Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation v Gregory Thomas Corney No. SCGRG 92/2134 Judgment No. 3844 Number of Pages 3 Workers' Compensation Assessment and Amount of Compensation (1993) 59 Sasr 451 - [1993] SASC 3844

COURT IN THE FULL COURT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA KING CJ, OLSSON AND PERRY JJ

CWDS
Workers' compensation - assessment and amount of compensation - Lump sum pursuant to 5.43 Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act - non-economic consequences of impairment of earning capacity element of non-economic loss for purpose of assessment of lump sum pursuant to

HRNG ADELAIDE, 3 March 1993 #DATE 3:3:1993
Counsel for appellant:         Mr G L Muecke
Solicitors for appellant:     Thomsons
Counsel for respondent:        Mr S C Cole
Solicitors for respondent:     Nelson Mansfield

ORDER
Appeal dismissed.

JUDGE1 KING CJ: This is an appeal pursuant to s.100 of the Workers Rehabilitationand Compensation Act 1986 on a question of law against a determination of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal. 2. The respondent contracted the disease of allergic contact dermatitis in consequence of exposure to certain materials used in the course of his employment. 3. He sought a lump sum by way of compensation pursuant to s.43 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act for non-economic loss sustained in consequence of that injury. 4. The Corporation rejected the claim. On review, a review officer allowed a lump sum calculated on the basis of 15% of the prescribed sum pursuant to ss.(2) of s.43. The respondent appealed to the tribunal and the tribunal allowed the appeal and increased the lump sum to 30% of the prescribed sum. 5. Section 43 so far as material is as follows:
    "(1) Subject to this Act, where a worker suffers a permanent
    disability and the disability is compensable under this Act, the
    worker is entitled (in addition to any entitlement apart from
    this section) to compensation for non-economic loss by way of a
    lump sum.
    (2) Subject to this section, the lump sum shall be a
    percentage of the prescribed sum determined by reference to
    the third schedule." 6. At the relevant time the section contained a ss.(3) which has since been repealed. That subsection was as follows: "Where a compensable disability, in respect of which compensation is payable by way of a lump sum under ss.(1), and is not mentioned in the third schedule, the lump sum shall be fixed by the Corporation as a percentage (not exceeding 1% of the prescribed sum), having regard to (a) the nature of the disability, and (b) the extent to which the worker's ability to lead a normal life has been impaired by the disabilities." 7. There is no doubt that the condition of "allergic contact dermatitis", from which the respondent suffers, is permanent, and that it constitutes a permanent disability. It follows that the respondent is entitled to compensation for the non-economic consequences of that disability. 8. In the course of the reasons given by the Tribunal for its decision, the Tribunal said:
    "The most profound effect on him is in his ability to work. As
    Mr Gilchrist argues, and as Mr Cole in fact concedes, it is
    important to keep steadily in mind that the task is one…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

AGLC: Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation v Gregory Thomas Corney No. SCGRG 92/2134 Judgment No. 3844 Number of Pages 3 Workers' Compensation Assessment and Amount of Compensation (1993) 59 Sasr 451 [1993] SASC 3844
Case: [1993] SASC 3844
Decision Date: 3 March 1993

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation appealed against a decision of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal which had increased a lump sum awarded to the respondent, Gregory Thomas Corney, for non-economic loss sustained in consequence of an injury he had suffered in the course of his employment. The injury, allergic contact dermatitis, was permanent and constituted a permanent disability, entitling the respondent to compensation for the non-economic consequences of that disability.

The central legal issue was whether certain non-economic consequences of the respondent's incapacity to work, as identified by the Tribunal, were indeed non-economic in nature and thus compensable under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. The Tribunal had allowed a lump sum calculated on the basis of 30% of the prescribed sum, which the Corporation argued was erroneous. The Corporation contended that the non-economic considerations mentioned by the Tribunal were actually economic and thus not compensable under the Act.

The court found that while the inability to work certainly had economic consequences, which were compensated through other provisions of the Act, it could also have non-economic consequences. These included the deprivation of the ability to pursue one's ordinary calling and the restriction on a person's capacity to engage in remunerative work, which could affect a person in a non-economic way. The court concluded that the Tribunal's approach was not erroneous and that the appeal should be dismissed. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia agreed, and the appeal was dismissed.

Orders