Wood v The State of New South Wales
[2008] FMCA 566
•5 March 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WOOD v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES | [2008] FMCA 566 |
| BANKRUPTCY – Application by each of the respondent and the intervenor to that the application, statement of claim and amended statement of claim be struck out – application by the respondent that the claim for relief based on each breach of duty of care be dismissed – that the proceeding be dismissed on the basis that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding and/or claim for relief as frivolous or vexatious – that the claim for relief is an abuse of the process of the Court – costs. |
| Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) |
| Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 Delph Sing v Wood & Ors (1918) 25 CLR 497 Re Ditfort; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 347 Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666 W.P. Kidd v Panwell Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 373 |
| Applicant: | ALAN GRANT WOOD |
| Respondent: | THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES |
| File Number: | BRG 991 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Burnett FM |
| Hearing date: | 5 March 2008 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 5 March 2008 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 5 March 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared on his own behalf. |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Pryor |
ORDERS
I allow the applications brought by each of the respondent and the intervenor.
I order that the principal application be dismissed.
I direct that the applicant pay the respondent's costs to be assessed on a standard basis.
I direct that the applicant pay the intervenor's costs to be assessed on an indemnity basis.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 991 of 2007
| ALAN GRANT WOOD |
Applicant
And
| THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application that has been brought by each of the respondent, the State of New South Wales, and the Intervenor, the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, seeking orders that the application filed 21 November 2007, statement of claimed filed 14 January 2008 and amended statement of claim filed 16 January 2008 be struck out, together with orders in respect of costs. The application is made by the Intervenor.
That application is amplified by an application by the respondent which seeks orders that pursuant to r.13.01 and/or r.17.05 of the Court Rules, the claim for relief based on each breach of duty of care be dismissed on the basis that the Court lacks jurisdiction in respect of the claim; and further, or in the alternative, pursuant to s.17A of the Federal Magistrates' Act [1999] and to r.17.05 or r.13.10 of The FMC Rules, the proceeding be dismissed on the basis that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding and/or claim for relief as frivolous or vexatious; and/or the proceeding or claim for relief is an abuse of the process of the Court; and/or the application filed 21 November 2007 and the statement of claimed filed 14 January 2008, the amended statement of claim filed 16 January 2008, disclose no reasonable cause of action.
It is also an application made by the applicant himself which, when distilled from its form as filed for leave to amend the principal application and to deliver an amended statement of claim in support of that application.
Some background is necessary to understand the context in which these applications are brought. The applicant was the subject of a sequestration order which was made in this Court in its Sydney Registry on 2 July 2004. On that occasion the petitioning creditor was the respondent, the State of New South Wales, and the petitioning creditor succeeded in its sequestration application brought in respect of on act of bankruptcy which was occasioned by a failure by the applicant to pay a sum of $40,647.58. That was a sum agreed to be paid by the applicant to the creditor in respect of proceedings that had been instituted by the creditor against the applicant in the District Court of New South Wales.
Three years have elapsed since that order was made, and indeed, the applicant has now been discharged from his bankruptcy. Despite that matter he now has made application by application filed 21 November 2007 for an annulment of the original bankruptcy. The application was returnable before the Court on 12 December, and on that occasion Registrar Ramsay made various orders in respect of the delivery of the pleadings which in part included an order that the applicant file and serve upon all parties points of claim or statement of claim on or before 15 January 2008.
A formal statement of claim was delivered but for reasons that I will come to shortly it clearly falls well short of what would be regarded as an acceptable pleading. It is a document which on its face is plainly embarrassing. It fails to disclose any reasonable cause of action and could otherwise be seen to constitute an abuse of the processes of the Court. It is in response to that particular document that this application now comes before me today. At the outset an application was made by Mr Wood, who appeared for himself, for an adjournment in order to enable him time to go away and prepare his response to the applications that I am about to proceed with.
That application for an adjournment is refused, in part because the applications filed by each of the respondent and the intervenor on or about 12 February 2008 and were served shortly thereafter. Given the technical nature of the arguments involved it would seem to me that the matters could have been attended to by Mr Wood in the time available between that time and now.
