WINES and VALUER**GENERAL'S OFFICE
[2006] WASAT 207
•27 JULY 2006
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
STREAM: DEVELOPMENT & RESOURCES
ACT: VALUATION OF LAND ACT 1978 (WA)
CITATION: WINES and VALUERGENERAL'S OFFICE [2006] WASAT 207
MEMBER: JUSTICE M L BARKER (PRESIDENT)
HEARD: 11 JULY 2006
DELIVERED : 27 JULY 2006
FILE NO/S: DR 191 of 2006
BETWEEN: PATRICK NOEL WINES
Applicant
AND
VALUERGENERAL'S OFFICE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Valuation of land – Previous decision of Tribunal on same issues – Reference under Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA) s 33 struck out as misconceived or lacking in substance
Legislation:
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 47
Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA), s 33, s 33(1), s 33(2), s 36, s 36(1)
Result:
Proceedings struck out
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Mr D Rutherford (Acting as Agent)
Solicitors:
Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Department of Land Information
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Wines and The Valuer‑General [2005] WASAT 263
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Summary of the Tribunal's decision
The Tribunal struck out a proceeding referred to the Tribunal under s 33 of the Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA) on the basis it was misconceived or lacking in substance. In an earlier decision involving the same parties the Tribunal had already ruled against the applicant on essentially the same grounds raised in the new proceedings.
Issue
These proceedings came on for a directions hearing before the President on 11 July 2006.
The President then identified the issues whether, in light of the earlier decision of the Tribunal in Wines and The Valuer‑General [2005] WASAT 263, the current proceeding should be dismissed.
The President then decided on 11 July 2006 that the proceeding should be dismissed and so ordered.
These reasons constitute the reasons for the decision made by the President on 11 July 2006.
Facts
On 29 September 2005, the Tribunal made a decision and published its reasons for decision in proceedings between the applicant (Mr Wines) and the Valuer‑General: see Wines and The Valuer‑General [2005] WASAT 263.
In those proceedings, as the reasons of the Tribunal make clear, Mr Wines objected to a determination of unimproved value of land owned by him at Bridgetown, which had been made by the Valuer‑General and took effect as of 30 June 2004. He estimated that the value of his land was approximately half that of the Valuer‑General's determination. He sought a review of the decision arguing in effect that fundamental errors of methodology had been made by the Valuer‑General and its expert valuers in relation to:
•the methodology of valuation;
•the properties compared and the adjustments made;
•where one property was a "forced sale";
•what constituted "merged improvements" to the land; and
•whether certain improvements should be excluded from valuation.
The Tribunal rejected all of Mr Wines' arguments, concluding that the Valuer‑General's expert and other evidence satisfied relevant standards arising out of both the law and practice evaluation, and was otherwise consistent with the statutory regime under the Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA).
Subsequent to the valuation considered in that proceedings, the Valuer‑General further revalued the unimproved value of land in the valuation district in which the land of Mr Wines is situated and as of 1 August 2004 the Valuer‑General assigned an unimproved value of $160 000 to the same land.
As Mr Wines had earlier done, he lodged an objection to this further valuation of the unimproved value of the land.
By letter dated 27 April 2006, the Department of Land Information Valuation Services Bunbury, through Matthew Pritchard AAPI, licenced valuer No 04417, Valuer Bunbury, advised Mr Wines that the "site value" was considered to be correct and his objection was disallowed.
Mr Wines then wrote to Mr Pritchard by letter dated 28 May 2004 stating that this decision was unacceptable to him for a number of reasons, stated to be:
•the definition of "merged improvements" is not supported by either your department or the government and there is no evidence or indication that the definition of merged improvements is used by anyone other than the Valuer‑General;
•the valuation is consistent with a market value less structural determination and a definition of merged improvements used "acts to make unimproved value equal to market value less structural improvements".
•the Valuer‑General did not present any sales evidence to support the valuation:
•the State Administrative Tribunal failed to rule on the question of whether government owned assets in the form of roads, power supply, scheme water and the land they are erected on should be included in the valuation – this being a reference to the Tribunal's decision in Wines and the Valuer‑General [2005] WASAT 263.
Mr Wines concluded his letter by stating:
"There is one issue to be determined by the Tribunal and that is the question of the inclusion of Government assets in the unimproved value of a property. Is it right and property for land owners to be levied on Government assets?"
