Williams v TT-Line (No 2)
[2022] VSC 413
•21 July 2022
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL COURT
ADMIRALTY LIST
S ECI 2018 0998
| ANDREW MICHAEL WILLIAMS | Plaintiffs |
| (and others according to the schedule of parties) | |
| v | |
| TT-LINE COMPANY PTY LTD (ACN 061 996 174) | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | Connock J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 21 July 2022 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 21 July 2022 ex tempore (revised 26 July 2022) |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Williams v TT-Line (No 2) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2022] VSC 413 |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application pursuant to s 27(3)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) – Release of obligation imposed in respect of documents and information to allow use in related proceeding – Requirement for special circumstances – Harman undertaking – Implied undertaking not to use documents or information for a purpose other than the legal proceeding – Documents and information required to have been produced under compulsion – Documents and information needed for defence to criminal charges – Application granted.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiffs | S Ryan (Solicitor) | Ryan Legal |
| For the Defendant | Martin Scott QC | HFW Australia |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
By summons filed 19 July 2022, the defendant seeks an order pursuant to s 27(3)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (Act) that it be released from its obligation under s 27(1) of the Act not to use certain documents and information filed or produced in this proceeding for a purpose other than in connection with this proceeding. The purpose for which it is said in the summons that the defendant wishes to use the documents and information is to assist the defendant with its defence in a criminal proceeding in the Magistrates‘ Court of Tasmania brought against it by the Director of Biosecurity Operations for Biosecurity Tasmania (Tasmanian Proceeding).
In the Tasmanian Proceeding the defendant is subject to 29 charges brought under animal welfare legislation in connection with the transport of 30 horses (Horses) across Bass Strait on the Spirit of Tasmania between 28 and 29 January 2018. The court was informed by senior counsel for the defendant that, following a directions hearing in the Tasmanian Proceeding held on 20 July 2022, further particulars of the charges were to be filed and served later that day but are now expected to be served very shortly.
The primary purpose of the defendant’s application is to allow the documents to be used by the defendant to potentially obtain expert opinion evidence from Dr Dunn, Professor Slocombe, Mr Kneller and Mr Bransden (Defendant’s Experts). The Defendant‘s Experts have each filed expert reports in this proceeding, have participated in joint expert conclaves, and have also participated in the production of court-ordered joint reports filed in this proceeding.
In a separate criminal proceeding brought against him by the Director of Biosecurity Operations for Biosecurity Tasmania, the first plaintiff has also been charged with numerous offences under animal welfare legislation in connection with the transport of the Horses across Bass Strait on the Spirit of Tasmania, between 28 and 29 January 2018.
The trials of the two criminal proceedings were due to commence on 8 August 2022 and to be heard concurrently between that date and 29 August 2022 in the Magistrates‘ Court of Tasmania at Burnie. Following a directions hearing on 7 July 2022, the defendant‘s solicitor, Mr Vallely, was informed that the first plaintiff had at that directions hearing entered a plea of guilty to the charges brought against him.
It was common ground between the parties, and established on the evidence in any event, that the Tasmanian Proceeding involves the same voyage, vehicles and horses as are the subject of this proceeding. In this proceeding the plaintiffs claim, among other things, damages from the defendant in connection with the alleged death of 16 of the Horses that were transported by the defendant on the Spirit of Tasmania from Devonport, Tasmania to Melbourne, Victoria and are said to have perished during the voyage. It was common ground that there is considerable factual overlap between the issues raised in this proceeding and in the Tasmanian Proceeding.
For the reasons that follow, the defendant will be granted the relief that it seeks and will also be granted related relief releasing it from its implied Harman undertaking in this proceeding.[1]
[1]Discussed further below at [16] and following.
Affidavit evidence and submissions
The defendant relied upon an affidavit of its solicitor, Mr Vallely, filed on 15 July 2022, and a written submission filed on 19 July 2022, which was supplemented orally by senior counsel for the defendant. I have considered and had regard to the affidavit evidence and the written and oral submissions. I have also had regard to the defendant’s solicitor’s email sent to the court during the hearing confirming that the Defendant’s Experts’ reports filed in this proceeding and the reports of the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr Leadon, do not contain statements or disclaimers that state that the reports are not to be used for any other purpose without the consent of the experts.[2]
[2]Or any other like statements.
