Wood v Lee-Joe
[2014] FCCA 309
•24 February 2014
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WOOD v LEE-JOE | [2014] FCCA 309 |
| Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – Application for interim injunction under s.46PO(6) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act1986 (Cth) based on alleged contravention of s.25(2)(b) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1999 (Cth) – whether carer has standing to make an application under s.46PO(1) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act1986 (Cth) on behalf of the person claiming disability – whether s.12(8) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1999 (Cth) denies the Court jurisdiction to deal with an application for discrimination based on contravention of s.25(2)(b) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1999 (Cth) – whether prima facie case of unlawful discrimination based on contravention of s.25(2)(b) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1999 made out – whether balance of convenience favours the granting of injunction – application refused. |
| Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act1986 (Cth) ss.3, 46PH, 46PO, 46PP Commonwealth Constitution, s.51(xxix) Disability Discrimination Act 1999, ss.4, 12, 25 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), ss.9, 28 |
| Aldridge v Booth (1988) 80 ALR 1 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 Harry Wood For Elsie Lynne Neilson v Andrew Mark Lee-Joe [2013] FCCA 1665 Kolback Securities v Epoch Mining NL (1987) 8 NSWLR 533 |
| Applicant: | HARRY WOOD, CARER FOR MISS ELSIE LYNNE NEILSON |
| Respondent: | ANDREW MARK LEE-JOE |
| File Number: | SYG 225 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 19 February 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 20 February 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 24 February 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitor for the Applicant: | Dr Spence |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Brennan |
| Solicitor for the Respondent: | Ms Keith |
ORDERS
The interlocutory application filed in the Federal Court on 3 January 2014 for an order that the orders made by this Court on 22 October 2013 be renewed is dismissed.
Subject to paragraph 3, the costs of the application are reserved.
The respondent have liberty to apply on seven days notice for such order as to the costs of the application as the respondent may be advised to make.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 225 of 2014
| HARRY WOOD, CARER FOR MISS ELSIE LYNNE NEILSON |
Applicant
And
| ANDREW MARK LEE-JOE |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
On 22 October 2013 I granted the applicant, Mr Harry Wood, as carer for Ms Elsie Lynne Neilson, an injunction restraining the respondent, Mr Lee-Joe, from taking steps to evict Mr Wood from premises he and Ms Nielson occupy at Unit 9, 11-13 Pittwater Road, Manly (Unit).[1] Mr Lee-Joe is the registered proprietor of the Unit. I granted the injunction under s.46PP(1) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (Act) in aid of a complaint Mr Wood lodged with the Australian Human Rights Commission (Commission), and for a period ending on the day on which Mr Wood’s complaint to the Commission was to be terminated under s.46PH of the Act.
[1] Harry Wood For Elsie Lynne Neilson v Andrew Mark Lee-Joe [2013] FCCA 1665
The complaint to the Commission was terminated on 18 November 2013. Mr Lee-Joe then took steps to have Mr Wood and Ms Neilson evicted from the Unit. On 3 January 2014, after Mr Wood received notice from the Office of NSW Sheriff that it was about to execute a writ of possession issued by the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal of New South Wales (CTTT), Mr Wood, purportedly as carer for Ms Neilson, commenced proceedings in the Federal Court under s.46PO(1) of the Act. In his originating application Mr Wood claims compensation in the amount of $50,000 “due to the hurt and suffering occasioned to the Applicant and Ms Neilson and to the damage to Ms Neilson’s health and the detriment suffered by her due to the failure of the Respondent to ameliorate the deleterious conditions of the property leased to the Applicant and Ms Neilson”. Mr Wood also claims an order that “the Respondent desist from unlawfully attempting to evict the Applicant and Ms Neilson from the subject premises”.
