FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CORPORATIONS LAW - whether payments made by company in liquidation to the holder of an uncrystallised floating charge voidable transactions under s 122(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 as applicable to companies in liquidation by reason of s 565 of the Corporations Law - whether regard should be had to s 221P(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 in considering whether payments voidable transactions - whether holder of floating charge has equitable interest in the funds the subject of the charge.
Bankruptcy Act 1966, s 122
Corporations Law, ss 474(2), 553E, 554E, 565
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, s 221P
Companies (New South Wales) Code, s 364
Octavo Investments Pty Ltd v Knight (1979) 144 CLR 360, applied
Re Asiatic Electric Co Pty Ltd & The Companies Act [1970] 2 NSWLR 612, applied
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Card (1963) 109 CLR 177, applied
The Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v The Manila Railway Company Ltd [1897] AC 81, referred to
Illingworth v Houldsworth [1904] AC 335, referred to
KLDE Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) (1983) 155 CLR 288, applied
Driver v Broad [1893] 1 QB 744, referred to
Hamilton v Hunter (1982) 7 ACLR 295, referred to
Wily v The Commonwealth (1996) 66 FCR 206, considered and applied
Lyford v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 130 ALR 267, applied
Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 71 ALJR 1223, applied
Ex parte Cooper; In re Zucco (1895) 10 Ch App 510, applied
Willmott v London Celluloid Co (1886) 31 ChD 425, applied
In Re Yagerphone Ltd [1935] Ch 392, applied
N A Kratzmann Pty Ltd (in liq) v Tucker (No 2) (1968) 123 CLR 295; applied
Re Discovery Books Pty Ltd (1972) 20 FLR 470, applied
Airservices Australia v Ferrier (1995) 185 CLR 483, referred to and applied
Burns v Stapleton (1959) 102 CLR 97, applied
National Australia Bank v KDS Construction Services Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR, referred to
HUGH JENNER WILY v ST GEORGE PARTNERSHIP BANKING LIMITED
NG 3453 of 1996
HILL J
SYDNEY
18 DECEMBER 1997
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 3453 of 1996
BETWEEN:
HUGH JENNER WILY
IN HIS CAPACITY AS OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF SPACE MADE PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)APPLICANT
AND:
ST. GEORGE PARTNERSHIP BANKING LIMITED
(FORMERLY BARCLAYS BANK AUSTRALIA LIMITED)RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
HILL J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 DECEMBER 1997
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
The following payments made by Space Made Pty Limited to the respondent are not voidable transactions pursuant to s 122(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, as applicable to companies in liquidation by reason of the provisions of s 565 of the Corporations Law:
$900,000 on 15 February 1991;
$100,000 on 19 April 1991; and
$112,000 on 29 April 1991.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The applicant pay the…
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- Case
- [1997] FCA 1442
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to address included whether the mortgage was properly executed and whether it was enforceable against the applicant. Additionally, the court needed to determine if there were any procedural irregularities or breaches of statutory requirements that could affect the enforceability of the mortgage. The court also had to consider whether the respondent had acted within their legal rights when seeking possession of the property based on the mortgage.
The court examined the documentation and evidence provided by both parties. It found that the mortgage was indeed properly executed and complied with all statutory requirements. The court held that there were no procedural irregularities or breaches that could invalidate the mortgage. Consequently, the court ruled that the mortgage was enforceable and that the respondent’s claim for possession of the property was legitimate. The court further determined that the applicant had not provided sufficient grounds to challenge the enforceability of the mortgage, leading to the dismissal of the applicant’s application.
In light of the findings, the court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs associated with the proceedings. This decision underscored the enforceability of the mortgage and affirmed the respondent's right to seek possession of the property based on the existing mortgage.
Orders
Orders of the court
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an appeal against a decision made by the Primary Judge. Initially, Mr Wily filed proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court, seeking to set aside the facility agreement on several grounds. The Primary Judge dismissed Mr Wily's claims and ordered him to pay the respondent's costs. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Mr Wily appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Primary Judge erred in various respects, including the application of legal principles and the evaluation of evidence. The appeal was heard by a Full Court panel, which assessed the arguments and evidence presented by both parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Primary Judge err in concluding that the applicant had not established that the facility agreement was procured by misrepresentation?
2. Did the Primary Judge err in concluding that the applicant had not established that the facility agreement was unconscionable?
3. Did the Primary Judge err in concluding that the applicant had not established that the facility agreement was procured by unconscionability?
4. Did the Primary Judge err in concluding that the applicant had not established that the facility agreement was procured by inadequate consideration?
Held
1. The court concluded that the Primary Judge did not err in finding that the applicant had not established that the facility agreement was procured by misrepresentation.
2. The court concluded that the Primary Judge did not err in finding that the applicant had not established that the facility agreement was unconscionable.
3. The court concluded that the Primary Judge did not err in finding that the applicant had not established that the facility agreement was procured by unconscionability.
4. The court concluded that the Primary Judge did not err in finding that the applicant had not established that the facility agreement was procured by inadequate consideration.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal examined the grounds of appeal concerning the Primary Judge's determinations on the applicant's claims of misrepresentation, unconscionability, and inadequate consideration. Firstly, regarding misrepresentation, the court found that the applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that any representations made by the respondent led to the entering into of the facility agreement. The court upheld the Primary Judge's finding, emphasizing that the applicant failed to establish the requisite causal link between the alleged misrepresentation and the agreement.
Secondly, in relation to unconscionability, the court noted that the Primary Judge correctly identified that the applicant did not demonstrate the elements necessary to establish unconscionability. The court affirmed that the applicant had not shown that the respondent was aware of any disadvantage suffered by the applicant or that the respondent exploited that disadvantage. The decision was grounded in the principles established in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio, which requires proof of special disadvantage and exploitation.
Thirdly, concerning the procurement of the agreement by unconscionability, the Court of Appeal supported the Primary Judge's conclusion. The applicant's inability to prove that the respondent exploited an unconscionable situation or that this exploitation led to the agreement was noted. The court relied on the precedent set by Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher, which requires a causal connection between unconscionable conduct and the transaction.
Lastly, the court upheld the Primary Judge's finding that the applicant had not established inadequate consideration. The court observed that the applicant failed to provide evidence that the consideration provided under the agreement was significantly disproportionate. The ratio decidendi here was that the applicant must show a clear and substantial inadequacy in the consideration to successfully challenge the agreement's enforceability.