Furthermore, despite that matter, there has been communication between Mr Wood and persons whom he has alleged were acting for him, and in particular, Glen Collinson of Keller Now & Brown Solicitors (who it would seem, indeed, do not act for him), informing both them and Mr Wood of the intention of the respondent and intervenor to bring this application today. Those communications in fact pre-date the bringing of the applicant’s application and were set up by correspondence which is exhibited in the affidavit of Mr Evans, which was filed on 5 February and marked Exhibit PWE4.
I say that they are matters that are relevant to the issue of discretion on this point because, although those solicitors did not act for Mr Brown, it was clear that Mr Brown had been in communication with them as Mr Evans states in his affidavit. On 1 February Mr Evans was telephoned by Mr Wood who advised him that Mr Collinson would be acting for him. He informed him that he had known the firm for many years and they would be briefing Mr Coulson of counsel. Mr Evans was left with a clear impression that Mr Coulson would be engaged to prepare a new statement of claim.
Shortly after that conversation it would seem that Mr Evans then phoned Glen Collinson of Keller Now & Brown who could not speak with him. He left a message and then subsequently on 4 February sent a letter to both Mr Wood and Mr Collinson informing them of the intention of the Official Trustee to bring the application to strike out the proceedings. Subsequently later that day he received a telephone call from Mr Collinson in which Mr Collinson informed him that neither he nor the firm were acting in the matter, but he did indicate to Mr Evans that he was helping Mr Wood put together a brief for Mr Coulson.
It would seem that from at least 4 February Mr Wood has been armed with sufficient notice of this application and, it would seem, has been in contact with persons whom he hoped to have acted for him. That is the first matter: I think there has been sufficient time.
The second point, and perhaps more tellingly, the other significant discretionary issue in the application for the adjournment is the prospect of any success in the application if an adjournment is granted. There is little utility in granting an adjournment if the application is doomed to fail in any event. I say tellingly because Mr Coulson is not here today nor is Mr Brown represented by solicitors, despite there being at least a month since that correspondence and those events of 4 February. The material itself bespeaks the absence of legal representation. It does appear to me, for reasons that I will explain in a moment, that the applications brought by both the respondent and the intervenor should succeed because, on the face of the material, there really appears to be no real prospect of the applicant successfully prosecuting his claim.
Turning then to the claim itself: as I have earlier indicated, the underlying application is an application pursuant to s.153B of the Bankruptcy Act for an annulment by the Court of the bankruptcy. Section 153B, sub-s.(1) relevantly provides that:
“If the Court is satisfied that a sequestration order ought not to have been made, or in the case of a debtor's petition that a petition ought not to have been presented, or it not to have been accepted by the official receiver, the Court may make an order annulling the bankruptcy.”
The pleading that was delivered pursuant to the order made by the Registrar was expected to flush from the applicant the relevant matters giving rise to a prima facie entitlement to relief under s.153B of the Act. Clearly if there had been allegations made which gave rise to a prima facie basis for relief, then the applicant would not be in the position he is in today. However, if one looks to the statement of claim, which is annexure F to the affidavit of Mr Gerard – it can be seen that, in essence, the applicant's allegations appear to be founded upon assertions related to the claim made by the New South Wales Government through its various agencies in respect of real estate transactions that were relevant to the conduct of his business as a conveyancer in New South Wales.
The pleading itself fails in all respects as a proper pleading, in the sense that it is embarrassing by reason of its failure to succinctly identify the relevant facts giving rise to its cause of action. As a document it constitutes more of a narration than an allegation of facts. Further, it fails to identify with any particularity the frauds and/or other misfeasance which is alleged in support of his claim; bearing in mind that when one pleads in a cause of action involving a fraud there is a very high bar to be hurdled in pleading such matters given the serious nature of allegations of fraud.
Then, perhaps finally, the pleading in its claim for relief fails to adequately particularise the basis upon which damages are to be assessed; and furthermore fails to plead an adequate causal link between the matters complained of and the relief which is sought. It might well be that with some recrafting the pleading could be corrected, but it is, frankly, not the sort of pleading that could be reasonably capable of correction. It could really only be struck out and repleaded.
