Woodruff and Woodruff

Case [2014] FamCA 1151


FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WOODRUFF & WOODRUFF [2014] FamCA 1151
FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Application by husband to set aside property orders pursuant to s 79A(1)(a) made in November 2013 – Application unsuccessful
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79A (1)(a)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Suiker & Suiker (1993) FLC 92-436
APPLICANT: Mr Woodruff
RESPONDENT: Ms Woodruff
INTERVENOR:
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:
FILE NUMBER: LNC 214 of 2012
DATE DELIVERED: 4 December 2014
PLACE DELIVERED: Launceston
PLACE HEARD: Launceston
JUDGMENT OF: Benjamin J
HEARING DATE: 4 December 2014

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Welch
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Philip Welch
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Brown
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Legal Solutions

Orders

  1. The application made by Mr Woodruff to set aside the final property orders made on 21 November 2013 is dismissed.

  2. In respect of the parties’ outstanding applications for costs, each of the parties who seeks to pursue costs orders shall:

    (a)on or before 19 December 2014, file and serve written submissions in relation to such cost applications (including reference to any filed or published material)  together with any further affidavit evidence upon which that party wishes to rely;

    (b)on or before 28 January 2015, the costs respondent may file and serve written submissions in relation to such cost applications (including reference to any filed or published material)  together with any further affidavit evidence upon which that party wishes to rely; and

    (c)on or before 6 February 2015 the costs applicant/s shall file and serve any reply to the cost respondent/s costs application.

  3. All outstanding applications are stood over for mention before me at the Launceston Registry at 10.00am on 11 February 2015. The husband is given leave to attend by telephone.

IT IS CERTIFIED

  1. Pursuant to Rule 19.50 of the Family Law Rules 2004 it was reasonable to engage counsel to attend.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Woodruff & Woodruff has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT LAUNCESTON

FILE NUMBER:  LNC 214 of 2012

Mr Woodruff

Applicant

And

Ms Woodruff

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. Mr Woodruff (‘the husband’) and Ms Woodruff (‘the wife’) entered into consent property orders (‘the orders’) on 21 November 2013 after a defended hearing had commenced the previous day.  In those orders the parties asked the Court, and the Court noted, and I quote:-

    That the parties intend these orders to be full and final settlement of their respective rights and claims against the other for property settlement and spousal maintenance pursuant to part VIII of the Family Law Act and superannuation orders pursuant to part VIIIB of the Family Law Act.

  2. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.  There are now three substantive applications before the Court.  The first is the application by the husband filed 23 May 2014, or thereabouts, to set aside the orders.  This was amended by his amended…

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AGLC
Woodruff and Woodruff [2014] FamCA 1151
Case
[2014] FamCA 1151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of *Woodruff and Woodruff*, Benjamin J of the Family Court of Australia considered an application by Mr Woodruff to set aside final property orders made on 21 November 2013. The primary dispute before the court was the validity of these previously made property orders.

The central legal issue before Benjamin J was whether the final property orders of 21 November 2013 should be set aside. This required the court to consider the grounds upon which such orders could be vitiated, likely involving an assessment of whether there was any material non-disclosure, fraud, or other vitiating factor that would justify departing from the finality of the original orders.

Benjamin J dismissed Mr Woodruff's application to set aside the final property orders. The court's reasoning, though not detailed in the provided text, led to the conclusion that the existing orders should stand. The court then made detailed orders regarding the parties' outstanding applications for costs, setting a timetable for the filing and service of written submissions and further affidavit evidence. All remaining applications were stood over for mention, with the husband granted leave to attend by telephone. The court also certified that it was reasonable to engage counsel to attend, pursuant to Rule 19.50 of the *Family Law Rules 2004*.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application made by Mr Woodruff to set aside the final property orders made on 21 November 2013 is dismissed.

2.

In respect of the parties’ outstanding applications for costs, each of the parties who seeks to pursue costs orders shall:

(a) on or before 19 December 2014, file and serve written submissions in relation to such cost applications (including reference to any filed or published material) together with any further affidavit evidence upon which that party wishes to rely;

(b) on or before 28 January 2015, the costs respondent may file and serve written submissions in relation to such cost applications (including reference to any filed or published material) together with any further affidavit evidence upon which that party wishes to rely; and

(c) on or before 6 February 2015 the costs applicant/s shall file and serve any reply to the cost respondent/s costs application.

3.

All outstanding applications are stood over for mention before me at the Launceston Registry at 10.00am on 11 February 2015. The husband is given leave to attend by telephone.

IT IS CERTIFIED

4.

Pursuant to Rule 19.50 of the Family Law Rules 2004 it was reasonable to engage counsel to attend.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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