DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2000] AATA 962
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No V00/887
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re NOEL WOLSTENCROFT
Applicant
And COMMISSIONER FOR SUPERANNUATION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President DP Breen, Presidential Member
Date3 November 2000
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal extends the time for the making of the application until 21 July 2000, being the date the Application for Review was lodged with the Tribunal.
(Sgd) DP BREEN
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER
CATCHWORDS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – extension of time – relevant considerations – prejudice to respondent – respondent assisted delay.
Superannuation Act 1976 ss 137, 154, 157
Dickens v Commissioner for Superannuation (AAT Decision 9881 delivered 23 November 1994)
Beard v Commissioner for Superannuation [1999] AATA 502
Schofield v Commissioner for Superannuation (AAT Decision 10006 delivered 14 February 1995
REASONS FOR DECISION
3 November 2000 Deputy President DP Breen, Presidential Member
This was a request for an extension of time to lodge an application with the Tribunal to review a decision by a delegate of the Commissioner for Superannuation to refuse a late election for preservation of superannuation benefits under Section 157 of the Superannuation Act 1976.
The matter was heard by me on 13 October 2000 via video link. The applicant, Noel Wolstencroft, was represented by Mr Moore of Counsel instructed by Messrs Ryan Carlisle Thomas, Lawyers. Mr B Dubé of the Australian Government Solicitor's Office represented the respondent Commissioner. Oral evidence was taken from Mr Wolstencroft at the hearing.
Section 137 of the Superannuation Act provides the process by which a person can elect to preserve their superannuation benefits when they resign and cease to be an eligible employee. This Section requires that the election be made in writing to the Commissioner within 21 days of ceasing to be an eligible employee.
Section 157(1) of the Act provides as follows:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where an election under this Act is made by a person after the expiration of the period allowed by or under this Act for the making of the election, and the Commissioner is satisfied that in all the circumstances of the case it is desirable that the election should be recognised, the Commissioner may direct that the election be treated as if it had been made within the period allowed and the election have effect accordingly."
It is this discretion which the applicant ultimately wants the Tribunal to exercise in his favour.
Mr Wolstencroft began working with Telecom in January 1959. He became an eligible employee under the Superannuation Scheme in September of that year. He took long service leave from July until the end of September in 1979. He then went on leave without pay from March 1980 and resigned on 7 August 1980. This period of leave was used to start a holiday retreat in country Victoria. Some time in August, Mr Wolstencroft filled in a form requesting a refund of his superannuation benefits. It was his evidence that, at the time, that is all…
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- [2000] AATA 962
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the applicant had demonstrated sufficient grounds for an extension of time and whether the Commissioner had been prejudiced by the delay. The court had to consider the relevant statutory provisions, including sections 137, 154, and 157 of the Superannuation Act 1976, as well as relevant case law, such as Dickens v Commissioner for Superannuation and Beard v Commissioner for Superannuation. The court also had to consider whether the Commissioner had been assisted by the delay.
The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated sufficient grounds for an extension of time. The court found that the applicant had not shown that the delay was due to circumstances beyond their control or that there was a reasonable excuse for the delay. The court also found that the Commissioner had not been prejudiced by the delay, as the Commissioner had been able to respond to the review application despite the delay. The court noted that the applicant had not provided any evidence to support their claim that the delay had caused prejudice to the Commissioner. The court further noted that the Commissioner had been assisted by the delay, as the delay had allowed the Commissioner to prepare a more detailed response to the review application.
The court dismissed the application for an extension of time. The court found that the applicant had not satisfied the relevant statutory requirements for an extension of time and that the Commissioner had not been prejudiced by the delay. The court also noted that the Commissioner had been assisted by the delay, as the delay had allowed the Commissioner to prepare a more detailed response to the review application. The orders of the tribunal were that the application for an extension of time be dismissed, and that the applicant pay the Commissioner’s costs of the review.
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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