It is further asserted on the part of both the respondent and the intervenor that in any event it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action. Again, when one comes back to the pleading, it is difficult in my view to discern a cause of action in the pleading. As I have already stated, it appears to be more of a rambling narration than a pleading which succinctly and clearly identifies the action to be prosecuted. Something as elementary, for instance, as to whether or not the respondent is indeed the correct respondent is a matter which is not appropriately addressed in the pleading; allegations are made, for instance, about the cancellation of the licence by the Department of Fair Trading of New South Wales; there is, for instance, no reference to legislation which indicates whether or not the Department of Fair Trading itself constitutes a body corporate – or is a statutory body capable of suing or being sued in its own right, name and title, or whether the Crown is the appropriate respondent, or whether some other respondent might otherwise be the appropriate respondent.
That is an issue that arises when actions are pleaded against the government. It is important that the correct identity of the government agency or instrumentality be identified in the pleading and that the legislative basis for such identification be pleaded. Because although a party may have a right of action against an arm of government, it is not necessarily the case that the arm of government is simply, as is alleged in this case, the State of New South Wales. It may well be, but the pleading does not assist in identifying the resolution of that issue.
So on that basis alone, arguably, the action fails to disclose a proper cause of action. Other matters arise as well: for instance, there is a failure to plead, in respect of the pleading, anything more general than that the State of New South Wales and its servants, the Director General, owed the applicant a duty of care. The particulars of that are not provided, and the allegation itself, without adequate particularisation, does not support a cause of action. Furthermore, if one is going to allege a breach of duty of care, there then of course is the need to also allege a breach of the requisite standard of care, and no standard of care allegation appears in the face of the pleading.
All up it seems to me that the pleading does not disclose a proper cause of action, at least in relation to the question of any breach of duty of care, which seems to be one of the grounds alleged.
Next, the action appears to plead a denial of natural justice. I am not certain that a bald allegation of a denial of natural justice itself enlivens a right to damages, as the nature of relief provided for denials of natural justice is more conventionally prerogative relief in the form of certiorari mandamus or prohibition. No relief is sought in that regard, so the allegation, if it has any substance, to that end is stillborn.
Finally - and it is a matter which is more generally pleaded, there is an assertion, or certainly a strongly implied assertion, that there has been some fraud or other misfeasance – and I use that term in the common law sense. Again, the particulars of the pleading are such as not to enable any sensible understanding of the cause of action to be extracted from the pleading, having regard to the manner in which the document has been drafted. Additionally and again, in any event, causation does not appear to be adequately addressed. All up it seems to me that the pleading does not properly disclose a reasonable cause of action, and on that basis it ought be struck out.
So in summary, the pleading document as it is presently pleaded offends the rules in relation to pleading in that it fails to plead material facts on the evidence; it is unduly prolix and by its form is embarrassing; and it being a pleading that involves allegations of fraud and illegality, fails to adequately particularise those matters; and in addition, fails in a technical sense to address the other matters which I have earlier related in relation to the other causes of action which may apparently be inferred to be read from the pleading, namely, negligence in respect of a breach, or denial of natural justice.
In my view it is appropriate, therefore, that the pleading be struck out on the basis of its failure to comply with those procedural requirements.
As to whether the application itself should be struck out, of course, requires the Court then to consider again those parts of s.153B which relate to whether or not the sequestration order ought to have been made. To that end Mr Wood contends even if his pleading is struck out he should be permitted leave to amend his application, because he says that the sequestration order ought not to have been made because – and to quote his words - he had a claim or set off available to him.
Section 40 of the Act is quite clear. In so far as an act of bankruptcy is concerned it says in simple terms that:
“If a creditor obtains against the debtor a final judgment and it has served on the debtor a bankruptcy notice under the Act and there is non-compliance with that notice, his only option is to satisfy the Court that he has a counter-claim, set off or cross demand equal to or amounting to the judgment debt that he could not have set up in the action.”
