Wribass Pty Ltd v John Edward Swallow & the Australian Meat Industry Employees Union

[1978] FCA 103

IN THE FEDERAL CCURT )

r . .-

OF AUSTRA1.TA .- No. VG. G 2 of 1978 l03 11%

)

GENERAL DIVISION )

BETWEEN :

VRIBASS PTY LIMTTED

- and -

JOHN EDWARD SWALLOTV'

and THE AUSTRALASI.AiX :EAT

INDUSTRY ENPLOYFES U X I O N -

REASONS FOR JUDGMEKT

1978 KEELY, J. November 16

The plaintiff has launched proceedings claiming a

declaration that the conduct of the two defendanls is

unlawful as being contrary to s.45D of thc Trade Practices

e	Act 1974, an injunction to restrain the dcfendantt: fron
certain conduct and damages. The writ was issued on
9 November 1978 and the matter before the court today is
an application for an interim injunction to restrain thc
defendants from certain conduct pending the determination
of the suit.

The court has power under S . 80 of the Trade Practices

Act t o :

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I 1 ... grant an injunction restraining a person

from engaging in conduct that constitutes or

would constitute -

( d ) a contravention of a provision o f Part IV or V ;

(e) attempting to contravene such a provision;

(f) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring

a person to contravene such a provision;

(g)	inducing, or attemptmg to induce, a person,
whether by threats, promises or otherwise, t o 11

contravene such a provision; ...

As the Chief Judge of this court, Sir Nigel Bowen, said in

World Series Cricket Pty Ltd	v. Parish (1977) 1G A.L.R.	1 S 1
at 185:

11 ... it is inherent in the nature of an application

for interlocutory relief that the evidence upon

which the application must be determined will

be incomplete and unsatisfactory for the purpose

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of making a final finding.

Because this is an interlocutory applicaLion it is not:

desirable that I should form any concluded views	as t o the
evidence.

The principles applicable to this application for

interim injunctions are dealt with in thc judgment o € the

F u l l Court o f the High Court of AusLralia in Beecham's Case

(1968) 116 C.L.R. 618. As Bowen CJ. said in the World

Series Cricket Case to which I have referrcd (at pp.185-6):

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A plaintiff is required to wake out a prima

I

facie case, in the sense that i f thc evidcncc

remains as it is, there is a probability that

at thc trial of the acLion, the plajntiff will

be held cntitlcd to r c l l e f ' (CLR at 6 2 2 ) . 'Tl~e

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s t r e n g t h o f t h e c a s e w h i c h t h e p l a i n t i f f must

make o u t w i l l depend upon the nature of the

r i g h t w h i c h he i s s e c k i n g t o a s s e r t , a n d t h e

consequences which w i l l f low fro-n thz making

o f t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r y o r d e r . However, wherc

t h e facts are s e r i o u s l y i n d l s p u t e , t h e c o u r t

w i l l no t unde r t ake a p re l imina ry t r i a l of Lhe

a c t i o n i n o r d e r t o f o r e c a s L a p r o b a b l e r e s u l t ,

b u t r a t h e r , i f the p l a l n t i f f h a s a fair chance

of success (and what w i l l be r equ i r cd will v a r y

a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n a t u r e of t h e c a s e ) , t h e c o u r L

w i l l p roceed to look to the ba lance of convenience . II

The cour t has to cons ide r whe the r , on the ev idence a t p r e s e n t

b e f o r e i t , t h e r e i s a p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the p l a i n L i f f w i l l

succeed when the a c t i o n comes on f o r Lrial. A s I s a i d e a r l i e r ,

it i s u n d e s i r a b l e that I should form any conLluded views on the

evidence a t p r e s e n t b e f o r e me. However, t h e r e i s evidcncc

b e f o r e t h e c o u r t as t o t h e f o l l o w i n g m a t t e r s ( i n t e r a l i a ) :

1. The secondnamed defendant i s an o rgan i sa t ion o f

employees r eg i s t e red unde r the Conc i l i a t ion and

A r b i t r a t i o n Act 1904.

2. The f i r s tnamed e fendant i s t h e s e c r e t a r y of t h e

Tasmanian Branch of the secondnamed defcndnnt and

one G . H. Adams i s t h e a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r y o f t h e

Tasmanian Branch of the secondnamed dcfendant.

3. Both the f i rs tnamed efendant and Mr Adams i n

d i s c u s s i o n s with M r B a s s c t t , a d i r e c t o r o f t h e

p l a i n t i f f , s p o k e of t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f a h l s c k ban

upon the supply of meat to the plnj.nLiff being

inlplcmenLed by the me;nbers of t h e secondnamed

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d e f e n d a n t i f t h e p l a i n t i f f c o n t i n u e d t o s e l l mcat

on Saturday mornings. There i s evidcnce that, when

t o l d by M r W r i g h t , t h e o n l y o t h c r d i r c c t o r o f t h e

p l a i n t i f f , thaL t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t c n d e d t o c o n t i n u e

t o s e l l meat on Saturday mornings, the firstnamed

de fendan t s a id , "that he had n o a l t e r n a t i v e b u t to

have a b l a c k b a n p l a c e d o n ( t h e p l a i n t i f f ' ? ) mmt

supply". There i s a l s o e v i d e n c e that l a t e r

(on 20 October 1976) the f i r s tnamed defendant sa id

" t h a t a black ban had bcen imposed but that no

meeting of members of the union had yet been held".

