WRB Transport Pty Ltd v Chivell No. Scgrg-98-1423 Judgment No. S6937

[1998] SASC 6937

WRB TRANSPORT PTY LTD v CHIVEL

[1998] SASC 6937

1 WICKS J                  This was an application for judicial review directed to the State Coroner, Mr W C Chivell, at the instance of WRB Transport Pty Ltd ("WRB Transport"), Philip Ian Bunker, Wayne Ross Bunker and Marta Bunka ("the applicants").  The relief sought was in the nature of prohibition or an injunction preventing the Coroner from proceeding to hold an inquest into the deaths on 3 August 1996 of Susan Margaret Duffy, Walter Edward Duffy, Vida May Claxton, Christopher Verdun Claxton, Nita Claire Hastwell and Ivy Nell Hastwell ("the deceased persons") or to continue with the proceedings until there has been a determination as to the exclusion of evidence in material proposed to be adduced in a hearing before the Coroner.  Also, relief was sought in the nature of prohibition preventing the Coroner from receiving the evidence of some nineteen individuals, details of whose proofs of evidence were contained in an exhibit to the affidavit of Craig James Caldicott in support of the summons for principal relief ("the additional witnesses").
2 A declaration was sought that if the Coroner were to call the additional witnesses to give evidence at the inquest to the effect of their respective proofs of evidence, doing so would be ultra vires the Coroner.  A further declaration was sought to the effect that the Coroner erred in law in refusing a request of the applicants to exclude evidence from the additional witnesses.
3 On 3 August 1996, the deceased persons died as a result of a motor accident in which a truck owned by the applicant WRB Transport Pty Ltd and driven by one, Brian Snewin, an employee of WRB Transport, collided with motor vehicles in which the deceased persons were travelling.
4 Following the accident, Mr Snewin was charged with six counts of causing death by dangerous driving.  He was convicted and sentenced in the District Court.
5 On or about 9 September 1998, the applicants were made aware that there was to be a coronial inquest into the deaths of the deceased persons.  In connection with the inquest, counsel assisting the Coroner made available to the solicitors for the applicants copies of statements given by witnesses proposed to be called at the inquest.  On the basis of that material, it would appear that it was the intention of counsel assisting the Coroner at the inquest to ask the Coroner to call witnesses who would give evidence that certain employees of WRB Transport supplied tablets to its drivers and, in addition, that these drivers were under pressure to drive for periods of time in excess of the period permitted by law.
6 The applicants instructed their solicitors to have excluded from the coronial inquest statements of the additional witnesses on the ground that their evidence and the material referred to above was outside the ambit of the proposed inquest and that it was prejudicial to the applicants and not relevant to deciding the essential issue as to what caused the death of the deceased persons.
7 The inquest was due to commence on 19 October 1998.  On 16 October 1998, the applicants applied to the Coroner to have evidence from the additional witnesses excluded from the inquiry on the ground that the evidence was irrelevant to the matter before the court and should therefore not be led.  The Coroner ruled that the evidence was both relevant and admissible and would be admitted.
8 Shortly after the Coroner gave his ruling, the applicants commenced these present proceedings. The hearing commenced on 16 October, 1998. When the court resumed on 19 October 1998, counsel for the Coroner intimated that the Coroner wished to withdraw from the proceedings on the basis that he would abide the decision of the Court. Whilst matters of procedure were discussed, the hearing of the substantive claim for relief was stood over until the following day. On the following morning, the Attorney General intervened in the matter pursuant to subs9(2) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1992. Further argument was heard and argument completed. I adjourned the matter shortly before lunch. On resumption after lunch, I asked whether there was anything further anybody wished to put to me. Counsel for the applicants intimated that there was not. I then indicated that I had considered the matter over the adjournment and had decided to give judgment then. I thereupon proceeded to dismiss the action and intimated that if requested I would provide short reasons for my decision. These are my reasons.
9 Section 12 of the Coroners Act 1975 confers jurisdiction on the Coroner to hold an inquest in order to ascertain the cause or circumstances of death of any person by violent, unusual or unknown cause.
10 In this case the applicants cannot succeed unless the Coroner has made a jurisdictional error. In its narrow sense, a jurisdictional error occurs "where the court or tribunal concerned mistakenly asserts or denies the existence of jurisdiction or where it misapprehends or disregards the nature or limits of its functions or powers in a case where it correctly recognises jurisdiction does exist": Craig v South Australia (1994-1995) 184 CLR 163 at p177. In that case the High Court drew a distinction between courts forming part of the hierarchical court structure and "courts" and administrative bodies outside that structure.
11 The Coroner’s function is to carry out inquiries and to report his findings to the Attorney-General: Coroners Act 1975, s12 and s25. In addition to his findings on an inquest, he is authorised by the Act to add any recommendation that might in his opinion, prevent or reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of an event similar to the event that was the subject of the inquest: s25. So far as the matter of jurisdictional error is concerned, the Coroner is not part of the hierarchical court structure and therefore falls into the category of "courts" and tribunals which stand outside that structure.
12 Jurisdictional error in the narrow sense as described above is relevant to the present case. The definition given above is therefore applicable. The expression "jurisdictional error" has a wider meaning as set out in a passage in Lord Reid’s speech in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 AC 147 at p171 but the wider meaning has no application to this case.
13 Counsel for the applicants submitted that the question of whether particular evidence is admissible in coronial proceedings depends upon its relevance to the inquiry in question.  In turn, relevance is determined by reference to the concept of causation.  It was submitted that the evidence of witnesses proposed to be led by counsel assisting the Coroner that certain employees of WRB Transport supplied tablets to drivers of that company, and in addition that drivers of that company were under pressure to drive for periods of time which were in excess of the period permitted by law would not relate to any fact, matter or circumstance which formed part of the sequence of events leading up to the deaths of the deceased persons and was therefore outside the ambit of the coronial jurisdiction.  He said that this jurisdiction was to inquire into the cause or causes of death of the deceased persons and beyond that inquiry, the Coroner had no power to call witnesses or compel them to answer questions, produce documents or otherwise adduce evidence.
14 Harmsworth v The State Coroner (1989) VR 989 was cited in argument. It was a case involving an inquest following the death of five prisoners in the course of a fire which one of them had lit in a cell block. The prisoners had barricaded themselves in and died in the fire before anyone could reach them. In the course of his judgment, Nathan J said at p995:
"                 The coroner’s source of power of investigation arises from the particular death or fire.  A coroner does not have general powers of enquiry or detection ... The enquiry must be relevant, in the legal sense to the death or fire, this brings into focus the concept of ‘remoteness’.  Of course the prisoners would not have died, if they had not been in prison.  The sociological factors which related to the causes of their imprisonment could not be remotely relevant.  This can be tested by considering how wide, prolix and indeterminate the inquest might be if each of the many facets of the individual personalities, of all those involved were to be considered ... Such an inquest would never end, but worse it could never arrive at the coherent, let alone concise, findings required by the Act, which are the causes of death, etc.  Such an inquest could certainly provide material for much comment.  Such discursive investigations are not envisaged nor empowered by the Act.  They are not within jurisdictional power."