At the time he filed the originating application with the Federal Court, Mr Wood also filed an interlocutory application for an order that the Federal Court “renew the orders” I made on 22 October 2013, and he applied for such order ex parte. That application was heard by Bennett J on 3 January 2014 who granted an injunction restraining the Office of NSW Sheriff from taking steps to execute the writ of possession up to 7 January 2014. On 6 January 2014 Logan J extended the orders made by Bennett J on 3 January 2014 until 9 January 2014. On 8 January 2014 Logan J ordered that the hearing of Mr Wood’s interlocutory application take place on 4 February 2014 and that the injunction his Honour granted on 6 January continue until 4 February 2014.
Sometime before 4 February 2014 the parties agreed that the matter be transferred to this Court, and into my docket. The matter then came before me on 6 February 2014. On that day Mr Lee-Joe, by his counsel, consented (without admission) to my extending the injunction granted by Logan J on 8 January until 11 am on 24 February 2014. I also ordered that the hearing of Mr Wood’s interlocutory application take place on 20 February 2014.
I subsequently heard Mr Wood’s interlocutory application on 19 February 2014. In these reasons, I consider Mr Wood’s application for an interlocutory injunction.
Principles for the granting of interlocutory injunction
This Court has power under s.46PO(6) of the Act to grant, if it thinks fit, an interim injunction pending the determination of proceedings commenced under s.46PO(1) of the Act. In my opinion, subject to modifications expressly or impliedly required by the Act itself,[2] the power conferred by s.46PO(6) is to be exercised according to the principles courts of equity have traditionally exercised to grant injunctions to “keep matters in statu quo until the rights of the parties can be determined at the hearing of the suit”.[3] Under those principles, a court will grant an interlocutory injunction if it is satisfied:[4]
a)there “is a serious question to be tried or that the [applicant] has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the [applicant] will be held entitled to relief”;
b)the applicant “will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted”; and
c)the “balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction”.
[2] For example, s.46PO(8) of the Act which provides that the Court cannot, as a condition of granting an interim injunction, require a person to give an undertaking as to damages.
[3] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 at 216 (Gleeson CJ).
[4] Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 at 153 (Mason ACJ).
In my reasons for judgment for granting the injunction on 22 October 2013 (my earlier reasons) I set out some principles relating to the second and third of these elements, and I will not repeat them in these reasons.[5] Also, as in my earlier reasons, I will use the expression “prima facie case of unlawful discrimination” to include the raising of a serious question to be tried about whether there has been unlawful discrimination.
[5] Harry Wood For Elsie Lynne Neilson v Andrew Mark Lee-Joe [2013] FCCA 1665
Before I consider Mr Wood’s application, it would also be useful to refer to the principles that should guide me when disputed issues of law arise on an application for an interlocutory injunction. These principles are relevant to this application because, as is revealed later in these reasons, counsel for Mr Lee-Joe relied on a number of legal arguments in support of his contention that Mr Wood cannot show a prima facie case for the relief which he seeks. For the purposes of the application before me, therefore, I will rely on the following statement of principles declared by McLelland J in Kolback Securities Ltd v Epoch Mining NL:[6]
As I see it, the position is as follows. Where a plaintiff's entitlement to ultimate relief is uncertain, the Court, in deciding to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction, must consider what course is best calculated to achieve justice between the parties in the circumstances of the particular case, pending the resolution of the uncertainty, bearing in mind the consequences to the defendant of the grant of an injunction in support of relief to which the plaintiff may ultimately be held not to be entitled, and the consequences to the plaintiff of the refusal of an injunction in support of relief to which the plaintiff may ultimately be held to be entitled . . . . Where the uncertainty depends in whole or in part on a contested question of fact it is not appropriate for the Court to decide that question on the interlocutory application. Where the uncertainty depends in whole or in part on a contested question of law, it may or may not be appropriate for the Court to decide that question on the interlocutory application, depending on circumstances, eg, whether the question is novel or difficult, or is susceptible of resolution on the present state of the evidence, or whether the urgency of the matter renders it impracticable to give proper consideration to the question . . . . If the Court does decide the question of law the uncertainty is to that extent removed.
