Wingfield v The Queen - [1995] HCATrans 72

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A46 of 1994

B e t w e e n -

DONALD REX WINGFIELD

Applicant

and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON THURSDAY, 30 MARCH 1995, AT 11.43 AM

MR C.J. KOURAKIS: If the Court pleases, I appear with my friend, MS G.A. BROWN for the applicant. (instructed by J. Hartnett, Director, Legal Services Commission of South Australia)

MS W.J. ABRAHAM: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR R.N. JENSEN for the respondent. (instructed by P.J.L.Rofe, QC, Director of Public Prosecutions (South Australia))

BRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Kourakis.

MR KOURAKIS: If the Court pleases, the sentencing principle which the applicant contends has been violated in this case is this, that where the evidence does not establish beyond reasonable doubt an aggravating factual circumstance, the offender must be sentenced on the basis that that circumstance does not exist.

In this particular case, the substitution of the verdict of manslaughter meant that the applicant’s deliberate acts which caused death carried with them an appreciable risk of injury, but it also meant, in a negative sense, that the applicant did not have an intention to cause grievous injury in this offending. If the Court pleases, that being so, the fact that the applicant’s crime was saved from being the full crime of murder only because the Court of Criminal Appeal had a doubt about that mens rea, rather than being positively satisfied of its absence, had no relevance or place in sentencing, in the applicant’s submission, nor was it to the point that the applicant’s drunkenness only might have affected his ability to appreciate the harm his actions had caused. Nor could those factors justify a sentencing approach which was to fix a sentence which was to some extent less than murder than that which would have been imposed for murder.

BRENNAN J: But does one not start by looking at the conduct of the accused person, what that person did and the state of intoxication of that person at the time that it was done. One inference that that evidence may have supported was an inference of intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm. But if, for reasons which appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, the evidence did not quite get to that, the evidence must have revealed such a gross degree of recklessness as to nonetheless attract, as a condign punishment, an extremely severe sentence.

MR KOURAKIS: If the Court please, the Court of Criminal Appeal, in the reasons for decision when it substituted the verdict of manslaughter, found that by reason of the drunkenness it was unlikely that the applicant appreciated the extent of harm inherent in his actions. The applicant accepts that if the court had then sentenced clearly upon that basis there would not…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Wingfield v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Wingfield v The Queen [1995] HCATrans 72
Case: [1995] HCATrans 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Wingfield appealed his conviction for murder in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The appeal was heard by the High Court of Australia. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant, specifically statements made by him to police and a confession.

The High Court was required to determine whether the statements and confession made by the appellant were admissible in evidence, given the circumstances under which they were obtained. This involved considering whether the appellant had been improperly induced to make those statements and, if so, whether their admission would be unfair to the appellant or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court applied the principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly the rule that a confession is inadmissible if it is obtained by means of an untrue representation or promise made to the accused. Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ found that the police had made an untrue representation to the appellant that if he confessed, he would be charged with manslaughter and not murder. This representation was found to be a significant inducement, rendering the subsequent confession inadmissible. The Court held that the admission of the confession would be unfair to the appellant and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

Orders