Having regard to the facts which are contended for by the applicant it would seem that the matters he seeks to raise are matters that could have been set up in the action which gave rise to the judgment, namely, the action wherein the Department sued him for the $600,000–odd, which in turn gave rise to the $400,000 compromise. It follows then, accepting that position, that the only other basis upon which the sequestration order ought not to have been made is that the applicant was able to demonstrate under s.52(2) of the Act that there was other sufficient cause as to why a sequestration order ought not to be made.
The law in relation to s.52(2) is fairly well settled, and perhaps the best or clearest authority in the present circumstances would be the observations of the Barwick CJ in Sandell v Porter[1] where, at page 670, considering the matter of other sufficient cause, the Chief Justice stated:
“But the debtor's own moneys are not limited to his cash resources immediately available. They extend to moneys which he can procure by realisation, by sale or by mortgage or pledge of his assets in a relatively short time, relative to the nature and amount of the debts and to the circumstances, including the nature of the business of the debtor. A conclusion of insolvency ought to be clear from a consideration of the debtor's financial position in its entirety, and generally speaking ought not to be drawn simply from evidence of a temporary lack of liquidity. It is the debtor's inability in utilising such cash resources as he has or can command through the use of his assets to meet his debts a they fall due which indicates insolvency. Whether that state of his affairs is arrived at is a question for the Court.”
[1] (1966) 115 CLR 666.
It would seem on the applicant's case that the principal asset which was available for realisation and for consideration in terms of the s.52(2) considerations was the cause of action which is now the subject of the amended pleading which I just struck out. When that particular cause of action is examined, for reasons I have earlier indicated, it is a cause of action which appears at this stage, at least in its present form, to be one which is imperfectly formed and, as it certainly reads from the narrative which the struck out pleading constitutes, to be a cause of action which does not have particularly strong prospects.
I note the complaint by Mr Wood that the effect of the sequestration was to deny him the capacity to pursue that cause of action; but needless to say, I am certain that if Mr Wood was to indemnify and fund his trustee there would have been little doubt that the trustee would have pursued a cause of action on his behalf. However, the trustee, in exercising his duties and obligations, determined that it was not worthwhile to pursue that cause of action and for that reason, I expect, did not pursue the cause of action. No doubt he formed a view that the prospects of recovery of any moneys from that cause of action were remote, if not, fanciful.
I have detailed that matter because that is the first point to be considered in terms of resolving part of this application. It was noted by the New South Wales Supreme Court in Delph Sing v Wood & Ors:
“…The Court has to consider, in the first instance, whether in its opinion a sequestration order ought not to have been made, and, if it is of that opinion, then it has to consider whether in the exercise of its discretion that order should be discharged.”[2]
If, indeed, there was on foot – a real cause of action which had real prospects which could of themselves have then been advanced as a basis to fall within the observations of the Chief Justice in Sandell v Porter[3], such that the question was, if you like, more a matter of cash flow than assets, then clearly there may have been room for argument; but in this case I do not think there was. In any event, the matter was resolved at first instance by the Court in determining the sequestration application in respect of which I note there has been no appeal.
[2] Delph Sing v Wood & Ors (1918) 25 CLR 497 at 498 citing Street J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales which judgment was affirmed on appeal.
[3] (1966) 115 CLR 666.
In my view, the applicant really fails in limine because he fails on this essential threshold question to demonstrate that it is indeed a situation where a sequestration order ought not to have been made. In the event that I am wrong on that point and Mr Wood is able to persuade another Court that he in fact could overcome the threshold problem, then the next question to be resolved is whether or not the Court was bound to make the original sequestration order.
There were two lines of argument identified by Mr Evans in his outline. The lines of authority indicate there are both narrow and wide views. Mr Wood prefers, he says, the wide view to the narrow view, but with respect to Mr Wood the statement was made out of context, not appreciating the nature of the Court's views in relation to whether there should be a narrow or a wide view adopted.
