FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WIRYA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2009] FMCA 590 |
| MIGRATION – Review of MRT decision refusing a skilled student visa – where Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision because the applicant had not made an investment into a designated security which would have given her a qualifying score overall – applicant unable to make such an investment at the time as no designated securities existed – where Tribunal unaware of Department’s policy of holding such applications in abeyance – whether Tribunal ought to have made inquiries – Tribunal’s power of remittal considered. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 349 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) |
| Applicant: | ADISTI ANGELICA WIRYA |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 3444 of 2008 |
| Judgment of: | Raphael FM |
| Hearing date: | 18 June 2009 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 18 June 2009 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 1 July 2009 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr N Poynder |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms L Clegg |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
A writ of certiorari issue directed to the Migration Review Tribunal removing into this Court to be quashed the decision of the Tribunal made on 9 December 2008.
A writ of mandamus be directed to the Second Respondent directing it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
The First Respondent to pay the Applicant’s cost assessed in the sum of $5,000.00.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3444 of 2008
| ADISTI ANGELICA WIRYA |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant is a young Indonesian who came to Australia to study. In July 2005 she completed her Bachelor of Business (E Commerce and Marketing) degree at Edith Cowan University. She obtained a skills assessment by the Australian Computer Society as a Computing Professional (ASCO 2231-79). This assessment allowed her to apply within Australia for a Class DD (Sub-class 880) permanent residence visa. In order to be granted such a visa, the applicant was required to achieve a qualifying score when assessed under Sub-division 3 of Part 2 (ss.92 – 96) of the Migration Act 1958 (the “Act”). This qualifying score is known generically as the “points system” under which applicants for particular kinds of visas are given a score based on points for particular qualifications. For a Sub-class 880 visa the possible points are set out in Schedule 6A of the Migration Regulations 1994. The total points required are 120. This can…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Wirya v Minister for Immigration and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2009] FMCA 590
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and the case law to determine the appropriate scope of the Tribunal's discretion. It was noted that the Tribunal had the authority to either affirm, vary, remit, or set aside a decision. The use of the word "may" in section 349 was interpreted as signifying that the Tribunal could choose from these options based on the merits of each case. The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to consider whether it was appropriate to remit the matter to the primary decision-maker could be seen as a jurisdictional error, especially if such a course of action would have been administratively efficient and in line with current policy practices.
In light of these findings, the court issued a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision and a writ of mandamus directing the Minister to reconsider the matter according to law. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the applicant's costs, assessed at $5,000.00. This outcome underscores the importance of the Tribunal fully exercising its statutory powers and considering all appropriate options in its review process.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
A writ of certiorari issue directed to the Migration Review Tribunal removing into this Court to be quashed the decision of the Tribunal made on 9 December 2008.
2.
A writ of mandamus be directed to the Second Respondent directing it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
3.
The First Respondent to pay the Applicant’s cost assessed in the sum of $5,000.00.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I cannot deny that there is considerable strength in this argument. In particular, I accept that wherever possible a Tribunal should conclude its determination of an application. Section 349 is in the following terms: “Powers of Migration Review Tribunal (1)The Tribunal may, for the purposes of the review of an MRT-reviewable decision, exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by this Act on the person who made the decision. (2) The Tribunal may: (a) affirm the decision; or (b) vary the decision; or (c) if the decision relates to a prescribed matter--remit the matter for reconsideration in accordance with such directions or recommendations of the Tribunal as are permitted by the regulations; or (d) set the decision aside and substitute a new decision. (3) If the Tribunal: (a) varies the decision; or (b) sets aside the decision and substitutes a new decision; the decision as varied or substituted is taken (except for the purpose of appeals from decisions of the Tribunal) to be a decision of the Minister. (4)To avoid doubt, the Tribunal must not, by varying a decision or setting a decision aside and substituting a new decision, purport to make a decision that is not authorised by the Act or the regulations.”These terms suggest that the conclusion of an application can take more than one form. Like Moore J in Lal v Minister for Immigration (2000) 106 FCR 12 at [6], I am of the view that: “[t]he use of the word “may” in s.349(1) is not intended, in my opinion, to confer, in a case such as the present, a discretionary power on the Tribunal to exercise or not exercise powers and discretions of the primary decision maker… “may” in that subsection is intended to signify that one (or a number) of the identified remedies can be granted depending upon the conclusion reached.” The applicant argues that the jurisdictional error committed by the Tribunal was its failure to consider the exercise of its power under s.349 to remit the matter. It did not take the step of considering whether it was appropriate and administratively efficient in the circumstances to allow the primary administrator rather than itself to complete the process; Poudyal v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 265 at [48]. The applicant says that the Tribunal’s reason for not so acting was either that it did not consider it had the power to remit with a direction that the applicant had obtained the requisite number of points, which she clearly did, or it did not consider that the use of such power was appropriate. The first reason would be an error of law on the part of the Tribunal which would constitute a jurisdictional error. The second reason would only fall to be considered a jurisdictional error if the Tribunal had failed to make an inquiry that would have shown that such a remitter was appropriate. If an inquiry had been made the Tribunal would have discovered that the current policy of the Department was to hold these matters in abeyance which would have made a remitter entirely appropriate.