Wilsons Ceramics Pty Ltd v Pantaenius Australia Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 22 min read

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Wilsons Ceramics Pty Ltd v Pantaenius Australia Pty Ltd [2021] QDC 74

PARTIES:

Wilsons Ceramics Pty Ltd (ABN 28 100 491 709)
(Plaintiff)

v

PANTAENIUS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ABN 95 148 013 085)
(Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

3167 of 2019

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

4 May 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

15 February 2021 with further written submissions received 24 February 2021, 9 March 2021 and 12 March 2021

JUDGE:

Kefford DCJ

ORDER:

I order:

1.      The application is dismissed.

2.      The matter be listed for further mention on Thursday, 6 May 2021 at 9 am.

CATCHWORDS:

APPLICATION IN PENDING PROCEEDING – where the proceeding relates to the condition of the hull of the plaintiff’s yacht – where the defendant insurer seeks an order for inspection to facilitate further core sampling of the hull – whether it is a pre-requisite that the inspection be “necessary” – whether it would be appropriate to exercise discretion to make an order for inspection

LEGISLATION:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 250

CASES:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27, applied

Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Orekinetics & Ors [2002] QSC 42; [2002] 2 Qd R 345, applied

Hartley v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd [1996] QDC 311, distinguished

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305, (2001) 52 NSWLR 705, 729-30 [59]-[60], applied

Rooskov v Laconholme [2002] QDC 217, distinguished

COUNSEL:

J B Rolls for the plaintiff
C Templeton for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

Kerin Lawyers for the plaintiff
Hall & Wilcox Lawyers for the defendant

Introduction

  1. The plaintiff is the owner of a yacht called “Enhansed” (“the vessel”).  The vessel was insured under a policy issued by the defendant.  The plaintiff alleges that on 9 November 2017 the vessel was struck by lightning and that, as a consequence, the vessel was damaged beyond all economic repair.[1]   The particulars of that allegation include that the lightning strike exited the box steel frame via the hull, creating lightning exit holes throughout the hull which caused saltwater ingress into the structural steel box frame into the bilge.  The plaintiff also alleges that the condition of the vessel after the lightning strike was such that the vessel was not fit for its intended purpose, it could not be made seaworthy for its intended purpose, it was not able to be sold for its intended purpose, and the structural integrity of the hull, amongst other things, had been compromised by the lightning strike.[2]  The defendant denies these allegations and says the vessel is not beyond reasonable economic repair.  The defendant alleges that the vessel can be restored to its pre-incident condition. 

    [1]Statement of Claim, [8].

    [2]Statement of Claim, [9(d)].

  2. The integrity of the hull is a central issue in the proceeding.  It appears to be common ground that the hull is…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Wilsons Ceramics Pty Ltd v Pantaenius Australia Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] QDC 74
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wilsons Ceramics Pty Ltd v Pantaenius Australia Pty Ltd, the plaintiff sought compensation from the defendant insurer for damage to the hull of their yacht. The defendant, in turn, sought an order for inspection of the yacht's hull to facilitate further core sampling. The primary legal issue before the court was whether an inspection order was necessary and appropriate for the defendant to proceed with the sampling. The court had to determine if the inspection was a prerequisite and if it was appropriate to exercise discretion to make such an order.

The court considered the principles established in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles, where it was observed that expert evidence must provide the trier of fact with criteria to evaluate the validity of the expert’s conclusions. The court also noted that expert opinion evidence, while important, cannot usurp the judicial function. The court must decide whether to accept the expert opinion based on its fundamental soundness and applicability to the issue. In this case, the court needed to balance the defendant’s need for further evidence with the plaintiff’s rights and interests. The court found that the defendant had not sufficiently demonstrated that an inspection was necessary, and therefore, declined to exercise its discretion to order an inspection.

