Winter v Ostwald Bros Civil Pty Ltd
[2012] FMCA 51
•27 January 2012
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WINTER v OSTWALD BROS CIVIL PTY LTD | [2012] FMCA 51 |
| INDUSTRIAL LAW – Claim alleging dismissal in contravention of a general protection – applicant claims terminated because of worker’s compensation claim and physical disability due to workplace injury – respondent claims termination for genuine operational reasons – termination for genuine operational reasons – application dismissed. |
| Fair Work Act 2009, ss.342, 351(1), 361(1) |
| Hayward v Rohd Four Pty Ltd & Ors [2008] FMCA 1490 Jones v Queensland Tertiary Admissions Centre Ltd (No.2) [2010] FCA 399 Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Arnotts Biscuits Limited [2010] FCA 770 Barclay v The Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education (2011) 191 FCR 212 |
| Applicant: | BRAD WINTER |
| Respondent: | OSTWALD BROS CIVIL PTY LTD ACN 063 036 760 |
| File Number: | BRG 917 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Jarrett FM |
| Hearing date: | 28 July 2011 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 28 July 2011 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 27 January 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitor for the Applicant: | Mr Tayler |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Workers First Australia Pty Ltd |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Dwyer |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | McCullough Robertson Lawyers |
ORDERS
The application filed on 6 September, 2010 be dismissed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 917 of 2010
| BRAD WINTER |
Applicant
And
| OSTWALD BROS CIVIL PTY LTD ACN 063 036 760 |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Brad Winter was employed, in broad terms, as a concreter by Ostwald Bros Civil Pty Ltd between 12 November, 2007 and 16 June, 2010.
Mr Winter’s employment was terminated on 16 June, 2010 by Ostwald Bros. This case is about what, if any, compensation Mr Winter is entitled to by reason of the circumstances in which he was dismissed.
The issue for determination is ultimately a factual one – did Ostwald Bros terminate Mr Winter’s employment for a reason other than for the reason that he had a physical disability or that he had made a worker’s compensation claim arising out of an injury to his back.
The Facts
According to the evidence Ostwald Bros’ core business is earthmoving. For a time Ostwald Bros also engaged in concreting services although it was not its main business activity.
As part of its business, Ostwald Bros operated two concreting crews in the period 2007-2009. One crew was based in central Queensland and the other in south-east Queensland, operating from Dalby. At some point prior to the end of 2009 the south-east Queensland crew was divided into two teams – an A and a B team.
During 2009 concreting work dropped away so that by the end of 2009 the company’s concreting workforce in south-east Queensland reduced to one crew. The size of that crew, which from time to time was up to 14 people, dropped to only four men.
In 2009 and 2010 Mr Winter was designated and paid as a Leading Hand. He was able to supervise the work being done when the crew’s usual supervisor, Mr Clayton Kuhl, was absent.
Concreting work continued to decline and so by September, 2010 Ostwald Bros ceased employing its own concreters in south east Queensland entirely and moved to using sub-contractors to perform the concreting work it needed performed. The Central Queensland crew remained, and continues to remain, in tact.
The parties agree that on 28 March, 2010 Mr Winter sustained an injury to his back whilst working for Ostwald Bros. He made a worker’s compensation claim in respect of his injury. The claim was accepted and paid. In evidence Mr Winter said that all of his costs and expenses were met by WorkCover.
Mr Winter reduced his working hours following his injury. However, he had minimal time off work. It is not clear if he was off work entirely for any particular period, but the point is not important. When he returned to work a suitable duties plan was formulated under the guidance of his treating medical practitioner to accommodate Mr Winter’s injury. Ostwald Bros facilitated Mr Winter’s suitable duties plan. He was given work in the company’s workshop on lighter duties. Mr Winter makes no complaint about the way Ostwald Bros facilitated his return to work and the accommodation it afforded him because of his impaired capacity.