The narrow view is demonstrated by the comments in cases such as re Frank ex parte Polici, and re Jenane ex parte Jenane, which cases adopt the view that if the sequestration order was made in circumstances where the Court exercised its discretion to do so, it is only if it can be demonstrated that none of the circumstances justifying the making of the order existed that the Court's discretion arises under s 153B. Upon the narrow view, I think that the circumstances justifying the making of that order can be said to have existed. I think the order was an order that was appropriate, having regard to the information or material before me.
The wider view, which is the view preferred by the applicant, is that other factors might come to light after the original hearing to indicate that the sequestration order ought not to have been made those matters ought be considered. He relied upon the observations of Gummow J in Re Ditfort; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation.[4] However, this is not a case where it is said that other material has come to light since the sequestration order indicating the sequestration order ought not to have been made, and to that end I think that Mr Wood misunderstood the wide view. Mr Wood relies upon matters that were evident at the time the sequestration order was made. If they were not advanced at the time of the original application then that is a problem with Mr Wood's initial prosecution of his response to the sequestration application. In any event it seems to me from the material that it is unlikely the matter was not advanced on the first occasion.
[4] (1988) 19 FCR 347.
Based on the material that has been put before me, that there is no reason why the circumstances before the Court in July 2004 would not have warranted the making of the sequestration order. Indeed, as Mr Evans submits in his outline at paragraph 30, the affidavit material of Mr Wood supports the view that the original making of the sequestration order was completely in order because he swears to these matters: first, that on 13 August 1998 a receiver was appointed to his business, Twin Towns Conveyancing; second, that on 15 July 2002 the State of New South Wales issued proceedings against him pursuant to the Property Stock and Business Agents Act seeking reimbursement of funds paid out to Sitco Industries Proprietary Limited, Vincent O'Malley, and costs incurred by the receiver of the business; third, that in settlement of the claim by the State Mr Wood agreed to pay a sum of $40,647.58, being the costs of the receiver; fourth, that Mr Wood has not – and never has paid that settlement sum for $40,647.58; fifth, that on 2 July, following a hearing in this Court in Sydney, a sequestration order was made; sixth, that Mr Wood appeared at that hearing and made submissions; and seventh, that Mr Wood acknowledges that at the time the sequestration order was made that he had two creditors, namely the State of New South Wales in the sum of $40,647.58, and a Mrs J. Terry in the sum of $2000; and finally that he was unable to pay those debts when they fell due, although he had offered to pay them off over time.
In conclusion, it seems to me that there is no reason why the original sequestration order ought not to have been made.
Finally, there are the discretionary considerations. I think the order should have been made, but in the event that an order ought not to have been made, this Court still has a discretion under s.153B to consider whether it ought make an order annulling the bankruptcy. That imposes an onus upon the applicant to demonstrate the Court ought exercise its jurisdiction to annul the bankruptcy.
A number of factors are relevant to the exercise of the discretion. The most significant of those are these: first, the timeliness of the application for annulment. This application has now been brought approximately three and a half years since the sequestration order. There has been no explanation for the delay nor has there been any attempt to explain the delay. Indeed, the bankrupt is now discharged from bankruptcy by reason of the operation of law. There has been no challenge to the judgment debt upon which the bankruptcy notice was based. It was indeed based upon a debt following a consent judgment entered in settlement of legal proceedings. Despite there being some assertion in relation to other matters, there is no suggestion of any denial of natural justice in the making of the sequestration order, given that the applicant was both present at the proceedings and by telephone he also made submissions. His satisfaction with the process is in part indicated by his failure to appeal any order made as he ought to have done if he was unhappy with the manner in which the process proceeded.
In addition, when one looks at the conduct of the applicant since the bankruptcy, he has done nothing except allow the bankruptcy to expire. He has not proceeded to seek to set aside the judgment underlying the original bankruptcy debt nor appeal the order made by the Court in July 2004.
It is also contended for on the part of the trustee that there was some question about the bankrupt's motive for the issuing of proceedings. He notes, for instance, that on the one hand the bankrupt claims he wishes to clear his name before he dies, but on the other hand he wants this Court to award a significant sum of money by way of damages for a wrongful bankruptcy. It does, as I say, send a confused message as to his motivation. In my view that is another matter which would be considered in the context of the timeliness application brought by the applicant for his annulment.
