was about to impose on the s 32 notice offences could be made concurrent solely due to the appellant's youth and the like. There may have been some hyperbole in the sentencing judge's comment that 'the sentence that I am about to impose on you is about half of that which I would have imposed on you if you were an adult'. Nonetheless, taken as a whole, I think the sentencing remarks show that his Honour was alive to the appellant's youth and had regard to it. This aspect of the challenge has not been made out.
The plea of guilty
The primary judge also had regard to the fact that the appellant had pleaded guilty to the offences. Ordinarily, a plea of guilty is a mitigating factor because it is usually indicative of remorse and evidences an acceptance of responsibility. In this case the sentencing judge accepted that the appellant had demonstrated genuine remorse. A guilty plea may also be of utilitarian value because of its capacity to demonstrate a willingness to facilitate the course of justice, to save the time and expense of a trial and because it may save victims of crime from the trauma of having to re‑live what happened to them in the course of preparing for, and giving, evidence. One circumstance that has elements of both the personal and utilitarian aspects that I have mentioned arises where the guilty plea follows a voluntary disclosure of the offences to the authorities.
It is well recognised that, when a conviction follows upon a plea of guilty that is itself the result of a voluntary disclosure of guilt by the offender, a further element of leniency enters into the sentencing process: Ryan v The Queen [2001] HCA 21; (2001) 206 CLR 267 [12], [92] ‑ [94]. The degree of leniency to be shown for the disclosure of unknown offences will depend on the likelihood that the guilt of the offender would have been discovered by the authorities and the likelihood of the guilt being established against the offender in court.
The appellant complains that the sentencing judge failed to take into account, or failed to pay sufficient regard to, the fact that he had voluntarily disclosed his offending to the police. He contends that he should have received a discount for the voluntary disclosure of guilt beyond the discount that he received for the early plea of guilty.
In the plea in mitigation defence counsel told the primary judge that in 2007 the appellant suffered a drug-induced psychosis at home. Police attended, restrained him and took him to hospital. Whilst in hospital he told his brother about the crimes that he had committed, not in detail, and subsequently the major crime squad were called and after questioning he confessed to some of the offences. But due to his fragile mental state police took the view that he was mentally unwell and the information that he provided to them was unreliable.
From the material that was before the sentencing judge, it appears that the appellant was spoken to by police on 13 May 2008 after his DNA was found on a red beanie that had been located by police near the scene of the armed robbery. The beanie had been identified by the shop attendant as similar to the one that was worn by the person who held up the service station. The appellant denied all knowledge of the offence and was released.
The appellant was again questioned by the police on 11 August 2009 after his fingerprint was found on a piece of broken glass at Stalker Pumps. He was also questioned again about the armed robbery. He denied any knowledge of those offences and was released.
Later that day the appellant contacted the police and indicated that he wanted to clear up the matters that he had been questioned about earlier that day. On 14 August 2008 he attended the arson squad office and participated in a video record of interview. In the interview he confessed to all the matters the subject of the indictment and the s 32 notice. At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor said:
[T]he state recognises that not only has there been an early plea of guilty but rather extraordinarily, the offender voluntarily admitted his guilt and his participation in these offences.
It is difficult to tell from the materials available on appeal exactly what information the authorities had in relation to these offences. But if the primary reason for the interest which they had in the appellant was the fingerprints on the glass (count 2) and the red beanie (count 4), I think it can fairly be said that the voluntary disclosures made by the appellant were significant in the context of these proceedings. It should also be borne in mind that, according to defence counsel at the sentencing hearing, the appellant had also made some admissions while in hospital in 2007. These matters would have entitled the appellant to a degree of leniency over and above that normally afforded to an early guilty plea.
In sentencing the appellant the primary judge did not mention a percentage deduction he had in mind for the mitigating effects of the plea of guilty. Of course, his Honour was not obliged to do so and it is not suggested that the absence of quantitative information of that nature was an error. The primary judge said, relevantly, that the plea of guilty was of particular weight, indicated remorse, and was made at the earliest opportunity. He also noted that the appellant 'eventually came clean to the police'. Finally, he said that the plea of guilty and the remorse (among other things) 'significantly moderate the sentences'.
Properly read, these comments indicate that the primary judge had regard to the plea of guilty simpliciter and to two separate aspects of it; namely, the acceptance of responsibility (remorse) and the voluntary disclosures (coming clean). They also indicate that his Honour regarded these matters as material, hence the comment that they would 'significantly moderate' the sentences. In my view no error has been demonstrated in the way the primary judge approached the plea of guilty.
The circumstances of the offence
Read strictly, the third particular relates solely to the value of the property damaged. As mentioned earlier in these reasons, that approach is without merit. However, from the appellant's written and oral submissions it appears that the gravamen of the challenge is that when the circumstances of the charge the subject of count 2 are considered in their entirety the sentence is outside the range of sentences customarily imposed for offences of this type.
The appellant relies on several decisions of this court in support of the proposition that this sentence is outside the appropriate range. They are: R v Catts (1996) 85 A Crim R 171; Histon v The Queen (Unreported, WASCA, Library No 970197, 1 May 1997); The State of Western Australia v Warburton [2004] WASCA 228; Newton v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 247; and The State of Western Australia v Bennett [2009] WASCA 93. Of these I need refer only to Bennett as it is the most recent and all of the relevant authorities were examined in it.