Mr Winter was cleared by his General Practitioner, Dr Vern Madden, to return to full duties on 11 June, 2010. However, Mr Winter said that his doctor told him that ultimately he would have to do work other than concreting work “as I would end up having to come back to see him again”. Dr Madden told Mr Winter that he would be capable of doing “final trim grading work, truck driving, excavating or an office job.” Mr Winter gives evidence that Dr Madden rang Mr Mark Celledoni, Ostwald Bros’ Human Resources Manager, and “told him these things”.
The medical certificate issued by Dr Madden is annexed to Mr Winter’s affidavit. It certifies that Mr Winter is fit to return to normal duties from 12 June, 2010 and that no further follow up was required. It was unqualified.
I have evidence from Mr Celledoni, which I accept, as follows:
a)He was the Human Resources Manager for the Ostwald Bros group of companies from 20 March, 2006. He resigned with effect from 23 June, 2010 in order to start up his own business as a human resources consultant. Since then he has not provided any services to Ostwald Bros.
b)The size of a concrete crew in south-east Queensland would expand and contract. How many people were in a crew depended on the demand for work and any other operational requirements. Generally, it was the Operations Manager, Von Jones, who made decisions about how big a crew needed to be at any particular time.
c)At Christmas 2009 Von Jones told Mr Celledoni that he and the owners of Ostwald’s were having discussions about winding up the south-east Queensland concrete crew due to the fact that there was not enough work for them to do. It was planned to cease employing people to do concreting work if the work ran out. If any concreting work was required in the future then contractors would be engaged to perform the work.
d)The profitability of the south-east Queensland crew was negatively affected because that concreting team was top heavy with supervisory people.
e)From around Christmas 2009 Von Jones and Mr Celledoni spoke about how the concreting teams would be wound up. Between them they decided that they would slowly let people go as the work dried up and the remaining contracts ended. Mr Jones told Mr Celledoni that, in his opinion, Brad Winter would be the first person who he would consider for redundancy, if there were no other positions available for him elsewhere. That was because the main issue for Mr Jones was that Mr Winter was paid an extra amount to act as a Team Leader/Leading Hand. Although the extra amount was small ($1.50 per hour) over the cost of a project it had an impact.
f)Mr Winter was injured in March, 2010.
g)“While I was the HR Manager at Ostwald’s the company valued rehabilitation of its injured workers. I never heard any suggestion that someone would be thrown in the scrap-heap because of an injury. There was no culture of blame in relation to an injury. The tendency if there was a claim was to support the worker and make sure that they were properly compensated. There was no culture of ‘picking on’ employees who had suffered a workplace injury. It was not that kind of company. We were always very serious and pro-active about getting people rehabilitated and back to work as soon as they were able. This is something that I was proud of while I worked there.”
h)Mr Winter recommenced work on a suitable duties plan in late April, 2010. There was no position available for him so a position was created for him in the company’s warehouse. The position was not a position that could continue indefinitely once he was well. There was no budget for the role.
i)Mr Celledoni attempted to find alternative employment for Mr Winter within the Ostwald Bros organisation. No suitable options were found for him. Whilst there was the possibility of a “spotter’s job” in the central Queensland coalfields for Mr Winter, the position was filled before Mr Winter could be organised to fill it.
j)On or about 11 June, 2010 Mr Celledoni spoke with Dr Madden about Mr Winter’s return to work. Dr Madden told Mr Celledoni that Mr Winter’s injury had stabilised and that Mr Winter was fully fit to return to work. He also told Mr Celledoni that he had advised Mr Winter that in the long-term there was some prospect of him injuring his back in the future and that he should consider a different line of work. Dr Madden confirmed that Mr Winter could start work again the next day without any issues, but that in the long-term he should consider other options.
k)Apart from holding a “coal fields passport” and a bobcat licence, Mr Winter had no other qualifications (such as heavy machinery or earthmoving machinery licences). He had no current coal board health clearance (something which was necessary to work on the coalfields).
l)It was not Mr Celledoni’s decision to terminate Mr Winter’s employment, but rather it was a decision taken by Mr Jones.
