Wollongong Corporation v Cowan

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning a personal injury claim brought by Mrs. Maizie Cowan against the Council of the City of Greater Wollongong. Mrs. Cowan alleged that she suffered injury due to the Council's negligence in maintaining a slippery, polished linoleum floor in the town hall. After a jury found in favour of the Council, Mrs. Cowan appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking a new trial on the grounds of fresh evidence discovered after the initial trial. The Supreme Court granted a new trial, and the Council appealed this decision to the High Court.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Supreme Court erred in granting a new trial based on the discovery of fresh evidence. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the newly discovered evidence met the stringent legal criteria required to disturb a verdict that had been regularly obtained. This involved assessing whether the evidence was likely to produce an opposite result, whether reasonable diligence had been exercised to obtain such evidence prior to the first trial, and whether the affidavit supporting the application for a new trial was sufficiently detailed and credible.

The High Court reasoned that a verdict regularly obtained should only be disturbed in exceptional circumstances, such as where justice demands it due to the discovery of fresh evidence. The Court outlined the established legal principles: the fresh evidence must be reasonably clear to have produced an opposite result, or at least be so highly likely to do so as to make the contrary unreasonable. Furthermore, the party seeking a new trial must demonstrate that reasonable diligence was exercised to procure the evidence before the first trial. The Court found the affidavit in this case to be inadequate, lacking specific details about the witnesses, the precise nature of the evidence, and the inquiries made. It concluded that the fresh evidence, which largely concerned prior and subsequent incidents and did not definitively prove the Council's knowledge of an unusual danger at the time of the accident, did not meet the required standard of cogency. The Court also found that the requirement of reasonable diligence had not been fulfilled.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, discharged the order of the Supreme Court granting a new trial, and dismissed Mrs. Cowan's appeal to the Supreme Court. The Council was awarded its costs.