World Expo Park Pty Ltd v The Crown

[1994] QLC 40

[1994] QLC 40

 

  LAND COURT

BRISBANE

5 August, 1994

Re:     Determination of Compensation -
  Resumption by the Crown under Section 306
of the Land Act of 1962 -
  A93-26.

World Expo Park Pty Ltd
  v.
  The Crown

RE:  APPLICATION FOR COSTS

During the hearing of this matter, which resulted in the Court determining compensation at NIL, Counsel for the Respondent Crown made an application for costs.  Since the claimant company was not represented either at the hearing or at the delivery of judgement, the Court decided to refer to the claimant company a copy of the transcript of the cost application for its comment.  This was received from Pennant Holdings Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) to which company the claimant had assigned its interest in the claim for compensation.
           The claim for compensation before the Court was in the sum of $814,000 and the Crown assessment of compensation was as the Court determined.
           Included in the submission for an award of costs by Counsel for the Crown, was that the claim was exorbitant and extravagant and one which it was inappropriate to make.  Further it is urged that the claim could be categorised in a technical sense as being frivolous and vexatious.
           Pennant Holdings Ltd (Receiver and Manager appointed) has requested that the Crown's application for costs be rejected, mainly on the basis that it was the Crown which referred the matter of the determination of compensation to the Court in the first instance.
           In a recent decision (Banno and Anor v. Commonwealth of Australia and Anor (1993) 34 L.G.R.A. 34 at p. 53), Wilcox J had this to say in respect of a cost

application following determination of compensation:-

"The Court has a general discretion as to costs, but the discretion must be exercised on principled grounds.  The Commonwealth has succeeded on all issues.  It would therefore seem difficult to justify ordering it to pay the applicants' costs.  Moreover, if this was ordinary litigation, the Commonwealth might reasonably expect to obtain an order that the applicants' pay its costs.  But this is not ordinary litigation.  The relationship between the parties giving rise to the litigation did not arise out of their mutual desire; it arose because of the unilateral decision of the Commonwealth to acquire the applicants' land in order to satisfy a perceived public need.  The acquisition left the applicants in a position of either accepting the Commonwealth's assessment of the proper compensation or having the Court rule on its adequacy.  Perhaps people in that position should be allowed access to the Court, to present an arguable and well organised case, without being deterred by the prospect of being ordered to pay the Commonwealth's costs if their case proves unpersuasive.  I distinguish the situation of resumees who pursue a vexatious, dishonest or grossly exaggerated claim or present their case in such a way as to impose unnecessary burdens on the Commonwealth or the Court.  The present applicants' case was arguable.  It was presented efficiently and economically, the hearing occupying only two days.  "

Now, although the claimant company was not represented in the case, this was apparently due to financial constraints put upon it.  Although it could be argued that the claim for compensation was exorbitant and extravagant, it seems to me that, in view of the Crown's assessment of compensation at NIL, it was entitled to respond to the Crown's reference to the Court and to have the determination made by the Court.  This, of course, could not have been done without the Crown's costs being incurred but in any event, since it was a Crown reference, it no doubt was anxious to have the matter brought to finality.          
In the exercise of my discretion in accordance with the provisions of Section 41(9) of the Land Act of 1962, I make no order as to costs.

(C.H. Carter)     
  Member of the Land Court