six months Vacation of office-Statutory provision destroying accrued rights -Method of construction-" Sentence "--Government Railways Act 1912-1951 (N.S.W.) (No. 30 of 1912-No. 15 of 1951), S. 80.

The Government Railways Act 1912-1951 (N.S.W.), S. 80 provides, inter alia, that if any officer is convicted of any felony or is sentenced to imprison- ment for any term of or exceeding six months he shall be deemed to have vacated his office. The respondent was convicted by a court of petty sessions in respect of three offences, and was sentenced to imprisonment for three months on each charge. In respect of the third charge, the imprisonment was to " commence at the expiration of the imprisonment" for the first offence

Held, that the respondent had not been sentenced to imprisonment for any term of or exceeding six months.

It is a principle of construction that a statutory provision which destroys accrued rights is not to be given a wider or more ample operation than the literal, natural or grammatical meaning of the words conveys unless the context or subject matter SO demands.

The word "sentence" connotes a judicial judgment or pronouncement fixing a term of imprisonment. A term of imprisonment is the period fixed by the judgment as the punishment for the offence.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court): Ex parte Boaden; Re Winsor (1953) 70 W.N. (N.S.W.) 152, affirmed.

90 CLR 346

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The respondent, an officer in the employ of the railway com- missioner, was convicted by a court of petty sessions on three charges of knowingly having goods in custody reasonably suspected of being stolen, and was sentenced to three months' imprisonment on each charge. In respect of the third charge he was "adjudged

to be imprisoned in the gaol at Parramatta, be kept to hard labour for the space of three months to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment for the offence first mentioned. Section 80 of the Government Railways Act 1912-1951 is in the following terms :-If any officer is convicted of any felony or is sentenced to imprisonment for any term of or exceeding six months, or becomes bankrupt, or applies to take the benefit of any Act for the relief of insolvent debtors, or by any deed or other writing compounds with his creditors, or makes an assignment of his salary for their benefit, he shall be deemed to have vacated his office.

The appellants, the members of the board constituted under Pt. IX of the Government Railways Act 1912-1951 took the view that, by virtue of S. 80, the respondent was to be deemed to have vacated his office under such circumstances that he had forfeited his right to superannuation. The respondent applied to the Supreme Court for the issue of a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Winsor v Boaden

Details

AGLC: Winsor v Boaden [1953] HCA 46
Case: [1953] HCA 46
Decision Date: 19 August 1953

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales regarding the interpretation of section 80 of the *Government Railways Act 1912-1951* (N.S.W.). The appellants, members of a board constituted under the Act, took the view that the respondent, an officer in the employ of the railway commissioner, had vacated his office and forfeited his superannuation rights. This was based on the respondent's conviction for three offences, for which he received sentences of three months' imprisonment on each charge. The sentence for the third charge was to commence at the expiration of the sentences for the first two offences. The respondent sought a writ of mandamus to compel the board to certify his superannuation allowance.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondent had been "sentenced to imprisonment for any term of or exceeding six months" within the meaning of section 80 of the *Government Railways Act*. This section stipulated that an officer would be deemed to have vacated their office if convicted of a felony or sentenced to imprisonment for a term of or exceeding six months, among other conditions. The Supreme Court had previously held that the respondent had not met this criterion, despite the cumulative effect of his sentences amounting to six months.

The High Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court. The Court applied the principle of statutory construction that provisions which destroy accrued rights should not be given a wider operation than their literal, natural, or grammatical meaning unless the context or subject matter demands it. The Court reasoned that the word "sentence" connotes a judicial judgment fixing a specific term of imprisonment for an offence. In this instance, the respondent received three separate sentences, each for three months, and the third sentence was to commence sequentially. Therefore, there was no single sentence of six months or more. The Court concluded that the literal meaning of the words in section 80 should be adhered to, and that the respondent had not been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of or exceeding six months.

Consequently, the appeal by the board was dismissed with costs.

Orders