Finally, the other discretionary consideration which I think is worthy of comment concerns the utility of granting such an application. As the trustee says, the applicant has a perfectly sensible and easier option of simply paying out his creditors, trustee's costs, and being annulled pursuant to s.153A of the Act. Mr Wood has been advised of this particular option. However he is also aware that that course may compromise any attempt by him to maintain his damages proceedings. So he chose not to.
In summary, I do not think that even if I was wrong on the first point and that the sequestration order ought not to have been made, that in any event I would be inclined to exercise the discretion in his favour, if he was able to successfully overcome that threshold point. I have already stated I would not annul the sequestration order which was made in July 2004.
Accordingly, I allow the applications brought by each of the respondent and the intervenor.
I will order that the principal application be dismissed.
By reason of those orders it is not necessary for me to deal with the application filed by Mr Wood, who seeks that he be granted leave to amend his original application and to file a further amended statement of claim in support of that application, and so too that application will be dismissed.
In this application the intervenor seeks costs on an indemnity basis; the respondent seeks costs on the standard basis. Dealing with the respondent's costs first, there is really no reason why the respondent, having been successful in its application to dismiss the proceeding, that it should not be awarded its costs. Mr Wood has no answer to the submission that the usual order should follow. I direct that the applicant pay the respondent's costs to be assessed on a standard basis.
For the intervenor, Mr Evans does press for an order for indemnity costs. He particularly has directed me to a decision of McMeekin J in a case of W. P. Kidd v Panwell Pty Ltd.[5] There his Honour has very helpfully collected a series of authorities which are otherwise well known to the Court in the context of applications for indemnity costs. His Honour notes – and as is well accepted:
“In order to justify an order which departs from the usual practice of simply awarding costs on the standard basis, there needs to be some special or unusual feature of the case which warrants that order.”
[5] [2007] QSC 373.
In that regard Sheppard J in the well-known decision of Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd[6] page 233, His Honour said regard ought to be had to factors such as:
“Instances of the making of allegations of fraud knowing them to be false and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud; evidence of particular misconduct that causes loss of time to the Court and to the other parties; or the fact that proceedings were commenced or continued for some ulterior motive; or wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law; or the making of allegations which ought never to have been made; or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions.”
[6] (1993) 46 FCR 225.
Those matters are said to have relevance in the context of this case because, first, it is submitted that the application was hopeless at the outset. I think, with the greatest of respect to Mr Wood, that that is a fair assessment of the prospects of the annulment application in this case, particularly because of the failure by the applicant to resolve questions which have been agitated today on appeal if he was unhappy with the resolution of them at first instance. The fact remains that this prospective cause of action, if it indeed has any prospects, might well be statute barred. Finally the fact remains that it struck me as a hopeless cause of action. That in turn led to a hopeless application seeking to demonstrate that the sequestration order ought not to have been made.
Secondly, it is said that the pleading was embarrassing with respect to Mr Wood, it is a hopelessly embarrassing document and it does not surprise me in the least that today there has been no-one here to assist him. The document is one which I do not think any reasonably competent counsel would lend support to. I think any competent counsel would start by striking the entire document out and commencing afresh. The document, to my mind, is one which is simply irretrievably bad and cannot be salvaged.
The third point made is that legal advice was sought, and I have already commented upon that. Although I do not draw any inference on the failure of somebody to appear today – that could well be a matter which arises because of financial circumstances – the fact remains it does seem that there was at least some effort to obtain advice, and I can only speculate about what that advice may have been.
Irrespective of that matter, the fourth matter raised by Mr Evans, I think, is most telling. That is that in two comprehensive letters, with both citing the relevant authorities, the applicant was informed of what would occur in the event that he did not adopt a sensible approach to the application. It seems to me that in all of the circumstances, when one has regard to all those matters, that they together constitute special or unusual features which would justify the Court departing from the ordinary practice. I direct that the applicant pay the intervenor's costs to be assessed on an indemnity basis.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Burnett FM
Associate: Kimberley Thorne
Date: 2 April 2008
0
5
2