I start with the usual caution. Identifying an appropriate range is not a science. The range is merely a guideline and does not establish an immutable rule about the adequacy of sentences either within or outside the range. I should also mention that in each of the cases referred to by the appellant (other than Histon and Warburton) the offender pleaded guilty. Bennett stands as authority for three propositions:
(a)the dominant sentencing consideration in cases of arson is general deterrence;
(b)the personal circumstances of an offender carry less weight in cases of arson than they might otherwise do; and
(c)there is no tariff for the offence of arson, but in 'post-transitional' terms the offence commonly attracts sentences within a range of 2 years and 8 months and 4 years and 8 months in very serious cases and 2 years to 3 years and 4 months in less serious cases.
For present purposes it can be accepted that the range refers to cases in which the offender has pleaded guilty.
The offence the subject of count 2 was far from trivial. A lot of damage was done, records were lost and there was evidence of the harmful consequences for the owners of the business. Nonetheless, it lacked some of the features often present in very serious examples of arson. For example, there was no evidence that anyone other than the offender (or offenders) was present and there was no immediate danger to life. The fire was not part of an insurance (or other fraud) and nor was it started for revenge or to intimidate others.
In my view it would be wrong to characterise this offence as being in the more serious category of offences of this type. The sentence of 3 years and 3 months is at the high end of the range of sentences in the less serious category and at the low end of the more serious category. There was no trial of the issue whether the appellant had actually lit the fire. While that matter can not be taken too far in reducing culpability (he admitted to having been present and would have been aware of the grave consequences of starting a blaze) it, coupled with the absence of other aggravating factors, militates against regarding this offence as being in the very serious category.
In my view the sentence of 3 years and 3 months is very high given that it falls in the less serious category. Nonetheless, I cannot conclude that it is so out of kilter with sentences commonly imposed for offences of this type as to exhibit manifest excess. It follows that the ground of appeal has not been made out and the appeal must fail.
In the hope that it will help the appellant to appreciate that his concerns have been taken seriously, I think it is appropriate to add a further comment. The overall sentence was structured in a particular way (by making the terms on all counts and charges except counts 2 and 3 concurrent). As a matter of sentencing principle, the terms on counts 4 and 5 and those on each of the charges in the s 32 notice could have been made cumulative. I am not suggesting that this would or should have been the case because it would have resulted in a total sentence that would have been crushing on a man as young as, and with the problems suffered by, the appellant. I have set out the facts relating to each of the charges. The degree of criminality involved in each of them is significant. The appellant continued to offend from time to time over a three year period. Given the serious nature of the offending conduct taken as a whole and notwithstanding the many mitigating factors that were present (including
his age, plea of guilty, health problems and voluntary disclosures) it would have been difficult to mount an argument that a total term of 6 years and 3 months was manifestly excessive.
Put another way, even had the appeal against the sentence on count 2 succeeded and, for the sake of argument, a term of 2 years been substituted for the term actually imposed, on a resentencing it would have been necessary to revisit the question of concurrency of the other sentences. In my view it is highly unlikely that a total term less than 6 years and 3 months would have resulted.
Extension of time
The principles upon which the court acts in considering whether to extend time were recently considered by Wheeler JA in Wimbridge v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196 at [19] ‑ [25]. I adopt, without repeating, what her Honour said in those paragraphs.
The explanation for the delay is not particularly satisfactory. But the real problem the appellant faces is that he has not been able to persuade me that there is a viable ground of appeal. I would therefore refuse an extension of time within which to appeal. Had I been disposed to grant the extension of time I may have granted leave to appeal but I would have dismissed the appeal.
WHEELER JA: I have read in draft the reasons for decision of Owen JA. I agree with those reasons save for the conclusion, at [58], that the sentence in respect of the damage to Stalker Pumps is not "so out of kilter with sentences commonly imposed for offences of this type as to demonstrate manifest excess". In my view, when one adds the appellant's age at the time of the offending, and his voluntary disclosure (on two occasions) into the mix, manifest excess has been demonstrated. Although I am aware that mine is a minority view, I would have reduced that sentence by 12 months.
However, if I were called upon to resentence the appellant, it would be necessary for me to consider afresh questions of concurrency and cumulation. It seems to me that it would be necessary, in that event, to order the total or partial accumulation of count 4 or 5, in a way that arrived at a total effective sentence of between 6 and 6 1/2 years. A shorter total effective term would not adequately reflect the appellant's criminality, even allowing for the factors I have mentioned.
In practical terms, although I would have allowed the appeal, the outcome for the appellant would therefore be the same as if the appeal had been dismissed.
The Schedule
Indictment
Count
Offence
Offence date
Sentence
Concurrency
1
Burglary
21 May 2006
2 years
-
2
Damage by fire
21 May 2006
3 years and 3 months
Concurrent with count 1
3
Armed robbery
5 August 2006
3 years
Cumulative upon count 2
4
Steal motor vehicle
31 January 2008 - 1 February 2008
1 year and 3 months
Concurrent with count 1
5
Damage by fire
1 February 2008
2 years
Concurrent with count 4
Section 32 notice
Charge
Offence
Offence date
Sentence
Concurrency
49160/08
Steal motor vehicle
6 December 2005
1 year and 3 months
Concurrent with count 1
49161/08
Steal motor vehicle
11 December 2005
2 years
Concurrent with count 1
49165/08
Burglary
10 June 2006
2 years
Concurrent with count 1
49167/08
Burglary (dwelling)
29 September 2006 - 3 October 2006
2 years
Concurrent with count 1
48304/08
Burglary
6 August 2008
2 years
Concurrent with count 1
7
6
1