Wilson v Bowman
[2014] QCATA 16
•28 January 2014
| CITATION: | Wilson v Bowman [2014] QCATA 16 |
| PARTIES: | Angus Wilson (Applicant) |
| v | |
| Robyn Bowman (Respondent) |
| APPLICATION NUMBER: | APL483 -13 |
| MATTER TYPE: | Appeals |
| HEARING DATE: | On the papers |
| HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
| DECISION OF: | Senior Member Stilgoe OAM |
| DELIVERED ON: | 28 January 2014 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
| ORDERS MADE: | 1. Leave to appeal refused |
| CATCHWORDS: | APPEAL – LEAVE TO APPEAL - MINOR CIVIL DISPUTE – whether grounds for leave to appeal Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) s 419(3) Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549 Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41 McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577 |
APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):
The appeal tribunal heard and determined this matter on the papers in accordance with section 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mr Wilson was a tenant in a property owned by Ms Bowman from 2005 to 2010. When the tenancy agreement ended, Mr Wilson asked for a refund of his bond. Ms Bowman wanted the bond to cover outstanding electricity charges. On 25 January 2013, the tribunal found that Ms Bowman had charged Mr Wilson for electricity when she was not entitled to do so. The tribunal ordered that Mr Wilson receive $664.85 from the bond to compensate for the overpayment.
On 25 July 2013, Mr Wilson filed an application for return of the overpaid electricity. Two Justices of the Peace, sitting as the tribunal in its minor civil dispute jurisdiction, dismissed Mr Wilson’s claim because he filed it more than six months after he became aware of Ms Bowman’s breach of the tenancy agreement[1].
[1] Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) s 419(3)
Mr Wilson wants to appeal that decision. He says that the learned Justices erred in their application, and interpretation, of the six month limit.
Because this is an appeal from a decision of the tribunal in its minor civil disputes jurisdiction, leave is necessary. The question whether or not leave to appeal should be granted is usually addressed according to established principles. Is there a reasonably arguable case of error in the primary decision?[2] Is there a reasonable prospect that the applicant will obtain substantive relief?[3] Is leave necessary to correct a substantial injustice caused by some error?[4] Is there a question of general importance upon which further argument, and a decision of the appeals tribunal, would be to the public advantage?[5]
[2] QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
[3] Cachia v Grech [2009] NSWCA 232 at 2.
[4] QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
[5]Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 388 at 389; McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577 at 578, 580.
Mr Wilson argued at the hearing, and repeats the argument in this application, that he could not have been aware of Ms Bowman’s breach of the tenancy agreement until he sent a dispute resolution request for the overpaid charges and she failed to respond to it.
The Justices of the Peace considered Mr Wilson’s argument. They found, as they were entitled to do, that Mr Wilson knew of the breach when he filed the dispute resolution request that led to the decision of 25 January 2013.
The learned Justices of the Peace also considered Mr Wilson’s second argument; that the claim in the second proceeding arose from a different breach of the agreement. The learned Justices of the Peace considered that argument and, as they were entitled to do, rejected it.
At that time, the learned Member had considered the history of dealings between the parties and alerted Mr Wilson to the six-month time limit. Mr Wilson received some agreed compensation on 25 January 2013. The learned Justices of the Peace rightly concluded that Mr Wilson had exhausted his compensation rights.
There is no question of general importance that should be determined by the appeals tribunal. There is no reasonably arguable case that the learned Justices of the Peace were in error. There is no reasonable prospect of substantive relief on appeal. There is no evidence that a substantial injustice will result if leave is not granted. Leave to appeal should be refused.
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