Wilson v Britten-Jones (No 2)

In Wilson v Britten-Jones (No 2), the applicant, an equity partner and former deputy managing partner of a law firm, sought leave to commence proceedings against the managing partner, alleging unlawful discrimination and victimisation under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). The applicant alleged that her removal from her positions was discriminatory and a retaliatory act following her reporting of workplace bullying by her colleagues. The court had to decide whether the applicant's claims of sex discrimination and victimisation were reasonably arguable, considering the principles set out in James v WorkPower Inc.

The primary legal issue was whether the applicant had established a reasonably arguable case for her claims under the Sex Discrimination Act. The court considered whether the allegations of victimisation were factually arguable, applying the standard from James v WorkPower and subsequent cases. The court also examined the broader context of the applicant's claims, including her position within the firm and the nature of the complaints against her.

The court found that the applicant's claims of victimisation were not reasonably arguable, as they did not meet the factual threshold set by the precedents. Although the applicant had alleged various procedural flaws and inappropriate conduct by the managing partner, the court held that these did not establish a reasonably arguable case of victimisation. The applicant had not demonstrated a causal link between her reporting of bullying and her subsequent treatment by the managing partner that would satisfy the requirements of the Act.

As a result, the court refused leave to commence proceedings on the claims of sex discrimination and victimisation. The applicant could still proceed with other claims outlined in her application. The court's decision was based on the lack of factual basis for the victimisation claims and the high threshold for establishing such claims under the relevant legislation.

The court ordered that leave to make an application under section 46PO(1) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1984 (Cth) be refused. This decision was in line with the Federal Court Rules 2011, particularly Rule 39.32, which governs the entry of orders in such proceedings.