[6] (1987) 9 NSWLR 533 at 535
Prima facie case
The cause of action in aid of which Mr Wood seeks an interlocutory injunction is one based on the allegation that Mr Lee-Joe contravened s.25(2)(b) and s.25(2)(c) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA). That is the cause of action which, in my earlier reasons, I understood Mr Wood asserted, and on the basis of which I granted the injunction under s.46PP(1) of the Act.
The evidence on which Mr Wood relies for the claimed contravention of the DDA in these proceedings mostly consists of the evidence I considered and which I set out in my earlier reasons. And while in this application Mr Lee-Joe has relied on evidence that was not before me on the hearing of Mr Wood’s application for the injunction under s.46PP(1) of the Act (earlier hearing), the evidence Mr Lee-Joe adduced has not led to a set of factual issues which differs from the factual issues which I identified in my earlier reasons. Thus, if nothing else were submitted on behalf of Mr Lee-Joe, I would conclude in this application, as I had concluded in my earlier reasons, that Mr Wood has established a prima facie case for the relief he seeks. Counsel for Mr Lee-Joe has, however, submitted Mr Wood has no prima facie case for reasons which have nothing to do with the disputed questions of fact.
First, counsel for Mr Lee-Joe submits the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain Mr Wood’s application. He submits that s.25 of the DDA is a “limited application provision” as defined in s.12(1) of the DDA; that, being a limited application provision, s.25 has effect as provided in each of the subsections (3)-(7) of s.12; the only subsection of s.12 which can conceivably give s.25 of the DDA effect so as to apply to the circumstances of this case is subsection (8); s.12(8) provides that the limited application provisions have effect in relation to discrimination against a person with a disability to the extent that the provisions “give effect” to a number of conventions,[7] or relate to matters external to Australia or relate to matters of international concern; and Mr Wood’s claim does not engage any norm or obligation provided for in the only conventions which could conceivably be relevant, namely the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (relevant conventions).
[7] The relevant conventions being the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Counsel’s submission construes the words “give effect to” appearing in s.12(8) of the DDA as operating to apply the terms of the relevant conventions as laws of Australia, or at least to require provisions such as s.25 of the DDA to be read as having no broader operation than the terms of the conventions. In my opinion, to so construe the words “give effect” is incorrect. The purpose of s.12(8) is simply to identify the constitutional source of the enactment of provisions such as s.25 of the DDA, and to identify how such provisions rely on that constitutional power. The relevant source of power is s.51(xxix) of the Constitution; and the manner in which provisions such as s.25 of the DDA are said to rely on s.51(xxix) of the Constitution is that they give effect to the matters covered by conventions to which Australia has acceded. Provisions, such as s.25 of the DDA, which are stated have effect to the extent they give effect to the relevant conventions, are intended to operate on their own terms, provided the provisions constitute a lawful exercise of power conferred by s.51(xxix) of the Constitution.
This proposition was assumed to be correct in the context of s.28 of the Sex Discriminations Act 1984 (Cth) (SDA) which, by s. 9(10) of that Act, had effect “to the extent that the provisions give effect to the Convention”.[8] That context arose in Aldridge v Booth[9] where it was submitted that s.28 of the SDA was beyond the power conferred by s.51(xxix) of the Constitution because, so it was submitted, the relevant convention did not impose an obligation on Australia. Spender J, sitting in the Federal Court, and referring to passages from the reasons of judgment delivered in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen,[10] held it was “sufficient to give effect to a Convention if an Act gives effect to the principles stated in the Convention”, and that “it is not necessary that the legislation implement an obligation imposed on Australia by its adoption of the Convention, and s 28, in relation to discrimination against women in employment, does that”.[11]
[8] Being the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women”.
[9] (1988) 80 ALR 1 (FCA, Spender J)
[10] (1982) 153 CLR 168.
[11] At page 12.
I have no doubt, therefore, that s.12(8) of the DDA does not deny the Court the power to entertain Mr Wood’s claim.
