Windsor v Sydney Medical Service Cooperative Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Windsor v Sydney Medical Service Cooperative Ltd [2008] FCA 348

CONTRACT - alleged breach - identity of party to contract

TRADE PRACTICES - misleading and deceptive conduct - alleged representations to enter into an agreement as an independent contractor to perform after hours medical services - application for substantive relief for alleged contraventions of s 52 - damages - Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 82, 87

CIVIL PROCEDURE - limitation period of actions - no reasonable cause of action disclosed - effect of time having run - pleading be struck out - Trade Practices Amendment Act (No 1)2001 (Cth) Sch 1 item 21, Federal Court Rules O 11 r 16 

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 82, 87
Trade Practices Amendment Act (No 1)2001 (Cth) Sch 1 item 21
Federal Court Rules O 11 r 16

Jobbins v Capel Corporation Limited and Another (1989) 25 FCR 226 cited
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 cited
Wardley Australia Limited and Another v The State of Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 cited

GINA NICOLE WINDSOR v SYDNEY MEDICAL SERVICE COOPERATIVE LIMITED

NSD 291 OF 2007

EDMONDS J
17 MARCH 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 291 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

GINA NICOLE WINDSOR
Applicant

AND:

SYDNEY MEDICAL SERVICE COOPERATIVE LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MARCH 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to Order 11, Rule 16 of the Federal Court Rules, the Statement of Claim be struck out.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 291 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

GINA NICOLE WINDSOR
Applicant

AND:

SYDNEY MEDICAL SERVICE COOPERATIVE LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE:

17 MARCH 2008

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 28 February 2007 the applicant (‘Ms Windsor’), a medical practitioner, commenced proceedings in this Court against the respondent by filing an application and statement of claim. In her application, Ms Windsor sought damages for alleged breach of contract and damages pursuant to ss 82 and 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA’) for alleged breach of s 52 of the TPA as particularised in the statement of claim.

  2. In her statement of claim, Ms Windsor pleaded that she entered into an agreement with the respondent for provision of after hours medical services as a locum on or about 8 January 2001; that she did so as an independent contractor and provided such services from 13 January 2001 through to 24 December 2006.

  3. She pleaded that the respondent breached the fundamental terms or conditions of the agreement in the following ways:

    (1)Reduced the number of regular dawn shifts below that contracted for;

    (2)reduced the total number of regular shift hours below that contracted for;

    (3)increased the rate of commission to be…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 348
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Windsor v Sydney Medical Service Cooperative Ltd, the respondent, Sydney Medical Service Cooperative Ltd, sought to have the applicant’s statement of claim struck out on the basis of abuse of process and pursuant to Order 11, Rule 16 of the Federal Court Rules. The applicant, Windsor, was employed by the respondent for a period and had contracted with the respondent through an intermediary, InterNEOn. The respondent contended that InterNEOn was the actual contracting party, whereas Windsor maintained that she was the contracting party. The central issue before the court was to determine whether the applicant's claim was time barred and, if so, whether the statement of claim should be struck out.

The court had to decide whether the applicant's cause of action accrued when she entered into the contract or when she first suffered loss, and whether the applicant's claim was indeed time barred. The court examined the evidence, including the tax returns of both the applicant and InterNEOn, and the submissions made by both parties. The respondent argued that the applicant's claim was time barred because the cause of action accrued when she first suffered loss, which was on 13 January 2001, according to her own case. The applicant argued that she did not suffer loss by reason of the representations, but rather by reason of a breach of contract. The court found that regardless of the basis of the applicant's case, the cause of action accrued on 13 January 2001, and thus the claim was time barred.

