Williamson v Brown - [1914] HCA 46

WILLIAMSON BROWN Lunacy-Person deemed to be insane-Order for detention in hospital for insane-

Jurisdiction of justices-Lunacy Act 1898 (N.S. W.) (No. 45 of 1898), 8ecs. 4, 5, 6.

Where a person deemed to be insane is brought before two justices in accordance with the provisions of sec. 4 of the Lunacy Act of 1898 the justices may satisfy themselves as to any one of the five matters mentioned in sec. 6, and if they are satisfied as to any one of them they may make an order Gavan Duffy JJ. accordingly.

A person was apprehended by a constable and brought before a stipendiary magistrate (who has the powers of two or more justices) as being a person deemed to be insane who was discovered under circumstances that denoted a purpose of committing some offence against the law. * The provisions of secs. 4, 5 and 6 of

"5. Any constable who has know- the Lunacy Act of 1898 are as follow :-

ledge that any person deemed to be 4. Upon information on oath before

insane is not under proper care and con- a justice that a person deemed to be

trol, or is cruelly treated or cruelly neglected by any relative or other per- support, or is wandering at large, or

son having or assuming the care or charge of him, shall forthwith give stances that denote a purpose of com-

information thereof upon oath to a mitting some offence against the law,

justice, and such justice upon such such justice may by order under his

information or upon the information hand require a constable to apprehend

upon oath of any person whomsoever such person and bring him before two justices; and every constable finding

visit and examine such person and any such person so wandering or under

make inquiry into the case, or by an such circumstances as are lastly above

order under his hand direct and mentioned may without any such order

authorize some medical practitioner to apprehend him and take him before

visit and examine such person and two justices.

make such inquiry and to report in

18 CLR 434

Held, by Griffith C.J. and Isaacs J. (Gavan Duffy J. doubting), that the magistrate had jurisdiction under sec. 6 to make an order for the detention of the person in a hospital for the insane as being an insane person not under proper care and control.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales Ex parte Brown, 14 S.R. (N.S. W.), 182, reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

On 25th March 1914 Thomas Edwin Brown was brought before a stipendiary magistrate (who has the powers of two or more justices) as being a person deemed to be insane who was dis- covered under circumstances that denoted a purpose of com- mitting some offence against the law. The magistrate thereupon proceeded to hold an inquiry as directed by sec. 6 of the Lunacy Act of 1898. Certificates of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1914] HCA 46
Decision Date: 4 September 1914

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, William Cotter Williamson, the superintendent of the Hospital for the Insane at Parramatta, appealed against an order of the Supreme Court which had quashed an order made by a stipendiary magistrate for the detention of Thomas Edwin Brown in the hospital. Brown had been apprehended by a constable and brought before the magistrate as a person deemed to be insane, discovered under circumstances denoting a purpose of committing an offence against the law.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the stipendiary magistrate had the jurisdiction, under section 6 of the *Lunacy Act 1898* (NSW), to make an order for the detention of Brown in a hospital for the insane on the ground that he was insane and not under proper care and control, even though the specific reason for his apprehension and presentation to the magistrate was that he was discovered under circumstances denoting a purpose of committing an offence. The Supreme Court had held that the magistrate lacked this jurisdiction, interpreting section 6 as limiting the magistrate's power to address only the specific ground upon which the person was brought before them.

The High Court, by majority (Griffith C.J. and Isaacs J., with Gavan Duffy J. doubting), held that the magistrate did have the requisite jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that section 6 of the *Lunacy Act 1898* provided a broad power for justices to make an order for detention if they were satisfied that a person brought before them was insane and a proper subject for care and treatment, provided they were satisfied as to any one of the five matters listed in sections 4 and 5 of the Act. The Court found no ambiguity in the wording of section 6, which referred to "any such person" brought before the justices, and concluded that this meant any person deemed to be insane, regardless of the specific circumstances that led to their apprehension. The literal interpretation of the section, supported by precedent regarding similar English legislation, indicated that the justices were not confined to inquiring only into the specific ground for apprehension.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, discharged the rule nisi for habeas corpus, and set aside the order of the Supreme Court. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders