Wilson and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development (Practice and procedure) - [2025] ARTA 2253

Wilson and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 2253 (24 October 2025)
Applicant/s:  Eric and Tracey Wilson
Respondent:  Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development
Other Parties:  Australia Pacific Airports (Melbourne) Pty Ltd

Tribunal Number: 2024/7965 and 2024/9936

Tribunal:Deputy President O'Donovan
Place:Brisbane
Date:24 October 2025

Decision:The Tribunal dismisses the application for reinstatement.

Statement made on 24 October 2025 at 4:09pm
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – reinstatement application – airports – decision to approve a major development plan– application for review dismissed under s 101(1)(b) – applicants are not persons whose ‘interests are affected by’ the decision – consideration of scope and purpose of Airports Act – application for reinstatement dismissed
Legislation
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) ss 97, 101, 102
Airports Act 1996 (Cth) ss 5, 90-94, 242
Cases
Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250, 260
Argos Pty Ltd v Corbell, Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development (2014) 254 CLR 394
Brisbane Airport Corporation Ltd v Wright (2002) 120 FCR 157
Lees v Comcare [1999] FCA 753
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286, 324, [134]
Wilson and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 716
Wilson and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 1762
Secondary Materials
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2024 (Cth)
Statement of Reasons

Eric and Tracey Wilson (‘the applicants’) live 55 kilometres north of Melbourne Airport. On 10 September 2024 the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (‘the Minister’) decided to approve the major development plan for the third runway at Melbourne Airport. The decision was made pursuant to s 94(2) of the Airports Act 1996 (Cth) (‘Airports Act’).
On 8 October 2024 the applicants applied to the Administrative Appeal Tribunal (‘AAT’) for review of that decision. On 14 October 2024, the AAT was abolished and the Administrative Review Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) commenced operation. Extant matters before the AAT were transferred for determination to the new Tribunal.
On 7 March 2025 the Minister and the other party to these proceedings, Australian Pacific Airports (Melbourne) Pty Ltd (‘APAM’), applied to have the Wilsons’ applications dismissed. APAM leases and operates the Melbourne Airport and proposes to construct the new north-south runway. The application was made on the basis that the applicants were not persons whose ‘interests are affected by’ the decision to approve the major development plan and so lacked standing to bring the application.
On 10 June 2025 DP Britten-Jones dismissed the Wilsons’ applications (‘Dismissal Decision’).[1] The applications were dismissed pursuant to s 101(1)(b) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (‘ART Act’). DP Britten-Jones accepted that the applicants were not persons whose interests were affected by the decision to approve the major development plan.
[1] Wilson and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 716.
On 8 July 2025 the applicants wrote to the Tribunal requesting a full rehearing of the interlocutory application due to what they described as errors in the decision of DP Britten-Jones. That request has been treated as an application for reinstatement under s 102(5), or an application to have the Dismissal Decision treated as a nullity on the basis of the legal principle known as the Bhardwaj[2] principle.
[2] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597.
In relation to the reinstatement application, the Tribunal heard as a preliminary question, whether the fact that the Dismissal Decision was made following a full hearing on the question of standing had the consequence that the Tribunal had no power to reinstate the application. In a decision published to the parties on 29 August 2025 I rejected that proposition (‘Power Decision’).[3] The matter was then listed for a hearing on the merits of the reinstatement application and the parties were provided with an opportunity to make submissions and file additional material.
[3] Wilson and Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 1762.
The application was heard on 23 September 2025, and I had before me the following material:
Applicants’ Material
·     Applicants’ submission in support of reinstatement dated 9 September 2025
·     Applicants’ reply submissions dated 22 September 2025
·     Applicants’ letter to Tribunal in support of reinstatement dated 8 July 2025
·     Applicants’ submission in support of reinstatement dated 19 August 2025
·     Applicants Interlocutory Submissions dated 30 April 2025
·     Document entitled Macedon Ranges Planning Scheme - Rural Conservation Zone, consisting of seven pages
·     Contour maps of Applicants’ and Commonwealth’s lands
·     Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 1992 (1 May 1992), Department of the Environment and Energy
·     Extracts of T Documents, T5.2, consisting of two pages
·     Letter from Eric and Tracey Wilson to the Minister, dated 18 February 2025
·     Extract of website ‘BITRE Airline activity statistics’, consisting of seven pages
·     Extract from report ‘Melbourne Airport’s Third Runway (APAM, 2020)’ consisting of four pages
Minister’s Material
·     Respondent’s Submissions on the Applicant’s Reinstatement Application dated 16 September 2025
·     Respondent’s Submissions on the Applicant’s Reinstatement Application dated 15 August 2025
·     Respondent’s Submissions on Standing dated 4 April 2025
APAM’s Material
·     Submission of APAM on reinstatement application dated 16 September 2025
·     Annexure A: Submissions of APAM on Standing Application dated 4 April 2025
·     Annexure B: Affidavit Laura Brannigan dated 4 April 2025
·     Annexure C: Affidavit Joseph Gandy dated 4 April 2025
·     Annexure D: Submission of APAM on reinstatement application dated 15 August 2025
Having considered the material and submissions I have decided to dismiss the application for reinstatement for the reasons which follow.
Statutory Framework
Section 102 relevantly provides as follows:
(5) A party to the proceeding in relation to the application may apply to the Tribunal for reinstatement of the application on the grounds of error within 28 days after the party receives notice that the application is dismissed (or such longer period as the Tribunal, in special circumstances, allows).
(6) If a party applies under subsection (5) and the Tribunal considers that the application was dismissed in error, the Tribunal may reinstate the application and make such orders as appear to the Tribunal to be appropriate in the circumstances.
To trigger the availability of the discretion to reinstate, the applicants must establish that:
· the decision of DP Britten-Jones contains errors; and
· those errors resulted in the dismissal of their application.
As discussed in the Power Decision, the kinds of errors that can meet the threshold for reinstatement under s 102 include administrative, legal and factual errors.
The applicants have itemised 25 matters as supporting the conclusion that the application was dismissed in error. APAM and the Minister, in their submissions, grouped those items into categories which allows them to be dealt with at a level of principle, and provided reasons why the errors alleged were not made out. They also relied on their earlier submissions to the effect that the question of whether a person’s interests are affected by a decision is determined having regard to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statutory scheme in the Airport’s Act, and when this is done, the Wilsons and the interests they assert do not establish standing.
Having regard to these general submissions, I accept that the Wilsons are not ‘persons whose interests are affected’ by the Minister’s decision to approve the major development plan that allows construction of the third runway.
. Consequently, even if DP Britten-Jones made some or all of the procedural and non-procedural errors that the Wilsons allege can be established (about which I make no finding), it would be inappropriate to exercise the discretion to reinstate the matter.
There is no point in reinstating the application either under s 102 or by applying the Bhardwaj principle because regardless of any other errors DP Britten-Jones may have made the application to the Tribunal cannot proceed because the applicants lack standing.
In order to deal with this application question by reference to the broad question of standing, two specific questions need to be addressed.
The first is whether the phrase ‘a person whose interests are adversely affected by a reviewable decision’ that appears in s 17 of the ART Act should be interpreted in a broad manner consistent with the High Court decision in Argos Pty Ltd v Corbell, Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development (2014) 254 CLR 394 (‘Argos’), or more narrowly and consistently with Brisbane Airport Corporation Ltd v Wright (2002) 120 FCR 157, having regard to the scope and purpose of the Airports Act.
If the more narrow approach is taken, the second question is whose interests does the Airport Act protect by providing access to merits review of a decision by the Minister to approve a major development plan and does it include the Wilsons and the interests they have identified.
Do the principles identified in Argos apply to merits review standing provisions?
The Wilsons contend that the wrong test for standing was applied in the Dismissal Decision. The nub of the issue is whether it is appropriate to have regard to the scope and purpose of the act under which the decision was made when determining whether an applicant’s interests are affected by a decision.
The applicants note that the High Court determined in Argos that the interests referred to in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) (‘ACT ADJR Act’) that create standing, are not ‘limited to those which fall within the subject-matter, scope and purposes of the particular enactment under which a decision was made or purported to be made’. The High Court found that determining standing in that way ‘must …be rejected in principle’.[4] The Wilson’s contend that the same approach should be adopted in relation to the ART Act and consequently DP Britten-Jones was wrong to proceed on the basis that Argos did not apply.
