Wright v Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wright v Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) [2020] FCA 21

File number(s): VID 1101 of 2018
Judge(s): ANDERSON J
Date of judgment: 20 January 2020
Catchwords:

COSTS – interlocutory applications – where applicant makes discovery application – where respondent objects to producing certain documents on basis of relevance and public interest immunity – where respondent makes application for non-disclosure of documents in dispute – where respondent seeks to further amend its defence at hearing of applications – where applications are later dismissed by consent save as to costs – whether respondent should pay costs of applications – whether respondent’s conduct in respect of the applications was unreasonable

Held: respondent’s conduct in respect of the interlocutory applications was not so unreasonable such as to warrant an adverse costs order – respondent to pay applicant’s costs thrown away by reason of the further amendment of the defence, but the costs of the applications are costs in the cause

Legislation:

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 4, 9(2), 15

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AF, 37AJ(1), 37AG(2), 37N(2), 43(2)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 20.13

Cases cited:

Consolidated Byrnes Holdings Ltd v Hardel Investments Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 399; 176 FCR 348

Gray v Richards (No 2) [2014] HCA 47; 89 ALJR 113; 315 ALR 1

Gribbles Pathology Pty Ltd v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 80 FCR 283

Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC v Gilead Sciences Pty Ltd(No 2) [2018] FCAFC 7

Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72

Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (Cth); Ex Parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; 186 CLR 622

Rhodium Australia Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 17

Stewart v Atco Controls Pty Ltd (In liq) (No 2) [2014] HCA 31; 252 CLR 331

Umoona Tjutagku Health Service Aboriginal Corp v Walsh [2019] FCAFC 32

Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 11 December 2019 (Applicant)
16 December 2019 (Respondent)
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms C Harris QC with Dr L Hilly
Solicitor for the Applicant: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Hanks QC with Ms E Bennett
Solicitor for the Respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth

ORDERS

VID 1101 of 2018
BETWEEN:

STUART WRIGHT

Applicant

AND:

CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

Respondent

JUDGE:

ANDERSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 JANUARY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs thrown away by reason of the amendment of the Amended Defence.

2.The costs of the applicant’s interlocutory application filed 1 April 2019 and the respondent’s interlocutory application filed 3 July 2019 be costs in the cause.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ANDERSON J:

Introduction and summary

  1. This decision relates to the appropriate costs…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 21
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Wright v Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) involves a dispute over the production of certain documents in a legal proceeding. The applicant, Wright, sought the discovery of documents from the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Police, which the Commissioner objected to on grounds of relevance and public interest immunity. The Commissioner subsequently applied for non-disclosure of the documents in question. The Commissioner also sought to amend his defence further at the hearing of the applications. Ultimately, the applications were dismissed by consent, with the exception of the costs issue.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Commissioner's conduct in respect of the interlocutory applications was unreasonable enough to warrant an adverse costs order against him. The court also considered whether the Commissioner should be required to pay the applicant's costs thrown away due to the further amendment of the defence. The court found that the Commissioner's conduct was not unreasonable enough to justify a costs order against him, but that he should pay the applicant's costs thrown away due to the amendment of the defence. The costs of the applications themselves were to be costs in the cause.

The court held that the Commissioner's conduct in respect of the interlocutory applications was not unreasonable enough to warrant an adverse costs order. The court acknowledged that it was regrettable that it took about 15 months for the parties to reach the position which led to the dismissal of the applications. However, the duration and intensity of pre-trial disputes did not, by itself, demonstrate unreasonableness by one or more of the parties. The court also found that the Commissioner had a strong claim to public interest immunity over the documents in dispute, which was clear from an early stage in the communications between the parties' solicitors. The court held that the Commissioner should pay the applicant's costs thrown away due to the amendment of the defence, but that the costs of the applications were to be costs in the cause.

In conclusion, the court ordered that the Commissioner pay the applicant's costs thrown away by reason of the amendment of the Amended Defence, but that the costs of the applications were to be costs in the cause. The critical question in this case was whether the Commissioner acted so unreasonably in the conduct of the applications such that, rather than the costs of those applications being in the cause, the Commissioner should be required to pay the applicant's costs. The court found that the Commissioner's conduct was not unreasonable enough to warrant a costs order against him. However, the court held that the Commissioner should pay the applicant's costs thrown away due to the amendment of the defence. The costs of the applications themselves were to be costs in the cause.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs thrown away by reason of the amendment of the Amended Defence.

2. The costs of the applicant’s interlocutory application filed 1 April 2019 and the respondent’s interlocutory application filed 3 July 2019 be costs in the cause.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As highlighted in the legal principles summarised above, the ordinary position is that, in the absence of a hearing on the merits of the applications, a costs order in favour of the applicant should only be made in special circumstances. My view, on balance, is that the circumstances of this case do not justify a departure from that position.Conclusion For the reasons set out above, the Commissioner will be required to pay the applicant’s costs thrown away by reason of the amendment of the Amended Defence, but the costs of the applications will be costs in the cause.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The critical question in this case is whether, as alleged by the applicant, the Commissioner acted so unreasonably in the conduct of the applications such that, rather than the costs of those applications being in the cause, the Commissioner should be required to pay the applicant’s costs.Consideration My view is that, for the following reasons, the conduct of the Commissioner in the course of the applications was not so unreasonable such as to warrant a costs order against him. It is regrettable that it took about 15 months since the commencement of the proceeding for the parties to reach the position which led to the dismissal by consent of the applications on the basis of the foreshadowed amendments by the Commissioner to the Amended Defence. But the duration and intensity of pre-trial disputes does not, by itself, demonstrate unreasonableness by one or more of the parties. Having now reached this juncture, it is easy to look back and ask, as the applicant does, why the Commissioner did not amend his pleaded defence at an earlier stage. The applicant says that the Commissioner was aware from an early stage of the basis of the applicant’s Discovery Application, and the steps that the Commissioner could take to avert it. As the sequence of events have demonstrated, the Commissioner did have the option of avoiding direct confrontation with the Discovery Application. The Commissioner was evidently of the belief that he had a strong claim to public interest immunity over the documents in dispute. This was clear from an early stage in the communications between the solicitors for the respective parties. For instance, in a letter to the applicant’s solicitors dated 23 January 2019, the Commissioner’s solicitors expressed the following:[W]e are instructed that information concerning the breed, selection, and training process of Police Trained Dogs are matters of significance to Victoria Police. If information of that kind were made public, it could enable individuals to undermine the efficacy of police dogs in different situations. Accordingly, information responsive to this category is subject to [] a claim of public interest immunity. Additionally, on 27 February 2019, after further correspondence, the Commissioner’s solicitors stated that We are instructed that there is a significant public interest in the confidentiality of the methods used by Victoria Police to train police dogs. The availability of that information could compromise public safety and police operations in the following ways:• Public awareness of the training of explosives detection dogs could be used to compromise the effectiveness of explosives detection by Victoria Police, thereby increasing the risk of a successful terrorist event.• Public awareness of the training of narcotics dogs could be used to avoid detection of concealed drugs and weapons, to the detriment of the Victorian public.• Public awareness of the training of general purpose dogs could allow offenders to avoid detection or apprehension.…The documents you seek provide details of the ways in which dogs are trained to detect narcotics, detect explosives, and search for and subdue offenders.We do not understand how documents of this kind are relevant to your client’s case, and we note that you have failed to explain their relevance, despite our recent request that you do so.In all of the circumstances, our client does not agree to provide the requested documents.We are instructed to resist any application for discovery by your client in respect of this category of documents