Woolston v Commissioner of Police

Link copied
Case Copied 10 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Woolston v Commissioner of Police [2023] QCA 152

PARTIES:

WOOLSTON, Loretta Dale
(applicant)
v
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 73 of 2022
DC No 2288 of 2021

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – [2022] QDC 70 (Loury KC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

28 July 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

19 July 2023

JUDGES:

Bond and Flanagan and Boddice JJA

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to adduce further evidence filed 17 January 2023 be refused.

2.   Application for leave to adduce further evidence filed 22 April 2023 be refused.

3.   Leave to appeal be refused.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – WHEN APPEAL LIES – FROM DISTRICT COURT – BY LEAVE OF COURT – where the applicant was convicted in the Magistrates Court of one charge of failing to provide a specimen of breath as required (roadside) in a manner directed by police and one charge of failing to provide a specimen of breath for analysis – where the applicant was fined, convictions were recorded and her licence was disqualified for six months from the date of conviction – where, as a consequence of the convictions, the applicant was subject to an interlock period where she could only drive a nominated vehicle fitted with a prescribed interlock – where the applicant unsuccessfully appealed to the District Court – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal the dismissal of that appeal – where the applicant submits there has been a miscarriage of justice occasioned by the matter being listed for trial in the Magistrates Court; that she had been discriminated against; and that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive – where the applicant further submits that had the trial not been the subject of delay and proceeded on the original listing date, she would not have been subject to a lengthier interlock period by virtue of the Transport Legislation (Road Safety and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2019 (Qld) – whether it was open for the applicant to be subject to the lengthier interlock period, notwithstanding that the offending preceded the introduction of the amending legislation – whether the primary judge’s conclusions were glaringly improbable or unreasonable – whether leave ought to be granted to correct a substantial injustice

Traffic Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), s 80, s 91J, s 91K, s 91M

Commissioner of Police v Antoniolli[2021] QCA 237, applied
R v Spina[2012] QCA 179, cited
Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679; [2016] HCA 22, cited

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared on her own behalf
Z A Kaplan for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared on her own behalf
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. BOND JA:  I agree with the reasons for judgment of Boddice JA and with the orders proposed by his Honour.

  2. FLANAGAN JA:  I agree with Boddice JA.

  3. BODDICE JA:

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Woolston v Commissioner of Police and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] QCA 152
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Woolston brought an appeal against a decision of the District Court, seeking leave to appeal the dismissal of her appeal from a conviction in the Magistrates Court of failing to provide a specimen of breath as required by police and failing to provide a specimen of breath for analysis. The applicant argued that the appeal should be allowed because there had been a miscarriage of justice, she had been discriminated against, and the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. She also argued that the lengthier interlock period should not apply to her because her offending occurred before the introduction of the amending legislation. The legal issues in this case were whether it was open for the applicant to be subject to the lengthier interlock period, notwithstanding that the offending preceded the introduction of the amending legislation, and whether the primary judge’s conclusions were glaringly improbable or unreasonable.

The Court found that the applicant had not established that there was a reasonable argument there was an error to be corrected and had not established that leave was necessary to correct a substantial injustice, or that the proposed appeal raised an important point of law or principle, or a question of general or public importance. The Court found that the primary judge had correctly summarised the operation of the amended provisions and that it was open as a matter of law for the applicant to be liable to such a condition, notwithstanding that the offending preceded the introduction of the amending legislation. The Court found that there was nothing in the applicant’s submissions to support a conclusion that the primary judge’s conclusions were contrary to the evidence, or unreasonable in the sense that the overwhelming preponderance of evidence was against such conclusions. The Court found that the primary judge’s findings were consistent with the contents of the medical certificate and the contemporaneous recordings, and that leave to adduce further evidence would not alter that conclusion.

The Court ordered that the application for leave to adduce further evidence filed 17 January 2023 and the application for leave to adduce further evidence filed 22 April 2023 be refused, and that leave to appeal be refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to adduce further evidence filed 17 January 2023 be refused.

2. Application for leave to adduce further evidence filed 22 April 2023 be refused.

3. Leave to appeal be refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further, nothing in the applicant’s submissions with respect to the interlock condition indicate error in the primary judge’s reasons. The primary judge correctly summarised the operation of the amended provisions at [70] – [79] of her Honour’s reasons. As observed, the provisions are now mandatory and apply to the applicant. It was, therefore, open as a matter of law for the applicant to be liable to such a condition, notwithstanding that the offending preceded the introduction of the amending legislation.Conclusions The applicant has not established that there is a reasonable argument there is an error to be corrected and has not established that leave is necessary to correct a substantial injustice, or that the proposed appeal raises an important point of law or principle, or a question of general or public importance.Orders I would order:1.Application for leave to adduce further evidence filed 17 January 2023 be refused.2.Application for leave to adduce further evidence filed 22 April 2023 be refused.3.Leave to appeal be refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Further, as a consequence of the applicant’s inability to purchase a car, pursuant to s 91K of the Act, the applicant will be subject to an interlock period of five years.[2] The applicant advances two submissions in this respect. First, had the trial not been the subject of delay and proceeded on the original listing date, the applicant submits she would have been subject to an interlock period of 12 months.[3] Second, it is submitted the requirement for an interlock device is a form of further punishment akin to the rule of ‘double jeopardy’.[2]Traffic Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s 91M.[3]See s 91N of the Traffic Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), current as at 22 July 2021.Consideration Nothing in the applicant’s submissions to this Court support a conclusion that the primary judge’s conclusions were contrary to the evidence, or unreasonable in the sense that the overwhelming preponderance of evidence was against such conclusions, rendering the conclusions unreasonable and almost perverse.[4][4]Commissioner of Police v Antoniolli at [117]–[118], citing Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 at 499, per Dixon J. To the contrary, the primary judge’s finding that the medical certificate exhibited to the applicant’s affidavit did not provide evidence that the applicant was incapable of providing a specimen of breath on 7 July 2020 was consistent with the contents of that certificate, as were the factual findings of the primary judge that a lawful requisition was given by police to the applicant to provide a breath sample; that the applicant failed to do so and did so deliberately; that nothing in the applicant’s presentation demonstrated an incapacity to provide a sample of breath due to health concerns; that the circumstances did not mandate the police requiring a specimen of the applicant’s blood;[5] that at no stage during her engagement with police at the police station did the applicant make mention of any concerns regarding the transmission of COVID-19 by either another person in the station or via any equipment; and that the applicant was simply obstinate in her refusal to provide the specimen.[5]Traffic Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s 80(8E). Further, a suggestion that evidence from an unidentified male, who was seated outside the breathalyser area upon the applicant’s arrival at the police station, would materially alter that conclusion, is without merit. First, the person is unknown. Second, the primary judge observed that the body camera footage recorded that the applicant did not speak to the man in the mask. It also recorded that the applicant did not express any concerns to police as she passed by him about the possible transmission of COVID-19, nor did she raise any concerns with the operator of the breathalyser machine in respect of possible transmission or cleaning procedures. As those factual findings were consistent with the contemporaneous recordings, and are neither glaringly improbable nor unreasonable,[6] there is no basis upon which this Court could interfere with those findings. Leave to adduce further evidence, of the kind sought by the applicant, would not alter that conclusion.[7][6]Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22 at [43], per French CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ.[7] R v Spina [2012] QCA 179 at [33], per McMurdo P.