IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Canberra No C5 of 2018
B e t w e e n -
GLEN RICHARD WILLIAMS
Appellant
and
WRECK BAY ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY COUNCIL
First Respondent
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Second Respondent
KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2018, AT 10.03 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.R. KENNETT, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the appellant. (instructed by Clayton Utz)
MR J.K. KIRK, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR R.J. ARTHUR and MR P.D. HERZFELD, for the first respondent. (instructed by Ken Cush & Associates)
MR P.J.F. GARRISSON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the Australian Capital Territory: May it please the Court, I appear with MS P.M. BINDON for the second respondent. (instructed by ACT Government Solicitor)
KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Mr Kennett.
MR KENNETT: Your Honours, I propose to go straight to section 46 of the Land Grant Act, if I may, because that is where ‑ ‑ ‑
KIEFEL CJ: Something of a threshold question?
MR KENNETT: That is where the issue that arises in the appeal is going to be resolved. We had an interesting debate in the Court of Appeal about the status of ACT laws that are picked up by section 4A of the Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act. That debate really does not need to be resolved because we have accepted that if there is a conflict between the Land Grant Act and the Residential Tenancies Act then it is the Land Grant Act that would prevail.
Whether there is a tension or a conflict used to be resolved, we say, by the application of section 46 and I want to say a little bit about the work that section 46 does in order to seek to elucidate why we say that it means just what it says. We seek to draw a distinction between provisions which provide rules for resolving conflicts between laws, section 109 is an example of one of those and provisions which aid the construction of statutes so as to minimise or avoid or perhaps create such conflicts on the other.
We say that section 46 is a provision of the latter kind. It does not supply a rule for resolving conflicts between laws. Those rules come from somewhere else. We can see that from just thinking about its terms. It speaks of a law in force in the Territory and therefore has work to do potentially, at least in principle, in relation to a number of different kinds of enactment. It has work to do in relation to laws of the ACT which are picked up under the current section 4A of the Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act and they were held by the Court of Appeal to have a…
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- Case
- [2018] HCATrans 183
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Council, as a body established under Commonwealth legislation to represent the interests of the Aboriginal community of the Jervis Bay Territory, could be considered an "authority of the Commonwealth" for the purposes of section 9(1) of the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* (Cth). This question was central to whether Mr. Williams could pursue his claim of racial discrimination against the Council under that Act. The Court also considered whether the Commonwealth could be vicariously liable for the actions of the Council.
The Court reasoned that the Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council was not an "authority of the Commonwealth" within the meaning of section 9(1) of the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* (Cth). Their Honours noted that the Council's powers and functions were derived from the *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Management Reform Act 1994* (Cth) and its constitution, and that it operated independently of direct Commonwealth control in its day-to-day operations and decision-making. The Court found that while the Council was established by Commonwealth legislation and performed functions related to land management, it did not possess the characteristics of a Commonwealth authority for the purposes of the Act. Consequently, the claim against the Commonwealth for vicarious liability failed as there was no primary liability on the part of the Council.
The High Court dismissed Mr. Williams' appeal.
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Decision
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