Mr Winter relies upon an affidavit by Dr Vern Madden, his treating general practitioner. Dr Madden swears that he spoke to Mr Celledoni and, although he has no recollection of the conversation, he made a contemporaneous note of the conversation. The note stated:
Plan:
d/w mark celledoni advised while I cleared for no return to concreting, heavy manual labouring, no high level wbv
Dr Madden explained in his affidavit that ‘wbv’ means “whole body vibration and essentially means not to operate mobile plant”
Dr Madden was cross-examined. He explained that while his certificate was unqualified and Mr Winter was certified to return to work, he was concerned that there was a risk of re-aggravation of the condition if Mr Winter engaged in concreting, heavy manual labouring or high level whole body vibration. Dr Madden gave evidence that he spoke to Mr Celledoni. It was put to Dr Madden that Mr Celledoni asked Dr Madden whether Mr Winter was fit to return to concreting “tomorrow” and that Dr Madden had replied: “yes, but there is a risk”. Dr Madden had no recollection of the conversation but accepted that what was put might have been said. The impression I formed was that he viewed it as consistent with his opinion. I am satisfied that the conversation took place.
I accept that Mr Celledoni formed the view that Dr Madden’s caution about the risk of further injury to Mr Winter was a caution about injury in the longer term, not the shorter term, such as upon his return to work with Ostwald Bros.
I accept that whilst Mr Winter was recovering from his injury, Mr Celledoni attempted to find Mr Winter an alternative position within Ostwald Bros. He did so because the position of the concreting crew generally was coming to an end. Whilst there were no firm arrangements for alternative work, some possibilities were discussed but ultimately they came to nothing for Mr Winter.
Mr Von Jones is the Operations Manager for Ostwald Bros. He was responsible for the decision to terminate Mr Winter’s employment. I accept his evidence that:
a)Most of the projects undertaken by the south east Queensland concreting crew were uncommercial in that they returned a loss rather than a profit.
b)He and the owners of Ostwald Bros had been in discussion for some time about making the south east Queensland concreting crew redundant.
c)Those discussions had come about as early as late 2009 because of a down-turn in work and a failure to win tenders.
d)When Mr Winter was injured the south-east Queensland crew had two projects ongoing described as the Louden Weir project (which finished on 10 June, 2010) and the Bottle Tree Feedlot project (which finished on June, 2010 as far as the concreting aspects were concerned).
e)When Mr Winter was injured, he was not replaced because the size of the crew (then 4 people) was sufficient to complete the work on hand.
I accept Mr Jones’ evidence that he made the decision to make Mr Winter redundant and terminate his employment for the following reasons:
a)Ostwald Bros had been reducing the numbers of men in the concrete crews in south east Queensland since August 2009.
b)Ostwald Bros was doing less and less concreting work and what was being done was unprofitable.
c)Ostwald Bros had fixed on a strategy which was to get out of concreting work in south east Queensland altogether.
d)Clayton Kuhl was the supervisor of a four man crew (including himself) and while he was working side by side with his men on a small crew there was no need for an employee at the Leading Hand level.
e)The budget on the Bottle Tree Feedlot job was tight and Mr Jones was trying to save as much money as possible. Mr Winter was paid $24.50 per hour, including his Leading Hand allowance. In June, 2010 the other full-time worker close to Mr Winter’s pay level was paid $23 per hour.
Mr Jones swears, and I accept that he did not select one of the other workers for the following reasons:
a)Clayton Kuhl was the concrete supervisor. He was on a more senior level to Mr Winter and it was necessary to keep him in order to oversee the remaining job.
b)The only other full-time employee was paid less per hour than Mr Winter.
c)The other two members of the crew were casual employees and were easier to manage on a day-to-day basis.
d)Clayton Kuhl had confirmed that he did not need a fifth worker or another worker with Mr Winter’s level of experience. He confirmed with Mr Jones that the workers in his crew were performing the job well and that introducing a new person to the existing crew would have possibly lead to delays. The project was run to a tight schedule and on a tight budget and delays can lead to additional costs.
