Wilson and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority

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Administrative

Appeals

Tribunal

 

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 81

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No N2005/815

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re TRACY PHILIP WILSON

Applicant

And

DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Senior Member M D Allen

Date3 February 2006

PlaceSydney

Decision The decision under review is set aside and the Tribunal substitutes its decision that the election made by the Applicant on 4 August 2002 be treated as if it were an election made within the period permitted by ss.76(1) of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973.

(Sgd) M. D. ALLEN

........................................

Senior Member

3. Unlike s.157 of the Superannuation Act 1976 to which s.76 has some superficial similarities, s.76 of the DFRDB Act has two important differences. The first is that the right to elect to preserve benefits only exist if the ex-member becomes a member of certain specified superannuation schemes (see ss.76(4) and s.73 of the DFRDB Act) but, more importantly, the right to a late election can only be exercised if “special circumstances” exist.

4.      Thus, whilst cases such as Chalk v Commissioner for Superannuation (1994) 33 ALD 420 and Commissioner for Superannuation v Boardman (1994) 123 ALR 239 deal with analogous matters, they are distinguishable as applying to quite different legislative provisions.

5.      The term “special circumstances” has been referred to in many cases both before this Tribunal and the common law courts.  The classic statement for the purposes of this Tribunal is that by the Tribunal in Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 at page 3, namely:

“An expression such as ‘special circumstances’ is by its very nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition.  The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional.  Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend upon the context in which they occur.  For it is the context which allows one to say that the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases.  This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special.”

6.      Of that explanation the Full Court said on appeal (Beadle v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 7 ALD 670 at 675):

“While we would place less emphasis on one dictionary definition of ‘special’ we are in broad agreement with the approach of the Tribunal…”

7.      In Ex parte Bucknel (1936) 56 CLR 221 at 224, the High Court in a joint judgment said of the phrase “special circumstances” where it related to a special leave application:

“It is not necessary or desirable to attempt to enumerate all the classes or circumstances which may be regarded as special in this connection.  Indeed, the very use of the word ‘special’ is designed to make it possible for the court to deal with each case individually in relation to its own particular circumstances.…

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Details
Case
[2006] AATA 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Wilson and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority involved an applicant who sought to extend the time in which to make an election to preserve his benefits under the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973. The applicant argued that special circumstances existed due to the lack of explanation given to him about the options to preserve his benefits, and that the circumstances surrounding his divorce were sufficiently unusual, uncommon, or exceptional to warrant an extension of time. The matter was heard by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which had to determine whether the decision under review should be set aside and substituted with a decision that the applicant's election be treated as if it were made within the period permitted by the Act.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant had established special circumstances that justified an extension of time to make the election to preserve his benefits. The Tribunal had to consider the evidence presented by the applicant about the circumstances surrounding his divorce and whether they were sufficiently unusual, uncommon, or exceptional to warrant an extension of time. The Tribunal also had to consider the authority of relevant cases, including Beadle v Director-General of Social Security, Groth v Department of Social Security, and Re Manion's Appeal, which provided guidance on the meaning of special circumstances in the context of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had established special circumstances that justified an extension of time to make the election to preserve his benefits. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had not received adequate information about the options available to him to preserve his benefits, and that the circumstances surrounding his divorce were sufficiently unusual, uncommon, or exceptional to warrant an extension of time. The Tribunal considered the authority of relevant cases and concluded that the decision under review should be set aside and substituted with a decision that the applicant's election be treated as if it were made within the period permitted by the Act. The Tribunal noted that the circumstances of the case were similar to those in Chalk v Commissioner for Superannuation, where an extension of time was granted due to the applicant's lack of understanding of the options available to him.

The Tribunal set aside the decision under review and substituted its decision that the election made by the applicant on 4 August 2002 be treated as if it were an election made within the period permitted by ss.76(1) of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973. The Tribunal found that the applicant had established special circumstances that justified an extension of time to make the election to preserve his benefits, and that the decision under review should be set aside and substituted with a decision that the applicant's election be treated as if it were made within the period permitted by the Act. The Tribunal's decision provides guidance to applicants who may be in a similar position and highlights the importance of providing adequate information to applicants about the options available to them to preserve their benefits.

Orders

Orders of the court

The decision under review is set aside and the Tribunal substitutes its decision that the election made by the Applicant on 4 August 2002 be treated as if it were an election made within the period permitted by ss.76(1) of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established