The court concluded that it was an abuse of process to bring a proceeding that can clearly be seen to be foredoomed to fail. Therefore, the statement of claim was struck out, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the motion. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to statutory time limits in legal proceedings and the consequences of failing to do so.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to Order 11, Rule 16 of the Federal Court Rules, the Statement of Claim be struck out.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ms Windsor’s income tax returns for the years ended 30 June 2001 and 2002 disclosed no income derived from the respondent or, for that matter, from InterNEOn. InterNEOn’s income tax return for the year ended 30 June 2001 disclosed ‘other gross income’ of $90,641 and contactor/sub-contractor expenses of $58,183. Particulars of the source of this income and the destination of the expense payments are not disclosed in the return. No other copy income tax returns of Ms Windsor and InterNEOn were produced in response to the notice to produce, notwithstanding that the notice called for the production of copy returns of Ms Windsor for the years ended 30 June 2001 to 2007 inclusive and copy returns of InterNEOn for the same years of income. No explanation for that non-production of those copy returns was forthcoming.Submissions on the Evidence The respondent submits that it is clear on the evidence that, from at least July 2001, InterNEOn received income from the respondent. The inference that arises is that it was also the recipient of income from the respondent during the 2001 financial year. It is unarguably clear that Ms Windsor did not receive the sums that were paid by the respondent for the services provided by Ms Windsor (on behalf of InterNEOn) in, at least, March 2001, April 2001, May 2001 and June 2001. So much is clear from the absence of disclosure of any income from the respondent in Ms Windsor’s tax returns. From the above, the respondent submits that the following conclusions arise:(a)InterNEOn enjoyed the benefit of the contract with the respondent;(b)Ms Windsor was not remunerated by InterNEOn for the services performed by her; and(c)it does not matter, for the purposes of the present application, why Ms Windsor chose to conduct her arrangement with the respondent in the way that she did. The only relevant question is the identification of the party who made promises to the respondent for the performance of services in exchange for payment. That person is clearly InterNEOn, evidenced not only by the letter from that corporation, where it promised to provide services to the respondent, but also by the financial documents produced. Ms Windsor submits that:(a)the respondent’s argument is based upon the fact that Ms Windsor initially directed the respondent to pay the third party, InterNEOn, the monies due to Ms Windsor for the work that she undertook for the respondent and must therefore be the contracting party;(b)this argument is fundamentally flawed, as InterNEOn only received payments from the respondent for a limited period. Other parties were the recipients of the respondent’s payments for the remainder of Ms Windsor’s employment period (as such evidence adduced by the respondent shows), such third parties were used for tax benefits accruing to Ms Windsor, not as the respondent suggests, to the benefit of InterNEOn;(c)Ms Windsor’s employment negotiations were carried out solely between Mr Neil Windsor on behalf of Ms Windsor and Mr Timothy Muldoon, on behalf of the respondent;(d)the respondent has failed to show the relevance, in respect of ascertaining the contracting party, that the tax returns of both the applicant and InterNEOn have, but agree with the respondent that ‘the only relevant question is the identification of the party who made promises to the respondent for the performance of services in exchange for payment’ and this has been made clear by the person charged by the respondent as being responsible for employing the applicant, Mr Timothy Muldoon; and(e)accordingly, the respondent has failed to prove that the contracting party was an entity other than Ms Windsor.Analysis

Decision

Reasons for decision

EDMONDS J
I agree with the respondent’s submission that if the case propounded by Ms Windsor is that the contract did contain terms consistent with the representations, she did not suffer loss by reason of the representations, but rather by reason of a breach of contract. Conversely, if her case is that the contract did not contain those terms, the cause of action plainly accrued when she entered into a bargain devoid of those terms or when the representations were first shown to be false. The case is put, further and in the alternative, that the representations contravened s 52 of the TPA by reason of the fact that the respondent failed to comply with them. On Ms Windsor’s own case, the cause of action accrued on 13 January 2001, when she first suffered loss: see paras 7(b) and 7(d) of her statement of claim. Accordingly, the case put, on either basis, is time barred.CONCLUSION Order 11 rule 16 of the Federal Court Rules permits the Court to strike out a pleading (in whole or in part) where no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; where the pleading has a tendency to cause embarrassment or is otherwise an abuse of process such as where an action is time barred: Jobbins v Capel Corporation Limited and Another (1989) 25 FCR 226. It is an abuse of process to bring a proceeding which can clearly be seen to be foredoomed to fail: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393. For the foregoing reasons the statement of claim must be struck out. The applicant must pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EDMONDS J