Mr Jones swears that the fact that Mr Winter was the only Leading Hand and that the company did not need a Leading Hand on the concreting crew, were factors in his decision. He did not want to make a cheaper employee redundant who was already performing the work adequately.
Mr Jones swears that Mr Celledoni reported to him Dr Madden’s opinion that Mr Winter was fit to return to his duties but was at risk of re-injury. As to that, Mr Jones swears:
49. Mark's advice regarding Dr Madden’s comments was a factor which I was aware of and which therefore would have played a part in the decision making process if there was room for a Leading Hand or even another concreter on the crew. If there was further concreting work available and if it was commercially viable to retain Brad then I would have asked Mark to seek clarification from Dr Madden about Brad's fitness to work. However, further medical advice was not necessary. I made the decision to make Brad redundant based on factors unrelated to the injury.
Mr Clayton Kuhl is a concreter who was employed by Ostwald Bros as a supervisor. He was the supervisor for Mr Winter’s crew and was his supervisor when Mr Winter hurt his back. Mr Kuhl left Ostwald Bros in September, 2010 and started his own concreting business. He performs concreting for Ostwald Bros from time to time as a sub-contractor.
Mr Josh Green gave evidence in the proceedings. He is Mr Winter’s nephew. He gave evidence that, from time to time, Mr Kuhl would make comments to the effect that he no longer needed Brad Winter as his back “was too useless for concreting”; that “the longer he [Mr Winter] stays on light duties the deeper he’s digging his hole”; “I can’t afford to have a bloke on the crew with a bad back as it will slow us down and make us look bad”; and “They’ll just get rid of him now as I don’t want him back as it will slow down and make us look bad”.
Mr Winter alleges that on 21 May, 2010 he had a conversation with Mr Josh Green – his nephew. Mr Green worked with Ostwald Bros and claimed to Mr Winter that he had attended a meeting of the concreting crew. At the meeting Mr Clayton Kuhl addressed the meeting and said words to the effect: “Brad will not be returning to the concreting crew, they are going to sack him and pay him out.”
Mr Winter was unimpressed by what Mr Green had told him. He approached Mr Celledoni and told him that he had heard what was going to happen to him. Mr Winter asked Mr Celledoni if he had told Mr Kuhl what it was that Mr Kuhl was alleged to have said in Mr Green’s presence. Mr Celledoni told him that it was not true and that he would speak to Mr Kuhl about it. Mr Celledoni said that he should not be talking to “the boys” about Mr Winter “anyway”.
There is a conflict in the evidence between Mr Green and Mr Winter. Mr Green’s evidence was that he spoke to Mr Winter on numerous occasions about what Mr Kuhl had said. Mr Winter’s evidence, however, was that it was just the one occasion. I prefer Mr Winter’s evidence as it is more consistent with Mr Celledoni’s evidence about the issue having been raised with him on one occasion by Mr Winter.
The Statutory Framework
The application arises against the following statutory framework. Section 351 of the Fair Work Act 2009 provides as follows:
Discrimination
(1) An employer must not take adverse action against a person who is an employee, or prospective employee, of the employer because of the person's race, colour, sex, sexual preference, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family or carer's responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin.
Note: This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).
(2) However, subsection (1) does not apply to action that is:
(a) not unlawful under any anti-discrimination law in force in the place where the action is taken; or
(b) taken because of the inherent requirements of the particular position concerned; or
(c) if the action is taken against a staff member of an institution conducted in accordance with the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of a particular religion or creed--taken:
(i) in good faith; and
(ii) to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities
of adherents of that religion or creed.
Section 342 of the Act defines the term “adverse action” to include dismissal.
Section 361(1) of the Act is important. It provides:
Reason for action to be presumed unless proved otherwise
(1) If:
(a) in an application in relation to a contravention of this Part, it is alleged that a person took, or is taking, action for a particular reason or with a particular intent; and
(b) taking that action for that reason or with that intent would constitute a contravention of this Part;
it is presumed, in proceedings arising from the application, that the action was, or is being, taken for that reason or with that intent, unless the person proves otherwise.