The court dismissed the application and ordered that the matter be listed for further mention. This decision underscores the importance of providing a sufficient basis for expert opinion and the necessity for a compelling reason to order an inspection in such proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

I order:

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The matter be listed for further mention on Thursday, 6 May 2021 at 9 am.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles[8], Heydon JA made the following pertinent observations about expert evidence:[8][2001] NSWCA 305, (2001) 52 NSWLR 705, 729-30 [59]-[60].“59If Professor Morton’s report were to be useful, it was necessary for it to comply with a prime duty of experts in giving opinion evidence: to furnish the trier of fact with criteria enabling evaluation of the validity of the expert’s conclusions. In Davie v Lord Provost, Magistrates and Councillors of the City of Edinburgh 1953 SC 34 at 39–40, Lord President Cooper, in a case concerning liability for damage to dwelling houses allegedly caused by blasting operations in the course of constructing a sewer, said:“The only difficulty experienced by the Lord Ordinary and developed before us arose from the scientific evidence regarding explosives and their effect. This evidence was given by Mr Teichman, one of the technical staff of the ICI, with whom a fellow employee, Mr Sheddan, was taken as concurring. Mr Sheddan was cross-examined on his qualifications with considerable effect, and the point was taken that Mr Teichman was truly uncorroborated. I do not consider that in the case of expert opinion evidence formal corroboration is required in the same way as it is required for proof of an essential fact, however desirable it may be in some cases to be able to rely upon two or more experts rather than upon one. The value of such evidence depends upon the authority, experience and qualifications of the expert and above all upon the extent to which his evidence carries conviction, and not upon the possibility of producing a second person to echo the sentiments of the first, usually by a formal concurrence. In this instance it would have made no difference to me if Mr Sheddan had not been adduced. The true question is whether the Lord Ordinary was entitled to discard Mr Teichman’s testimony and to base his judgment upon the other evidence in the case.Founding upon the fact that no counter evidence on the science of explosives and their effects was adduced for the pursuer, the defenders went so far as to maintain that we were bound to accept the conclusions of Mr Teichman. This view I must firmly reject as contrary to the principles in accordance with which expert opinion evidence is admitted. Expert witnesses, however skilled or eminent, can give no more than evidence. They cannot usurp the functions of the jury or Judge sitting as a jury, any more than a technical assessor can substitute his advice for the judgment of the Court. Their duty is to furnish the Judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the Judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested, becomes a factor (and often an important factor) for consideration along with the whole other evidence in the case, but the decision is for the Judge or jury. In particular the bare ipse dixit of a scientist, however eminent, upon the issue in controversy, will normally carry little weight, for it cannot be tested by cross-examination nor independently appraised, and the parties have invoked the decision of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert.” Lord Carmont expressed “complete agreement” with those views. Lord Russell said (at 42):“ The opinion expressed by an expert witness in any branch of technical science depends for its effect on, inter alia, his qualifications, skill and experience in that science. If it appears to be based on a sufficiency of research directed accurately and relevantly to a particular issue and to be so supported as to convince a Court of its fundamental soundness and applicability to the particular issue, a Court is entitled, although not obliged, to accept it, even if unsupported by any corroborative expert opinion. Secondly the defenders argued that in the absence of any counter evidence of expert opinion in the science professed by Mr Teichman the Court is bound to take his opinion as conclusive, and as decisive of the issue. I am clearly of opinion that that argument must be rejected as being contrary to the principles by which the rules of evidence are regulated, and as constituting an unwarrantable encroachment on the judicial function of the Court. I respectfully agree with your Lordship’s observations on that topic.”Lord Keith concurred with all the opinions expressed.60Davie’s case is not to be read as reflecting only a principle peculiar to Scottish law. Before it was decided, in R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277 at 303, Fullagar J said that an expert witness must “explain the basis of theory or experience” upon which the conclusions stated are supposed to rest, for, as Sir Owen Dixon said in an extra-judicial address quoted by Fullagar J, “Courts cannot be expected to act upon opinions the basis of which is unexplained”.”(emphasis added)