[4] Argos, 419, [80].
I reject that submission. Argos involved interpretation of the provisions of the ACT ADJR Act which is an Act concerned with the facilitation of judicial review. The standing provisions of such Acts are wide because ‘the object of judicial review is to ensure that the law is observed’.[5] This context encourages a generous interpretation of the phrase ‘a person whose interests are adversely affected by a decision’. If someone is adversely affected by a decision made beyond power, it is appropriate that access to the Courts is available to anyone with an interest beyond the interest of the public at large. A generous approach to standing ensures that the law is observed.
[5] Argos, 420, [82], citing Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250, 260.
The statutory context in which merits review by this Tribunal takes place is quite different. Merits review in most cases involves the remaking of the original decision, potentially having regard to different material. An applicant does not need to assert that there was anything wrong or defective in the decision the subject of review nor is the applicant subject to any costs risk in bringing the application. All that needs to be asserted is that having regard to the material before the Tribunal, a different decision is preferable. Whether review of this kind is available is determined by Parliament. It does this by making provision for it in the same legislation that authorises the decision. When review is being conducted by this Tribunal, it forms part of a decision-making continuum,[6] and the Tribunal ‘stands in the shoes’ of the original decision maker.[7] This creates a connection between the act that authorises the underlying decision and the work of the Tribunal, that is not present in the context of judicial review.
[6] Azevedo v Secretary, Department of Primary Industries and Energy [1992] FCA 84; (1992) 35 FCR 284, French J at 297.
[7] Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286, 324, [134].
That context means that before answering the question that s 17 of the ART Act raises, it is necessary to consider the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act that authorises the review of the decision in the first place. Whether someone is a person whose interests are affected in the relevant way is not a question that can be divorced from the process and considerations which led to the reviewable decision.
To take any interest, so long as it is greater than the interest of the public at large, as sufficient to give standing to seek merits review, would require a construction of the phrase ‘a person whose interests are affected by a reviewable decision’ that is divorced from the decision-making continuum which the Tribunal is part of.
I therefore reject the applicants’ submission that s 17 of the ART Act should be construed in a manner consistent with Argos and without regard to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Airports Act.
To the extent that Hicks & ors and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development & ors [2016] AATA 437 says otherwise, I disagree with that conclusion.
Interest affected as claimed by the Wilsons
As noted above, the applicants live 55 kilometres north of Melbourne Airport. The impact of the Minister’s decision on the Wilsons comes about as a result of the following sequence. In the absence of a decision to approve the major development plan a third runway cannot be built. Following the Minister’s decision, APAM is legally permitted to commence construction of the runway. If the third runway is built and utilised as proposed, it will result in more aircraft flying directly over the Wilsons’ property.
While the Wilsons identify a variety of specific ways that they are affected by the decision, almost all of the effects have as their ultimate source, the additional noise created by an increase in air traffic and potentially altered plane altitudes when the third runway comes into use. The Wilson’s rely on the areas particular environmental values recognised under state legislation. The exceptions to this general statement are the effect that aircraft may have on the flight patterns of wedge tailed eagles as a consequence of an actual collision between a plane and a bird, and an increase in traffic congestion near their property as a result of increased utilisation of the airport.
In relation to the noise effect on the Wilsons, the following evidence was cited by DP Britten-Jones.
· The major development plan contains assessments related to flight paths and aircraft noise based upon the Australian Noise Exposure Forecast (‘ANEF’) model which is a key determinant for aircraft noise effects in communities. The Airports Act describes ‘significant ANEF levels’ to mean ‘a noise above 30 ANEF levels’;
· APAM defined a geographical area for the scope of community consultation based upon conservative noise metrics. This area is used by APAM to define the extent of consultation reach for the project. The area encompasses almost 1 million households and approximately 2.7 million residents and is depicted on a plan within the major development plan.
