WL v Randwick City Council (No 2) (GD)

Appeal Panel - Internal

CITATION:	WL v Randwick City Council (No 2) (GD) [2008] NSWADTAP 52
PARTIES:	APPELLANT WL RESPONDENT Randwick City Council
FILE NUMBER:	089029
HEARING DATES:	On the papers
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	13 May 2008
DATE OF DECISION:	7 August 2008
BEFORE:	O'Connor K - DCJ (President)
CATCHWORDS:	Remittal following Successful Appeal - Nature of Power - Bias - Objection to Same Member Continuing to Preside
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Interlocutory Appeal
DECISION UNDER APPEAL:	WL v Randwick City Council [2008] NSWADT 87
FILE NUMBER UNDER APPEAL:	073294
DATE OF DECISION UNDER APPEAL:	03/18/2008
LEGISLATION CITED:	Administrative Decisions Tribunal (General) Regulation 2004 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Legal Profession Act 2004 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998
CASES CITED:	WL v Randwick City Council (GD) [2007] NSWADTAP 58 WL v Randwick City Council [2008] NSWADT 87
REPRESENTATION:	APPELLANT In person RESPONDENT A Seton, solicitor, Marsdens Law Group
ORDERS:	1. Leave granted 2. Appeal dismissed 3. Remit the appellant’s application to a differently constituted Tribunal.

1 This is the second appeal in this matter. The appellant is an applicant to the Tribunal under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (the Act or the Privacy Act). He has applied for review of certain conduct of the respondent agency.

2 On the occasion of the first appeal the question was whether the General Division of the Tribunal had correctly declined to exercise jurisdiction. The Appeal Panel ruled that the Tribunal did have jurisdiction, and remitted the matter for re-determination having regard to its reasons. It is helpful in setting a context for the present appeal, to repeat the concluding paragraphs of the Appeal Panel decision, WL v Randwick City Council (GD) [2007] NSWADTAP 58:

‘50 It will be seen that the Appeal Panel has a number of concerns over the analysis adopted by the Tribunal and the Council. In our view the evidence does not provide a safe basis for reaching the conclusion that the Act was not applicable, because ‘personal information’ was not collected, used or disclosed. Further, the Tribunal and the Council have given an interpretation to the meaning of ‘personal information’ which draws wrongly on the learning surrounding the ‘personal affairs’ exemption in the FOI Act. What evidence there is firmly points, in our view, to the conclusion that, at least by the time Mr Kerr began communicating with the strata manager, he was communicating ‘personal information’ held in a recorded form. We are not satisfied on the basis of the evidence as it stands that the terms of the protection given in respect of disclosure of personal information by the section 41 Direction have been satisfied.

51 The appellant seeks leave to have the matter extended to the merits. It is not desirable, we consider, for the Appeal Panel to take that step in the present case. There needs, we think, to be much clearer evidence placed before the Tribunal by the Council, and there needs to be a number of findings made, and various…