Woodards (Central) Pty Ltd v Luntz & Co (a firm)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 6234 of 2003

WOODARDS (CENTRAL) PTY LTD Appellant
v
LUNTZ & CO (a firm) Respondent

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JUDGE:

Balmford J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

10 and 11 February 2004

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

19 February 2004

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Woodards (Central) v Luntz

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2004] VSC 41

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Appeal under Magistrates’ Court Act 1989, s.9 – contract – right to termination for breach of obligation – whether time of the essence – procuration fee for obtaining finance – appeal dismissed.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Mr A Rodbard-Bean Best Hooper
For the Respondent Mr GP Harris Piper Alderman

HER HONOUR:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal on a question of law under section 109 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 from a final order made on 15 May 2003 by the Magistrates’ Court at Melbourne constituted by Mr Lauritsen, Magistrate, whereby the appellant (“Woodards”) was ordered to pay the claim of the respondent (“Luntz”) in the sum of $29,612.50 being a procuration fee for obtaining finance, together with interest of $1,925.50 and costs of $9,485.

  1. On 29 July 2003 Master Wheeler found the following questions of law to be shown by Woodards to be raised on the appeal:

(a)whether the magistrate erred in finding that the St. George indicative offer (document 13 of exhibit TLC 2 to the affidavit of Tania Louise Cincotta dated 12 June 2003) was sufficient to satisfy Luntz’s obligation under clause 26 of the Heads of Agreement dated 16 May 2002 (document 7 of exhibit TLC-2);

(b)whether the magistrate erred in not finding that Woodards was at liberty to and did terminate the agreement between Woodards and Luntz (document 12 of exhibit TLC-2) on:

(i)the evening of 15 June 2002;  alternatively

(ii)by letter from the solicitors for Woodards to Luntz dated 18 June 2002 (document 28 of exhibit TLC-2).

  1. Counsel for Woodards effectively abandoned question (a) by making no submissions as to that question, and the matter proceeded on the basis of question (b) alone.

The facts

  1. Luntz is a firm of accountants, of which the senior partner is Mr Luntz.   Woodards is a real estate agent, and the magistrate found the driving force behind Woodards to be Mr Piccolo, whose wife was a director of Woodards.   Woodards executed Heads of Agreement on 16 May 2002 providing for the purchase by it of the assets (“the business”) of two companies to which receivers and managers (“the vendors”) had been appointed.   The Heads of Agreement provided:

(a)by clause 26, that  Woodards was required to submit to the vendors by 6 June 2002 satisfactory evidence of its ability to finance the purchase;  and

(b)by clause 34, that completion would occur on 28 June 2002, which was the last working day of the financial year.

  1. Woodards had to borrow most of the purchase money.   On 14 May, Luntz wrote to St George Bank (“St George”) seeking the necessary finance…

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Details
Case
[2004] VSC 41
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Woodards (Central) Pty Ltd v Luntz & Co (a firm) involved a dispute between the parties regarding the termination of a contract. The matter was brought before the court under an appeal from a decision made in the Magistrates’ Court. The primary issue was whether the respondent had breached the contract by failing to procure finance within the stipulated time, and if time was of the essence in this context.

The court needed to determine the legal implications of the respondent's failure to secure finance within the agreed timeframe and whether this constituted a breach of contract. A secondary issue was whether the time specified for obtaining finance was an essential condition of the contract, thus making it "time of the essence." The appellant argued that the respondent's delay in procuring finance constituted a breach of contract, justifying termination. The respondent contended that the time for obtaining finance was not critical and, therefore, did not justify termination.

The court found that the respondent's delay in procuring finance did not breach the contract, as the stipulated time was not critical to the agreement. The court held that the delay was not of such a nature that it would have materially affected the outcome of the contract. Consequently, the respondent's failure to procure finance within the agreed timeframe did not justify termination. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the original decision of the Magistrates’ Court.

As a result of the court's decision, the appeal was dismissed, and the original decision stood. The respondent was not found to have breached the contract by failing to obtain finance within the agreed time, and the appellant's right to terminate the contract was not upheld. The court's ruling clarified that the time specified for procuring finance was not an essential condition of the contract, thereby affirming the respondent's position.

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