Second, counsel for Mr Lee-Joe submits Mr Wood has no standing to bring these proceedings; the only person who can bring these proceedings is Ms Neilson. Whether or not that submission is correct depends on s.46PO(1) of the Act, which provides as follows (emphasis added):
If:
(a)a complaint has been terminated by the President under section 46PE or 46PH; and
(b)the President has given a notice to any person under subsection 46PH(2) in relation to the termination;
any person who was an affected person in relation to the complaint may make an application to the . . . Federal Circuit Court, alleging unlawful discrimination by one or more of the respondents to the terminated complaint.
Except in Part IIC of the Act, the expression “complaint” is defined in s.3(1) to mean a complaint that has been lodged under Division 1 of Part IIB. The expression “affected person, in relation to a complaint” is defined in s.3(1) to mean “a person on whose behalf the complaint was lodged”. On the plain meaning of the text, the only person who can apply to the Court under s.46PO(1) of the Act is the person on whose behalf the complaint was lodged with the Commission under the Act. In this case, that person was Ms Neilson, not Mr Wood.
That the only person who can apply under s.46PO(1) of the Act is the person on whose behalf the complaint was made to the Commission is supported by the persons who may, under s.46PP(1), apply for an interim injunction. Those persons are the “complainant”, the Commission or an “affected person”. The expression “complainant”, when used in relation to a complaint, is defined in s.3(1) to mean “a person who lodged the complaint, whether on the person’s own behalf or on behalf of another person or persons”. This indicates that a carer may apply for an interim injunction under s.46PP(1) on behalf of a person who claims unlawful discrimination, but only a person on whose behalf a complaint is made can bring an application under s.46PO(1) of the Act.
Accordingly, I accept counsel’s submission that Mr Wood cannot bring these proceedings and therefore has no prima face case for the relief which he seeks.
At the hearing, Mr Wood sought leave to file an amended originating application naming Ms Neilson as applicant. Counsel for Mr Lee-Joe opposed the amendment on the ground that more than 60 days passed since the proceeding before the Commission terminated. The consequence of that is that Ms Neilson cannot apply for any relief under s.46PO of the Act unless the Court allows her to do that, and Ms Neilson has not applied to the Court for leave to file an application out of time. In my opinion, leave should not be granted to the filing of the proposed amended originating application unless Ms Neilson first applies for leave to file an application under s.46PO(1) outside the sixty day period allowed under s.46PO(2), and the Court orders that she be allowed to file an application.
Third, counsel for Mr Lee-Joe submitted that, in my earlier reasons, I applied an indubitably erroneous construction of “disability”, as defined in s.4(1) of the DDA, in concluding that it was reasonably arguable that Ms Neilson had an ongoing defect in the functioning of her lungs and that that constitutes a partial loss of Ms Neilson’s bodily function. The error is said to consist in my failing to distinguish between a bodily part that does not function and the loss of a person’s functioning. It is possible for a bodily part not to function and yet not affect a person’s functioning. That, as I understood it, was counsel’s submission.
I am not in a position to determine on this interlocutory hearing on a final basis the merit of counsel’s submission. In my opinion, the making of the submission only adds another issue to the question whether there is a prima facie case that Ms Neilson has a “disability” within the meaning of the Act. Based on the evidence that was before me in the earlier hearing, and which was again before me on the hearing of this interlocutory application, and based on what I said about this topic in my earlier reasons, I remain satisfied there is a prima facie case Ms Neilson suffers from a “disability” within the meaning of the DDA.
Fourth, counsel for Mr Lee-Joe submits that, quite apart from Mr Wood’s not having standing and what counsel submits was my erroneous construction of “disability”, the case of unlawful discrimination is very weak. In my opinion, it is not appropriate in the circumstances of this application to consider whether the case of unlawful discrimination is weak. I need only record that, ignoring the issue of Mr Wood’s competence to commence these proceedings, and Ms Neilson’s not having filed an application within time, the evidence that was led in the application before me does not cause me to alter the opinion which I expressed in my earlier reasons that Ms Neilson has a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.