· Significant ANEF levels (30 ANEF) extend about 10 kilometres from the airport. 20 ANEF levels extend about 20 kilometres from the airport. The property owned and occupied by the Wilsons is approximately 55 kilometres away from the airport and is therefore 45 kilometres outside areas associated with significant ANEF levels and is outside the area of consultation for the project. Their property is in a region that is overflown, but 80% of flights pass above at an altitude of 10,000 feet (the remainder not below 7,000 feet).[8]
[8] Dismissal Decision, [5], citing Affidavit of Laura Brannigan affirmed 4 April 2025, 3, [10].
The Wilson’s contest the altitude assessment in relation to their land, as it sits significantly above sea-level and raise additional noise concerns as a result of the granite rock formations on and near their land. Noone has ever assessed the Wilson’s property as being exposed to significant ANEF levels.
Having regard to the Airports Act, are the Wilsons ‘persons whose interests are affected’?
For the reasons explained above, in deciding whether the Wilsons are persons whose interests are affected for the purposes of s 17 of the ART Act, it is necessary to consider the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Airports Act and the nature of the reviewable decision.
Section 90 of the Airports Act prohibits carrying out a major development like the addition of a runway without an approved major development plan. The purpose of a major development plan is to establish the details of a major airport development that relates to the airport and ensure it is consistent with the airport lease and the final master plan for the airport. The airport-lessee must prepare a draft plan and comply with various statutory requirements as to content and consultation. In terms of consultation, before submitting a draft major development plan to the Minister, the airport-lessee company must advise:
·     the planning Minister of the State where the airport is situated;
·     the authority of that State for town planning or land use;
·     each local government body with responsibility for an area surrounding the airport.
of its intention to give the Commonwealth Minister the draft major development plan.[9]
[9] Airports Act, s 92(1A).
The airport-lessee must also undertake public consultation in accordance with the requirements of the Airports Act. Any written comments given must be submitted to the Minister with the draft plan. The minister can seek further information.[10]
[10] Ibid, s 92(1)-(2B).
The plan must address the extent (if any) of consistency with planning schemes in force under a law of the State in which the airport is located the justification for any inconsistencies.[11]
[11] Ibid, s 91(4).
Under section 94, the Minister must approve the plan or refuse to approve the plan. In deciding whether to approve the plan, the Minister must have regard to a range of matters specified in subsection 94(3).
If a final master plan is in force for the airport, the Minister must not approve the draft major development plan unless it is consistent with the final master plan.[12] A draft or final master plan must specify the airport-lessee company’s plans, developed following consultations with the airlines that use the airport and local government bodies in the vicinity of the airport, for managing aircraft noise intrusion in areas forecast to be subject to exposure above the significant ANEF levels.
[12] Ibid, s 94(5).
Significant ANEF levels is defined to mean ‘a noise above 30 ANEF levels’.[13]
[13] Ibid, s 5.
In deciding whether to approve the major development plan, the Minister must have regard to the following matters:
·     the extent to which the plan achieves the purpose of a major development plan;
·     the extent to which carrying out the plan would meet the future needs of civil aviation users of the airport, and other users of the airport, for services and facilities relating to the airport;
·     the effect that carrying out the plan would be likely to have on the future operating capacity of the airport;
·     the impact that carrying out the plan would be likely to have on the environment;
·     the consultations undertaken in preparing the plan (including the outcome of the consultations);
·     the views of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and Airservices Australia, in so far as they relate to safety aspects and operational aspects of the plan;
·     any other relevant matter.[14]
[14] Ibid, s 94(3).

Section 242(1) of the Airports Act provides that applications may be made to this Tribunal for review of decisions made by the Minister under the Airports Act.
Section 242(3) provides:
If the Minister:
(a)makes a decision of a kind covered by subsection (1); and
(b)gives to the person or persons whose interests are affected by the decision written notice of the making of the decision;
that notice is to include a statement to the effect that, subject to the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024, application may be made to the Administrative Review Tribunal for review of the decision.
This is the framework within which the reviewable decision of the Minister was made. When the approval decision is considered in this context, the better view is that only the airport-lessee is entitled to seek merits review of the decision that is made.
