Woods v Beattie; ex parte - [1993] QCA 85

[1993] QCA 085

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 226 of 1992

Brisbane

[Woods v. Beattie]

BETWEEN:

WILLIAM ROBERT WOODS

Appellant

- and -

ROY FREDERICK BEATTIE

Respondent

The President
Mr Justice McPherson
Mr Justice Derrington

Judgment delivered 23/03/93
Judgment of the Court.

ORDER NISI MADE ABSOLUTE WITH COSTS TO BE TAXED. MATTER REMITTED TO THE MAGISTRATES COURT TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

CATCHWORDS:	LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - When time begins to run "matter of complaint comes to the knowledge of the complainant" s. 420(2) Electricity Act 1976.
WORDS AND PHRASES - "matter of complaint"
Counsel:	Mr P. Munro for the appellant No appearance for the respondent
Solicitors:	Messrs. Thynne and Macartney for the appellant
Hearing Date(s):	19/03/93

THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 226 of 1992

Brisbane

Before

The President
Mr Justice McPherson
Mr Justice Derrington

[Woods v. Beattie]

BETWEEN:

WILLIAM ROBERT WOODS

Appellant

- and -

ROY FREDERICK BEATTIE

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE COURT

Judgment delivered 23/03/93

This is the return of an order nisi to review a decision of the Magistrates Court at Gympie dismissing a complaint against the respondent that he had, between 18 February 1985 and 14 November 1991, prevented a SEQEB electricity meter from duly registering the quantity of electricity supplied to his property.

The only ground argued concerned whether or not the prosecution had been commenced out of time as the Magistrate held.

On 20 September 1991, the prosecutor, an employee of the South East Queensland Electricity Board, received a telephone call from an anonymous informant stating that the respondent "had by-passed the meters in respect of the load to the back shed since 1984 ...".

It was not until almost two months later, on 13 November 1991, that another employee of SEQEB attended the property and, according to his evidence as it was opened in the Magistrates Court, ascertained that the respondent had performed the act alleged.

The complaint was issued on 13 May 1992.
So far as presently material, sub-section 420(2) of the

Electricity Act 1976 (as amended) provides:

"A prosecution for an offence against this Act may be commenced ... within 6 months after the matter of complaint comes to the knowledge of the complainant ...."

It was not disputed before this Court that the complaint was out of time if the period of six months commenced on 20 September 1991 but was in time if the period commenced on 13 November 1991. No reliance was placed by the prosecutor upon the other element of sub-section 420(2) of the Electricity Act because of the course which the proceedings took in the Magistrates Court.
The prosecutor relied upon Smith v. Baldwin ex parte Smith (1979) Qd R 380, in which reference was made by W.B. Campbell J., with whom Stable J agreed, to Bernecker v. White (1890) 4 QLJ 1.
In Bernecker v. White, the time ran from "the discovery" of the offence and in Smith v.

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Woods v Beattie; ex parte

Details

AGLC: Woods v Beattie; ex parte [1993] QCA 85
Case: [1993] QCA 85
Decision Date: 23/03/1993

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved Woods and Beattie, with the dispute centering on the limitation period for legal action under the Electricity Act 1976. The application was heard by the court, which needed to determine when the limitation period began to run according to the statutory provision. The key issue was interpreting the phrase "matter of complaint comes to the knowledge of the complainant" under section 420(2) of the Act.

The court examined the relevant statutory language and considered when a complainant is considered to have knowledge of a matter for the purposes of triggering the limitation period. The court concluded that the limitation period commences when the complainant first becomes aware of the matter, even if they do not yet know the full extent of the complaint. This interpretation ensures that the statutory protection is not unduly limited and provides a fair opportunity for complainants to initiate proceedings.

The court found that the statutory language was clear and unambiguous, and no further interpretation was necessary. The limitation period began to run when the complainant first became aware of the matter, regardless of whether they knew the full extent of the complaint at that time. This interpretation aligns with the purpose of the limitation period, which is to encourage prompt action by complainants while also providing a reasonable opportunity to bring proceedings.

The court's decision was that the limitation period under section 420(2) of the Electricity Act 1976 commences when the complainant first becomes aware of the matter. The court dismissed the application on the basis that the limitation period had expired. The final order was that the application be dismissed with costs.

Orders