Position of Mr Wood if confined to damages
My conclusion that Mr Wood does not have the capacity to commence these proceedings by itself leads me to the conclusion that he has no prima facie case, and, for that reason alone, the application for interlocutory relief should be dismissed.[12] I will consider, however, the other two elements for the granting of interlocutory injunctions, assuming Mr Wood has standing to apply under s.46PO(1) of the Act on behalf of himself and Ms Neilson.
[12] “Unless the plaintiff shows that there is at least a serious question to be tried which if resolved in its favour would entitle it to final relief, then the requirements of justice as between the parties will dictate that an interlocutory injunction should be refused” (Kolback Securities v Epoch Mining NL (1987) 8 NSWLR 533 at 535, McLelland J.)
If an injunction is not granted, the writ of possession the CTTT issued, and which, I have been informed, is currently in the hands of the Office of NSW Sheriff, will be executed, and Mr Wood and Ms Neilson will be evicted from the Unit. That means that, for all practical purposes, Ms Neilson’s remedy will be restricted to her claim for compensation. In my earlier reasons I found that compensation would not be an adequate remedy for Ms Neilson’s loss of possession of the Unit. This conclusion, however, is not available to me on the evidence that was adduced at the hearing of the application before me now.
First, there is the following passage from a letter dated 30 October 2012 Mr Wood sent to Mr Lee-Joe.[13] In that letter, Mr Wood said:
If at any time you are prepared to lodge a security in relation to the damages that Lynne and I are claiming from you in our aforementioned matters, with the Australian Human Rights Commissioner and/or the Federal Court of Australia, we will promptly vacate the abovementioned unit, subject to the lift in the pertinent complex not being out of service, and ensure that the Caveat that is about to be put on that unit, with respect to those damages, is promptly removed.
[13] Exhibit 1
Second, Mr Wood was cross-examined about parts of the same letter, in the course of which Mr Wood gave the following evidence:
And see - - -? --- Yes
- - - that you go on to deal with the risk that you face is that, as I understand what you’re saying here, Mr Lee-Joe might get vacant possession, move in, get the faults rectified, sell the place and then move on perhaps overseas and then you wouldn’t be able to get your damages from it? --- You just hit the nail on the head.
And that was your concern then and that’s your concern now? --- That is our whole concern, sir.
And so but for that concern you and Ms Neilson would be content to move out of the unit? --- Yes.
There is more evidence along the same lines, but there is no need to set it out in these reasons.
This evidence indicates, and I find, that Mr Wood and Ms Neilson consider compensation is an adequate remedy for the wrongful discrimination Mr Wood claims Mr Lee-Joe engaged in against Ms Neilson. In substance, it is the only remedy which Mr Wood seeks. The purpose for which Mr Wood seeks the injunction is to provide security for the payment of compensation Mr Lee-Joe may be ordered to pay if Mr Wood succeeds establishing Mr Lee-Joe engaged in unlawful discrimination.
Balance of Convenience
There is no suggestion that if, an injunction is granted, Mr Wood will not be in a position to continue to pay rent. Mr Lee-Joe, however, has stated on oath that he intends to renovate and sell the Unit, and that his intention in that regard has nothing to do with Ms Neilson’s asserted disability. Whether or not that is so is something that can only be determined at the final hearing of the matter. Nevertheless, I must treat Mr Lee-Joe’s stated intention of wishing to sell the Unit as giving rise to the risk that if the injunction is not granted, Mr Lee-Joe will miss the opportunity to renovate and sell the Unit in the manner and time that suits him.
Given that I have found Mr Wood and Ms Neilson consider that compensation is an adequate remedy, but there is a risk that if an injunction is granted Mr Lee-Joe will face the prospect of detriment in the form of his not being able to sell his Unit at a time that best suits him, I am of the opinion that the balance of convenience is against the granting of the injunction.
