Williment & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Williment v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 808

Citation: Williment v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 808
Parties: DOUGLAS WILLIMENT, WARREN SCANLON, STEPHEN TESORIERO, TRAVIS RUDOWSKI and STEPHEN CLARKE v FEDERAL COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number(s): NSD 918 of 2010
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 23 July 2010
Catchwords:

TAXATION – Taxation administration – Notice of compulsory attendance to give evidence – Power of court to restrain the Commissioner from proceeding on an issued notice – Injunctive relief inadequate to prevent the operation of an issued notice – Power to order mandatory injunction directing the Commissioner to repeal, rescind, revoke or amend the notice under s 33(3) Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Interlocutory injunction – Discretionary remedy – Unexplained delay in bringing application a basis for refusing relief

Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 264
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Sch 1, s 353-10
Cases cited: Carlton and United Breweries (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bond Brewing Company New South Wales Ltd (1987) 76 ALR 633 applied
Network Ten Ltd v Fulwood (1995) 62 IR 43 cited
Date of hearing: 23 July 2010
Date of last submissions: 23 July 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 18
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr I S Young
Solicitor for the Applicants: Jade Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G Kennett
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 918 of 2010

BETWEEN:

DOUGLAS WILLIMENT
First Applicant

WARREN SCANLON
Second Applicant

STEPHEN TESORIERO
Third Applicant

TRAVIS RUDOWSKI
Fourth Applicant

STEPHEN CLARKE
Fifth Applicant

AND:

FEDERAL COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 JULY 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for interlocutory relief be dismissed with costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 918 of 2010

BETWEEN:

DOUGLAS WILLIMENT
First Applicant

WARREN SCANLON
Second Applicant

STEPHEN TESORIERO
Third Applicant

TRAVIS RUDOWSKI
Fourth Applicant

STEPHEN CLARKE
Fifth Applicant

AND:

FEDERAL COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE:

23 JULY 2010

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Earlier today I granted the applicants leave to file in court an application and an affidavit of Ms Ly of 23 July 2010. The applicants are all subject to notices which have been issued pursuant to the provisions of s 353-10 of Schedule 1 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (“the Administration Act”) and s 264 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (“the 1936 Act”). There are a large number of notices attached to Ms Ly’s affidavit. They share in common the feature of requiring the applicants’ attendance before certain officials…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 808
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Williment & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation, the applicants sought relief from the court in relation to notices of compulsory attendance issued by the Commissioner of Taxation. The applicants argued that the notices were defective and that the court should intervene to prevent the Commissioner from proceeding with the notices. The primary legal issues that the court had to decide were whether the applicants had standing to bring the application and whether the court had the power to restrain the Commissioner from proceeding on an issued notice. The court also had to consider whether the applicants' unexplained delay in bringing the application was a basis for refusing relief.

The court found that the applicants did not have standing to bring the application as they had not demonstrated that they would suffer a significant detriment if the notices were enforced. The court also held that the power to grant an interlocutory injunction was inadequate to prevent the operation of an issued notice. The court found that the power to order a mandatory injunction directing the Commissioner to repeal, rescind, revoke or amend the notice under section 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) was the appropriate remedy. However, the court found that the applicants' unexplained delay in bringing the application was a basis for refusing relief. The court held that the delay had caused significant prejudice to the Commissioner and that it was not in the interests of justice to grant the relief sought by the applicants.

The final orders of the court were that the application for interlocutory relief be dismissed with costs. The court found that the applicants' delay in bringing the application was a significant factor in its decision to refuse relief. The court also found that the applicants had not demonstrated that they would suffer a significant detriment if the notices were enforced and that the power to grant an interlocutory injunction was inadequate to prevent the operation of an issued notice. The court held that the power to order a mandatory injunction was the appropriate remedy, but that it was not in the interests of justice to grant the relief sought by the applicants given their unexplained delay in bringing the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for interlocutory relief be dismissed with costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The second point that Mr Young made was that there were procedural irregularities attending some of the notices consisting of a failure to refer to the year of assessable income under examination. This complaint operated at a number of levels. The first level of the complaint was that some of the s 264 notices did not specify a particular year of assessable income which was being examined. Section 264 of the 1936 Act provides: Commissioner may require information and evidence (1)The Commissioner may by notice in writing require any person, whether a taxpayer or not, including any officer employed in or in connexion with any department of a Government or by any public authority: (a)to furnish him with such information as he may require; and (b) to attend and give evidence before him or before any officer authorized by him in that behalf concerning his or any other person’s income or assessment, and may require him to produce all books, documents and other papers whatever in his custody or under his control relating thereto. (2)The Commissioner may require the information or evidence to be given on oath or affirmation and either verbally or in writing, and for that purpose he or the officers so authorized by him may administer an oath or affirmation. (3)The regulations may prescribe scales of expenses to be allowed to persons required under this section to attend. The expression “concerning his or any other person’s income or assessment” has been consistently construed as giving rise to words of limitation. The question which immediately arises is whether, granted that those words are words of limitation, it needs to be the case that the notice referred to is concerned with a person’s income or assessment. For myself, it seems unlikely that they do but I am not prepared to say on an interlocutory argument that the contrary view is untenable. Therefore, I would accept in relation to the challenge premised on the notice’s inconsistency with s 264(1) that there is a triable issue. The second version of the argument put is that there is a similar timing limitation obtaining in the case of s 353-10(1)(b) of the Administration Act. Section 353-10 provides:353-10 Commissioner’s power (1)The Commissioner may by notice in writing require you to do all or any of the following: (a)to give the Commissioner any information that the Commissioner requires for the purpose of: (i)the application of an indirect tax law in relation to you or any other entity; or (ii)the administration or operation of this Schedule (other than Division 340); (b)to attend and give evidence before the Commissioner, or an individual authorised by the Commissioner, for the purpose of: (i)the application of an indirect tax law in relation to you or any other entity; or (ii)the administration or operation of this Schedule (other than Division 340); (c) to produce to the Commissioner any documents in your custody or under your control for the purpose of: (i)the application of an indirect tax law in relation to you or any other entity; or (ii) the administration or operation of this Schedule. (2)The Commissioner may require the information or evidence: (a)to be given on oath or affirmation; and (b) to be given orally or in writing. For that purpose, the Commissioner or the officer may administer an oath or affirmation. (3)The regulations may prescribe scales of expenses to be allowed to entities required to attend before the Commissioner or the officer.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established