Parliament has protected the multiplicity of competing interests that may be affected by large airport infrastructure by ensuring that the Minister, who is accountable to the Parliament for any adverse effects on other interests (broad and narrow), is the person who makes the decision, and before doing so, the Minister is placed in a position to properly understand what the public, and others potentially affected by the approval, have to say about it. This is the mechanism that protects those more distant interests. Only the airport-lessee however has a close and immediate interest in the outcome of the decision. If the Minister’s decision is to refuse to approve the major development plan, then the airport-lessee cannot progress with the development of their business. It is this direct and immediate impact on the interests of the airport-lessee that the availability of merits review is designed to protect. This is reflected in the fact that it is the airport-lessee that must be notified of any decision by the Minister[15]. Further, when notified the airport-lessee must be notified of its review rights in the Tribunal.[16]
[15] Ibid, ss 94(8) and (9).
[16] Ibid, s 242
In these circumstances I am satisfied that the Wilson’s are not ‘persons whose interests are affected by a decision’ as that phrase in should be understood in s17 of the ART Act when a decision under the Airports Act is the subject of the application.
I am fortified in that view by the decision in Brisbane Airport Corporation Ltd v Wright (2002) 120 FCR 157. Although that case concerned a decision to approve a draft master plan, and for that reason is not binding in this case, the logic that lead to that result applies with equal force. In that case Kevin Rudd, the Local Member and resident of a suburb likely to be affected by increased aircraft noise, sought review in the AAT of a decision to approve a draft master plan under s 81. Brisbane Airport Corporation challenged a finding by the AAT that Mr Rudd was a person whose interests were affected by the decision in the Federal Court.
Mr Rudd had succeeded in establishing an affected interest in the AAT on the basis that he and his wife owned and occupied a dwelling about 9-10 kilometres from the southern (nearer) end of the existing Brisbane runway. His concern about the master plan was that there was a proposal for a second runway at Brisbane airport in it and noise from such a development would adversely affect residential areas including the Rudd’s property. It was accepted that the Rudd’s property would not be subject to exposure above the significant ANEF levels. The forecast was that the property would not be exposed to ANEF levels in excess of 20. However, Mr Rudd was able to point to aspects of the evidence which suggested that ANEF levels are not always accurate in their predictions particularly at levels below 20.
Following a review of the authorities Dowsett J noted as follows:
In seeking to identify a person “whose interests are affected” by the decision to approve the master plan, the starting point is a construction of the subject, scope and purpose of the Airports Act.[17]
[17] Brisbane Airport Corporation Ltd v Wright (2002) 120 FCR 157, [28].
He noted that s (3)(b) referred to interests of the ‘general community’ but that that seemed to refer to collective, rather than individual interests and that the Airport Act itself assumes the continuing commercial operations of existing airports affecting many people with that operation. They and others may be affected favourably or otherwise by any change in the mode of operation. It is of the nature of a major airport operation that it is likely to affect many people in varying degrees.
In considering the matter Dowsett J considered that:
It is especially relevant that s 71(2) requires that a master plan specify:
· Forecasts relating to noise exposure levels; and
· The airport lessee company’s plans, developed following consultations with the airlines that use the airport and local government bodies in the vicinity of the airport, for managing aircraft noise intrusion in areas forecast to be subject to exposure above the significant ANEF levels…[18]
[18] Ibid, [29].
Dowsett J noted that the lessee is required to forecast areas which will be subject to aircraft noise experienced above 30 ANEF levels, consult with user airlines and relevant local authorities, and develop a plan for managing aircraft noise intrusion in those areas. Importantly, it was noted that the Airports Act does not require that a lessee consult with occupiers of properties which, it is forecast, will be affected. Dowsett J assumed that their interests were to be protected by the relevant local authorities.[19]
[19] Ibid, [31].
Dowsett J concluded that in those circumstances it seems unlikely that Parliament intended that individuals affected by significant ANEF should be able to commence proceedings for review of a decision to approve a master plan and that it is even less likely that occupiers likely to be exposed to lower levels of noise intrusion should be able to do so. The relevant ripple of affection is insufficient to constitute an affected interest for the purposes of the Airports Act.
It was also noted that s 81 requires the Minister to have regard to whether in carrying out the plan, what effect it would have on the use of the land. Dowsett J noted that the focus was on the use of land, not amenity or value. There was no suggestion that the use of the second respondent’s land would be so affected even if its amenity were reduced. Dowsett J noted that it was only in respect of the lessee that any obligation to give notice of review rights arose. [20]
[20] Ibid, [32].