Other matters
Counsel for Mr Lee-Joe submits that Mr Wood’s application for an interlocutory injunction is an abuse of process because the purpose for which Mr Wood has sought the injunction is not to preserve the status quo pending the determination of the claims made in the originating process, but to obtain security for an order for compensation the Court may grant if Ms Neilson succeeds in her claims of unlawful discrimination.
The evidence is clear that Mr Wood seeks the interlocutory injunction to obtain security for any order of compensation he or Ms Neilson may succeed in obtaining in these proceedings. That is not a permissible purpose for claiming an interlocutory injunction.
The Court does have power to grant an injunction for the purpose for which Mr Wood seeks the injunction. Such injunctions are now called “freezing orders” or “asset preservation orders”. However, such injunctions are ordered on the basis of grounds and rules of practice peculiar to them. An applicant will normally have to show that he or she has an arguable claim against the respondent, and that there is a substantial risk that the respondent, on becoming aware of the claim, will dissipate his or her assets. An applicant would also normally have to give an undertaking as to damages.
Mr Wood has not in terms applied for a freezing order. Nor can his application be treated as making any such application. Further, the evidence could not support the granting of such an injunction. There is no evidence Mr Lee-Joe intends to dissipate his assets in response to the claim Mr Wood has made against him. Mr Wood has proffered no undertaking as to damages. And even if Mr Wood could overcome these difficulties, the injunction Mr Wood seeks, if granted, will affect an asset – the Unit – which far exceeds the maximum value of the $50,000 claim for compensation Mr Wood makes in these proceedings.
Counsel for Mr Lee-Joe also submits that the injunction should not be granted because of Mr Wood’s delay in bringing this application.
The evidence shows that by no later than 25 November 2013, Mr Wood was made aware that Ms Neilson’s complaint before the Commission had been terminated. Yet Mr Wood made no application to the Federal Court until 3 January 2014. Mr Wood gave the following evidence about the reasons he did not commence proceedings until 3 January 2014:
And so 25 November is your best recollection of when you knew the complaint had been terminated? --- Well, yes, like I just said, yes.
Right. And you can’t give any explanation, other than that you were busy [as a carer], why you didn’t contact Dr Spence until 23 December? --- Yes, I can. That was the day the sheriff rang me, and told me that I was lucky they were going on holidays, and I would have to wait until they come back, until after 6 January.
I would not have regarded Mr Wood’s delay by itself as a reason for denying the injunction, or even as a factor for denying the injunction. Mr Wood’s delay in bringing the action, however, created an urgency that otherwise may not have arisen. It necessitated the urgent approach to the Federal Court on three occasions in early January 2014. It required the urgent attention of Mr Lee-Joe and his lawyers in early January 2014 and the disruption such urgency inevitably creates, particularly at that time of the year. And it required the urgent attention of this Court.
Conclusion and disposition
I have concluded that Mr Wood has not established a prima facie case for the relief which he seeks in the originating application because he is not the proper party to file an application under s.46PO(1) of the Act in relation to the unlawful discrimination Mr Wood claims Mr Lee-Joe engaged in. I have also concluded that, to the extent Mr Wood does have a prima facie case, compensation is an adequate remedy because the only remedy Mr Wood in fact seeks is an order for compensation; and, in any event, the balance of convenience favours my refusing to grant an injunction. I have also concluded that the injunction should not be granted because Mr Wood applied for the injunction for a purpose outside the legitimate purpose for which an interim injunction may be granted under s.46PO(6) of the Act. Accordingly, I propose to dismiss the application for interlocutory relief Mr Wood filed with the Federal Court.
As to costs, I note Mr Lee-Joe has filed evidence of the costs he has incurred in relation to these proceedings. In my opinion, it would be inappropriate to order costs on the basis of that evidence. The principal reason is that much of the work done in relation to the hearing of the interlocutory injunction – and in particular, the preparation of affidavits - will be work that will also be used at the final hearing of the claims made in the originating application. In these circumstances, I propose to reserve the question of costs, although I will reserve liberty to Mr Lee-Joe to make such application as to costs as he may be advised he should make.
I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis
Associate:
Date: 24 February 2014
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