Mr Wines then required the matter to be referred to the State Administrative Tribunal under s 36 of the Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA).
In the face of this request Duncan Rutherford, Manager, Bunbury of the Department of Land Information, Valuation Services, sent to the Executive Officer of the State Administrative Tribunal a statement of the reasons for decision in relation to the matter along with other material documents. Mr Rutherford noted that while Mr Wines sought to "appeal under section 36" of the Valuation of Land Act 1978 as distinct from s 33, the matter was referred under s 33(2) of the Valuation of Land Act 1978.
Section 36 of the Valuation of Land Act 1978 provides a right of general review of valuation "where there is a question of general interest as to whether proper principles have or have not been applied in the valuation under this Act of the whole or a definable part of the land in a valuation district … ". Section 36(1) gives a "rating or taxing authority having an interest in the valuation or any person liable to pay any rate or tax on the basis of the valuation" the right to apply to the State Administrative tribunal for a review of the question.
As can be seen, Mr Wines did not himself purport to seek review under s 36(1) but required the Department of Land Information (or Valuer‑General) to "submit the matter" to the Tribunal.
"There is one issue to be determined by the Tribunal and that is the question of the inclusion of Government assets in the unimproved value of a property. Is it right and property for land owners to be levied on Government assets?"
In the circumstances, Mr Rutherford took the view that the letter from Mr Wines to the Department of Land Information constituted an expression of his dissatisfaction with the decision of the Valuer‑General on the earlier objection and so should be characterised as a notice "requiring that the Valuer‑General refer the valuation to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review", as provided for in s 33(1).
The Tribunal is of the view that the interpretation placed on the sequence of events by Mr Rutherford on behalf of the Department of Land Information, Valuation Services, is correct. As can be seen from the matters of dissatisfaction contained in Mr Wines' letter dated 28 May 2004, he continued to complain about the valuation in his case and the alleged failure of the Tribunal to rule on a particular question.
In one way, it probably would not matter if the Tribuanl were apprised of the matter under s 36 or s 33 as the issue would be the same in either case.
The Tribunal's finding
While s 33(1) of the Valuation of Land Act 1978 provides a person who is dissatisfied with a decision of the Valuer‑General on an objection to cause the Valuer‑General to refer a valuation to the Tribunal for a review, does not mean that every time a person is dissatisfied with essentially the same valuation decision they can require a valuation review in the Tribunal.
In that regard, the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) s 47 gives the Tribunal the power to deal with unjustified proceedings. Under s 47 the Tribunal may order that a proceeding be dismissed or struck out and make any appropriate orders if a proceeding is –
•frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance;
•being used for an improper purpose
•otherwise an abuse of process.
In Wines and The Valuer General [2005] WASAT 263 the Tribunal dealt with the question of merged improvements at [47] – [56].
As to the particular issue whether government owned assets in the form of roads, power supply, scheme water and the land they are erected upon should be included in the valuation, the Tribunal expressly dealt with this issue under the heading "Excluded improvements" at [51] – [56] and rejected by the Tribunal in clear terms at [54] – [55].
The further complaint made by Mr Wines, in his letter dated 28 May 2004, concerning the lack of any sales evidence to support the valuation is misconceived. Mr Wines' complaint, as expressed, is that a particular property that he considers meets the definition of unimproved value, was not taken into account and that "the fundamental difference between that property and my land is the Government owned roads, power, and gazetted roadways". As this latter point had also already been ruled on by the Tribunal, Mr Wines' general point falls away.
In any event, the "one issue" that Mr Wines desires the Tribunal to determine, as stated in his letter dated 28 May 2004 and set out above, "is the question of the inclusion of Government assets in the unimproved value of the property". This has been explicitly dealt with by the Tribunal in the earlier decision of Wines and The Valuer‑General [2005] WASAT 263 at [51] – [56] and rejected.
In these circumstances, the Tribunal considers the current proceeding to be misconceived or lacking in substance.
Conclusion and Order
For the reasons given above, on 11 July 2006, the Tribunal ordered:
1.This proceeding be struck out pursuant to s 47 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).
I certify that this and the preceding [28] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
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JUSTICE M L BARKER, PRESIDENT
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