Dowsett J did not consider that the requirements in the Airports Act that notice of approval be given to ‘members of the public’ meant that any member of the public might seek review of a decision to approve a master plan in circumstances where s 81 does not compel consideration of public comments by the Minister in making his or her decision to approve.[21]
[21] Ibid, [34].
Dowsett J left open the possibility that a different view may be formed when considering a major development plan, but he concluded that where the decision in question concerns approval of a master plan, only the lessee is an interested party for the purposes of seeking review.
For the reasons I have stated, I am satisfied that the same conclusion should be reached in relation to major development plans.
Conclusion
I am therefore satisfied that the Wilsons do not meet the statutory description of persons whose interests are affected by the Minister’s decision. Their interests are accommodated within the broad consultation regime provided for in the Airports Act, not by the provision of entitlement to seek merits review in the Tribunal. The right to seek merits review is limited to the airport lessee. Having reached that conclusion, there is no need to undertake any detailed analysis of the particular kinds of interests that the Wilsons claim are affected.
Having reached the conclusion that the Wilson’s do not have standing, it would be pointless to reinstate their applications even if some error on the part of DP Britten-Jones were established. The applications cannot proceed in the Tribunal because the Wilsons do not meet the statutory requirements to bring their applications.
I note that DP Britten-Jones dismissed the applications under s 101(1)(b) on the basis that it had no reasonable prospects of success. I agree with that conclusion.
The Wilsons make the submission that dismissal under this section was not available because ‘in order to determine ‘no reasonable prospects of success’ every prospect of success should have been considered’.[22] I do not accept that submission. Once it is established that the Wilsons have no standing, their applications cannot succeed and must be dismissed. It is unnecessary to consider any question beyond the standing question. The Wilson’s also contend that they were not given a sufficient opportunity to establish standing.[23] I am not satisfied that is the case. The matter was listed for a hearing directed solely at the question of standing for a whole day on 5 May 2025. The Wilsons were aware that their standing to bring the application was subject to challenge. They had an opportunity to establish that they are persons whose interests are affected in the relevant way and have failed to do so despite the opportunity. Further, given my conclusion that only the airport-lessee has standing to challenge decisions to approve a major development plan, regardless of the evidence brought forward by the Wilsons, they could not establish standing.
[22] Applicants’ submission in support of reinstatement dated 9 September 2025, 6.
[23] Ibid, 10.
The other point to note about DP Britten-Jones’ decision to dismiss under s 101(1)(b) of the ART Act is that it is inconsistent with the revised explanatory memorandum to the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2024. It provides in relation to clause 97 (which became s 97):
This clause allows the Tribunal to dismiss an application if it is satisfied the decision is not reviewable. This may be because, for example, the legislation under which the decision is made does not provide for Tribunal review of those decisions, the application is out of time (and no extension is granted), or for other reasons, such as the person who brought the application does not have standing because their interests are not affected by the decision.[24]
[24] Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2024, 93-94.
Two points should be made about this. First, this supports the view that the Parliament did not regard questions of standing as appropriate for freestanding determination outside of the context of a dismissal application. Accordingly, when issues of standing are to be raised that should be done in the context of a dismissal application. Second, the identification of s 97 as the appropriate vehicle for such an application may not be correct. To dismiss under s 97 the Tribunal must be satisfied that the ‘decision is not reviewable by the Tribunal’. In the case of dismissal for want of standing, the issue is not whether the decision is reviewable, but whether the person bringing the application is entitled to proceed with the application. In my assessment DP Britten-Jones was correct to rely on s 101(1) rather than s 97 as the provision authorising dismissal of the application when standing is in issue.
In light of my conclusion that the applicants do not have standing to bring their application, I am also satisfied that it would be inappropriate to use the Bhardwaj principle to treat the Dismissal Decision as a nullity.
Decision
The application to reinstate the applications for review is dismissed.
Date of Hearing  23 September 2025
Applicant’s representative  Eric Wilson
Minister’s Counsel  Fiona Batten
Minister’s Solicitor  Clayton Utz
APAM’s Counsel  Julia Watson
APAM’s Solicitor  King & Wood Mallesons