Logan J explained the nature of the onus cast upon applicants like Mr Winter in applications such as this in Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Arnotts Biscuits Limited [2010] FCA 770 as follows:
13. Subject to the operation of s 360 and s 361 of the Fair Work Act, [the applicant] carries the burden of proving the alleged contraventions. While the proceedings are civil in character, they are nonetheless penal. Thus, though the Union must prove the contraventions on the balance of probabilities, s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act) requires that; due regard be given to the nature of the cause of action or defence; the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding; and the gravity of the matters alleged. That sub-section of the Evidence Act is a restatement of a well known passage in the judgment of Dixon J (as his Honour then was) in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362 in relation to considerations which intrude in deciding whether the standard of proof in civil proceedings has been met, “the seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters ‘reasonable satisfaction’ should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.”
Collier J in Jones v Queensland Tertiary Admissions Centre Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 399 summarised the effect of s.361 as follows:
10. That the employee is required to first prove the existence of objective facts which are said to provide a basis for the alleged adverse action, before the onus shifts to the employer in respect of the prohibited reason, was explained by Branson J in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1999) 140 IR 131 at [161]-[162] and Moore J in Rojas v Esselte Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 1585; [2008] 177 IR 306 at 321-322 [49]- [50]. To paraphrase observations of Moore J in Rojas [2008] FCA 1585; [2008] 177 IR 306 at 322, it is not sufficient for [the applicant] to simply allege that she had a workplace right and that she was the subject of adverse action – rather on the assumption that [the applicant] is able to prove these allegations, the burden is then cast on to QTAC to prove that adverse action was not taken against Ms Jones because of her workplace right for the purposes of s 340 and s 361 of the Act.
Such an approach is consistent with the approach outlined by Wilson FM in Hayward v Rohd Four Pty Ltd & Ors [2008] FMCA 1490. In that case his Honour was dealing with s.664 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), but what his Honour there said is equally apposite to a consideration of the comparative provisions of the Fair Work Act. After tracing the history of provisions similar to s.361 and the approach by Courts to those provisions, his Honour summarised the approach thus:
34. From the above review of the authorities I conclude that the determination of this proceeding requires the following:
a) The applicant proving the fact of employment and its termination;
b) The applicant proving such of the facts as he intends to rely upon to invoke one or more of the provisions in ss.659(2) and 793(1) of the Act;
c) The respondents proving that such identified reasons were not the reason, or one of the reasons, for the termination of the applicant’s employment;
d) In discharging that onus the respondents do not have to prove that the applicant’s employment was terminated for a valid reason, as long as it was not terminated for a proscribed reason.
In Barclay v The Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education (2011) 191 FCR 212 Gray and Bromberg JJ, pointed out:
27. The central question under s 346 is why was the aggrieved person treated as he or she was? If the aggrieved person was subjected to adverse action, was it “because” the aggrieved person did or did not have the attributes, or had or had not engaged or proposed to engage in the industrial activities, specified by s 346 in conjunction with s 347?
28. The determination of those questions involves characterisation of the reason or reasons of the person who took the adverse action. The state of mind or subjective intention of that person will be centrally relevant, but it is not decisive. What is required is a determination of what Mason J in Bowling (at 617) called the “real reason” for the conduct. The real reason for a person’s conduct is not necessarily the reason that the person asserts, even where the person genuinely believes he or she was motivated by that reason. The search is for what actuated the conduct of the person, not for what the person thinks he or she was actuated by. In that regard, the real reason may be conscious or unconscious, and where unconscious or not appreciated or understood, adverse action will not be excused simply because its perpetrator held a benevolent intent. It is not open to the decision-maker to choose to ignore the objective connection between the decision he or she is making and the attribute or activity in question.
…
32. The onus cast by s.361 on the person taking the adverse action means that, to succeed, that person has to establish that he or she was not actuated by the attributes or industrial activity which s.346 seeks to protect. As Mason J said in Bowling at 617, that objective will not be achieved unless the evidence establishes that the real reason for the adverse action lies outside the ambit of the provision - in this case s.346. The real reason or reasons for the taking of the adverse action must be shown to be "dissociated from the circumstances" that the aggrieved person has or had the s.346 attribute or has or had engaged in or proposes to engage in the s.346 industrial action.