15 Later in his judgment, the learned Judge said:
"                 An inquest into particular deaths in a prison, is not and should not be permitted to become an investigation into prisons in which deaths may occur.  A comment on the particular deaths may be pertinent, especially so if the prison facilities were found to be inadequate.  It could even be that a comment could have general application ..."

16 In Queensland Fire and Rescue Authority v Hall (1998) 2 Qd R 162, the court was concerned with the "cause of the death" and the "circumstances of the death". Lee J said at p170:
"                 It may be noted that s.7 first refers to ‘the cause of the death’ itself as the ultimate focus of the inquiry, i.e., the death, but there is the added requirement of ‘... and the circumstances of the death’.  The death is the actual event and the cause of it is the process of happening which brought the death about and is the cause of it, whereas ‘the circumstances’ obviously covers a much wider area of inquiry as the word itself conveys and as the various sections of the Act referred to indicate.  Circumstance means ‘time, place, manner, cause, occasion, etc. surroundings, of an act or event’: Concise Oxford Dictionary."

17 Section 12 of the Coroners Act 1975 was discussed in R v von Einem (1991) 55 SASR 199. At p225, Duggan J said:
"                 The words ‘cause or circumstances’ are of wide import and I disagree with the narrow interpretation which counsel would place upon them by emphasising the word ‘cause’."

18 In my opinion, the requirement of s12 of the Coroners Act to ascertain the cause or circumstances of a death involves the notion of "relevance". What is relevant to the cause or circumstances of death depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and cannot readily be the subject of generalisation. It is a question of judgment and degree. In some cases it is useful to test the relevance of evidence by applying the notions of causation and remoteness. These concepts are well known and generally applied in the context of the law of negligence. It does not follow, however, that they should become touchstones to determine what is or is not relevant in the context of a coronial inquiry. They will have application in some cases but not in others.
19 It is generally for the Coroner to determine what is relevant for the purposes of his inquiry.  In carrying out this task he should not be confined in the way in which a trial judge is confined in assessing the relevance of evidence in the conduct of civil litigation. He must be given a reasonable degree of latitude.  There may be differences of opinion between Coroners as to the relevance of evidence to be led in respect of a particular inquiry.  It is only when one reaches the point that no reasonable person could regard the evidence as relevant that a question of jurisdictional error arises.
20 In the present case, the evidence sought by the applicants to be excluded should be admitted if the Coroner feels that it will assist his inquiry.  As the Coroner put it in his ruling:
"It [the evidence] tends to show a work practice, a culture ... a course of conduct which puts into context the events of 3 August 1996.  It goes to the likelihood as to whether what occurred, occurred in the circumstances described by Mr Snewin and assists in the determination of whether what he did was done with the connivance, assistance, knowledge, consent or tacit acceptance of his employers or whether ... he was on a frolic of his own."

21 The concept of relevance is broad and in the context of a coronial inquiry it should not be restricted by the use of other concepts.
22 For these reasons, I have dismissed the summons in this action.