Woolfe v State of Tasmania - [2000] TASSC 122

[2000] TASSC 122

CITATION: Woolfe v State of Tasmania [2000] TASSC 122

PARTIES:  WOOLFE, Robyn Jennifer
  v
  STATE OF TASMANIA

(DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES)

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 14/2000
DELIVERED ON:  31 August 2000
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  14 August 2000
JUDGMENT OF:  Underwood J

CATCHWORDS:

Workers Compensation - Sufficiency of evidence and onus of proof - Particular accidents and diseases - Skin diseases and infections - Dermatitis suffered at work but not incapacitating - Subsequent incapacity due to entry of organism into broken skin - Injury being a disease not arising out of and in the course of employment.

Attorney-General (Tas) v Smith A35/1994; Smith v Attorney-General (1994) 4 Tas R 298, followed.
Aust Dig Workers Compensation [81]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
           Appellant:  D G Grey
           Respondent:  P Turner
Solicitors:
           Appellant:  Zeeman Kable & Page
           Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number: [2000] TASSC 122
Number of Paragraphs: 16

Serial No 122/2000
File No LCA 14/2000

ROBYN JENNIFER WOOLFE v STATE OF TASMANIA
(DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT UNDERWOOD J

31 August 2000

The appellant was a nurse employed at the Launceston General Hospital. She made a claim for compensation. It was disputed. The dispute was based upon the proposition that any incapacity for work that the appellant may have had, and any medical expenses that she may have incurred, did not result from an injury which was a disease within the meaning of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ("the Act"), s25(1)(b).

This issue went to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal ("the Tribunal") for determination. By order dated 1 May 2000, the appellant's application for compensation was dismissed. The Tribunal based the order of dismissal upon a finding it made that although the appellant had suffered an injury, being a disease, the appellant had not established that this injury had arisen out of and in the course of her employment.

By the notice of appeal, the appellant contends that this finding of fact constituted an error of law in that no tribunal, acting reasonably and properly instructed as to the law, could have made it.

The undisputed facts were that from time to time, the appellant suffered from dermatitis on her hands. This dermatitis was due to the use of the products Hepiclean and Hexol, which she was obliged to use frequently in the course of her employment to wash and sterilise her hands. These periodic outbreaks of dermatitis healed after a period away from her work and contact with cleansing agents.

On 18 January 1999, the appellant noted the presence of dermatitis on the forefinger of her right hand, similar in appearance to the dermatitis that had previously appeared on her hands. This dermatitis did not incapacitate the appellant from working, but she did not work after 18 January as she was due to commence a holiday break the following day.

Over the next 10 days, the appellant spent time with…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Woolfe v State of Tasmania

Details

AGLC: Woolfe v State of Tasmania [2000] TASSC 122
Case: [2000] TASSC 122
Decision Date: 31 August 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Robyn Jennifer Woolfe brought an appeal against the decision of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal which dismissed her claim for compensation under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. Woolfe, a nurse, suffered dermatitis from frequent use of cleansing agents at work, which healed but recurred. On 18 January 1999, she noted an outbreak of dermatitis on her right forefinger, which did not heal and became infected by Streptococcus Pyogenes, leading to incapacity and medical expenses. The Tribunal found that while Woolfe suffered a disease, the incapacity arose from the infection rather than the dermatitis, and it could not be established that the organism arose from her employment, thus dismissing her claim.

The key issue in this appeal was whether the Tribunal erred in finding that Woolfe's incapacity did not arise from a disease that occurred in the course of her employment. The Tribunal reasoned that the dermatitis, while a disease, did not incapacitate Woolfe, and the infection which did cause incapacity was not linked to her employment. The Tribunal distinguished this case from others where the incapacity arose directly from the progression of a disease contracted at work. The Court found that the Tribunal's reasoning was sound and in accordance with the law and facts.

Underwood J held that the Tribunal's decision was correct. The dermatitis was a separate disease from the infection that caused incapacity. The Tribunal was correct in its legal analysis and application of the evidence. The infection arose from an organism that could have been acquired at any time, not necessarily in the course of employment. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the Tribunal's decision upheld.

Orders