Those observations are equally apposite, in my respectful view, to the operation of s.361 where the relevant contravention is alleged to arise under s.351 (1) of the Act.
Consideration
There is no dispute that the action alleged by Mr Winter as constituting the adverse action:
a)occurred as a matter of fact;
b)was “adverse action” within the meaning of that term as set out in s.341 of Fair Work Act.
The facts relied upon by Mr Winter, objectively, are in my view sufficient to engage the operation of s.361 of the Act. That is to say, I am to presume that the adverse action taken against Mr Winter was taken for the proscribed reason alleged by Mr Winter, namely:
a)because he had made a worker’s compensation claim;
b)he had a disability namely he was at risk of re-injury if he returned to concreting work.
The onus falls upon Ostwald Bros in this case to satisfy the court that the adverse action taken against Mr Winter was not for a proscribed reason. The burden of proof is on the balance of probabilities.
I am satisfied that the respondent has discharged the onus upon it to show that the action it took against Mr Winter by terminating his employment was not for a proscribed reason. I find that Mr Winter was terminated because:
a)Ostwald Bros had decided to cease its concreting activities because:
a.that activity was unprofitable over a period from 2007 to 2010;
b.the amount of work available to the company had reduced over time;
c.despite attempting to win further work, the company did not receive any new work in 2010.
b)The entire south east Queensland crew was to be made redundant after the finalisation of the company’s ongoing work; and
c)The south east Queensland crew was in fact made redundant.
Mr Winter argues that the timing of his termination indicates that the decision to terminate him was informed by his injury and the advice of Dr Madden. Further, he argues that if, in truth, Ostwald Bros had determined to make the south east Queensland concreting crew redundant, the delay between the time of Mr Winter becoming unable to work by reason of his injury and the day upon which he was made redundant requires explanation. If he was to be made redundant for operational reasons, he ought to have been terminated soon after he became incapable of performing his concreting work. He argues that Mr Kuhl’s comments indicate that the company had made a decision to terminate his employment for reasons associated with his injury well before it told him he was terminated.
Further, Mr Winter argues that he could have been employed by Ostwald Bros in its central Queensland concreting crew. He says that the fact that he was not corroborates his claim that Ostwald Bros wanted to terminate him because of his injury. However, Mr Winter gave no evidence that he was prepared to take up such a position on a permanent basis – that is important because he had a wife and child in the south east Queensland area. Moreover, there is no evidence that there was a position available for him in that crew.
In my view Mr Winter was made redundant upon becoming fit to return to his concreting role for the reasons explained by Mr Jones. The delay in terminating his employment has been explained. The company did not want to terminate him whilst he was not fit to return to full duties. Moreover the company was trying to secure more work as the evidence of Mr Jones makes clear. The tendered for work did not eventuate and existing work was coming to an end. There was a team of men performing the remaining work on the Bottle Tree project. Mr Jones made a decision, for reasons explained by him, not to interfere with that team.
I accept Mr Celledoni’s evidence that he was entirely against the idea that Mr Winter should be made redundant whilst he was in the course of rehabilitation. I accept that the company took its responsibilities towards its injured employees seriously. I accept that Mr Jones was heavily influenced as to the timing of the termination of Mr Winter’s termination by Mr Celledoni’s approach to Mr Winter’s rehabilitation.
I am not satisfied that Mr Winter’s worker’s compensation claim, nor his physical disability by reason of his workplace injury played any part in the decision making by Mr Jones to terminate Mr Winter’s employment.
In my view the real reason for the adverse action taken against Mr Winter lies outside the ambit of s.351 (1) of the Fair Work Act. To use the words of Counsel for Ostwald Bros, the decision to terminate his employment was taken for “sound operational reasons”.
In the circumstances, the application will be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Jarrett FM
Date: 27 January 2012
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