4. A meeting of some o f t he members of Lhe secondnamed

defendant was held on 24 October 1975 at which the

f i r s tnamed defendant was prcsent and tha t mcet ing

d e c i d e d t h a t t h o s e members of the secondnamcd defcndant

would r e f u s e t o load m e a t f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f .

5. S u p p l y o f m e a t o t h e p l a i n t i f f h a s n o t a k e n p l a c c

i n t h e n o r m a l way s ince the mee t ing of 24 OLtober

a l t h o u g h t h e p l a i n t i f f h a s b e e n a b l e t o o b t a i r some

suppl ies of meat by other mcans. A s u b s t a n t i a l

quan t i ty o f meat ordered on 23 October 1976 from

S. P. Holman 6 Sons Pty Ltd, normally the main

supp l i e r o f mea t t o the p l a in t i f f , and d u e t o b e

d e l i v e r e d on 2 4 Octobcr 1073 has n o t been de11 v c r s c l .

. . - 5 -

6 . The ban complaincd of in this matter has had thc effect of causing substantlal oss or damage to thc business of the plaintiff and is likely to have such

an effect in the future if the ban continues.

Without expressing any concluded views on any of thc

matters in issue in my opinion the plaintiff has established

a prima facie case on all aspects against both dct-endants

including that the conduct in question was f o r purposes which

included the purpose of causing substantial loss or damagc to

the business of the plaintiff.

The evidence for the plaintiff was not challenged in

cross-examination and there is no evidcnce to the contrary.

Perhaps I should add, in fairness to Mr Levis who

ultimately represented both defendants, that neither de€endant

was represented by a legal practitioner when this application

for interim injunctions was first called on yesterday mornjng.

The firstnamed defendant appeared in person a d sought an

adjournment of two weeks to enable both defendants to obtain

such representation. The matter was stood down to enable

Mr Swallow to take certain action and at 2.15 yesterday

Mr Quinn appeared for both defendants and sought an adjournment

to enable him to brief senior counsel.

After hearing argument the court adjourncd the hearing

o f the application f o r interim injunctions until this morning.

However, having regard to the plainLiff's allegations a to its

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con t inu ing l o s s and the f ac t t ha t t he de fendan t s had no t t aken

a n y s t e p s t o o b t a i n l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n u n t i l a f t e r t h c m a t L e r

was c a l l e d on f o r h e a r i n g y e s t e r d a y , I r e fused t o g ran t an

ad journment for the per iod sought .

For similar reasons I was no t p repa rcc l t o g ran t t he

a p p l i c a t i o n t h i s morning by Mr Lcvis who then announced an

appearance for bo th defendants and sought a fu r thc r ad jou rnmal t

e of seven days. I s t o o d t h e m a t t e r dowr t o e n a b l e him t o

p repa re h i s case and I po in ted ou t that i f i n t e r i m ~ n ~ u n c t i o n s

were granted I would r e s e r v e l i b e r t y t o e a c h o f t h e d c f c n d a n t s

t o move on s h o r t n o t i c e f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e i n j u n c t i o n s .

H a v i n g d e c i d e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t l f f has e s t a b l i s h c d a prima

f a c i e c a s e I have considered the balance of con\-enience quest ion.

No evidence or argument has been presented to demonstrate any

r e a l i n j u r y o r i n c o n v e n i e n c e t o e i t h e r o f the two d e f e n d a n t s i f

e i n t e r l o c u t o r y i n j u n c t i o n s a r e g r a n t e d . On the o ther hand Lhcre

i s e v i d e n c e t h a t i n j u r y t o t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l occur j.1 t h e

conduct cont inues. In my view the balance of convenlcncc favours

t h e g r a n t i n g o f e n t e r i n g i n j u n c t i o n s r c s t r a i n i n g the t w o dcfendants

u n t i l t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r f i n d i n j u n c t i o n s ,

t h e h e a r i n g o f which w i l l now commence i n Burnic on Wednesday,

29 November 1378.

Accordingly, I formed the op in ion tha t i.1 i s desiral .) lc

t o g r a n t i n t e r i m i n j u n c t i o n s u n d e r s.80(2) o f t h e Act.

" > *

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\ .

Despi te M r L e v i s ' a r g u m e n t t o t h e c o n t r a r y I a ~ c e p t

Mr Heerey 's argument that i n any e v e n t t h c p l a i n t i f f ::hould

have i t s c o s t s o f y e s t e r d a y ' s s i t t i ngs when t h e p a r t i e s a p p c a r e d

bu t no hea r ing occur red . The matter d i d no t proceed because

the defendants had taken no p~- twious s teps to obLain legal

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; o t h e r w i s e c o s t s w i l l bc r e s c r v e d , I would

i n t e n d t h e y would f o l l o w the even t .

I'

S u b j e c t t o t h e matter of t he words i n conce r t " , t he

i n j u n c t i o n b e i n t h e form handcd up by Fi r Heerey \\.hich i n ~ l ~ d e s

t h e usual undertaking by a p l a i n t i f f s e e k i n g i n t e r i m i n j u n c . l - ~ o n s .

a

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