Prior to the hearing of the application the solicitor for the plaintiffs, Mr Ryan, informed the court by email that the plaintiffs did not oppose the making of the orders sought. Mr Ryan appeared at the hearing on behalf of the plaintiffs and confirmed that this remained the position. Consequently, no substantive submissions were made on behalf of the plaintiffs.
Noting the urgency with which this application has had to be dealt with and the absence of opposition to the making of the orders, it is not necessary to set out the detail of the submissions or the affidavit material, although the substance of the same is apparent from what I have said above and that which follows. I add that I have also reviewed to a limited extent the documents and information referred to in the Schedule in the form that they have been included in the court book filed in this proceeding.
I also note that, as was emphasised by the defendant, a similar application was brought by the first plaintiff in this proceeding in March 2021. This was considered and determined favourably to the first plaintiff by Justice Digby on 30 March 2021. See Williams v TT-Line (Williams).[3] Given the emphasis placed by the defendant on the decision of Digby J, I have given careful consideration to his Honour‘s reasons, but also note that the documents the subject of that application were largely of a different character to many of those now in question. This is because in the application before Digby J they did not primarily comprise documents prepared on behalf of the parties for the purpose of litigation, such as interrogatories, answers to interrogatories, expert reports and joint expert reports. That said, it is trite that the application before me falls to be considered by reference to its own particular facts and circumstances.
[3][2021] VSC 150.
The documents and information
The documents and information the subject of the application were identified in the schedule to the summons and comprised: certain interrogatories and answers to interrogatories filed in the proceeding, measurements taken by Dr Dunn and Professor Slocombe, expert reports of the Defendant‘s Experts, expert reports of the plaintiffs‘ expert, Dr Leadon, and joint expert reports filed in this proceeding.
The schedule of documents and information was revised at the request of the court to include court book page numbers so as to identify more specifically where the relevant documents were located in the recently filed and served court book in this proceeding. For the avoidance of doubt, it was confirmed by senior counsel for the defendant that the application related to the identified expert reports including their respective annexures and other parts of the same — although it may be noted that this was how the plaintiffs and the court had understood the position in any event.
The revised schedule of documents and information (Schedule) was in the following form:
| Doc No | Document/Information | Date | Page number of court book |
| 1. | Interrogatories served by the Second Defendant on the Second, Third, and Fourth Plaintiffs | 25 November 2019 | 67–84 |
| 2. | Interrogatories served by the Plaintiffs on the Defendant | 2 December 2019 | 48–51 |
| 3. | Interrogatories served by the Defendant on the First Plaintiff | 16 December 2019 | 57–59 |
| 4. | The First Second, Third, and Fourth Plaintiffs’ Answers to interrogatories served by the Defendant and the Second Defendant | 12 February 2020 | 60–66 85–103 |
| 5. | The Defendant’s Answers to interrogatories served by the Plaintiffs | 18 February 2020 | 52–56 |
| 6. | Measurements taken by Dr Dunn and Professor Slocombe at Richmond, New South Wales | 11 March 2021 | 732–738 |
| 7. | Expert opinion of Dr Leadon | 3 May 2021 | 104–573 |
| 8. | Expert opinion of Dr Dunn | 27 July 2021 | 716–854 |
| 9. | Expert opinion of Professor Slocombe | 2 August 2021 | 993–1608 |
| 10. | Expert opinion in reply of Professor Slocombe | 6 September 2021 | 1609–1631 |
| 11. | Expert opinion in reply of Dr Leadon | 6 September 2021 | 574–593 |
| 12. | Joint expert reports between Dr Leadon, Dr Dunn, Professor Slocombe, Mr Kneller and Mr Bransden | 19 October 2021 | 1747–1790 |
Early in the hearing the court was informed that the defendant did not press its application in relation to items 2 and 5 of the Schedule.
Summons amended to include the defendant’s Harman undertaking
At the outset of the application and after the issue was raised with the parties by the court, the defendant sought and was granted leave to amend its summons so as to include an application to be released from the implied undertaking not to disclose or use the documents or information in the Schedule for a purpose other than in connection with this proceeding. As many authorities have pointed out, this implied undertaking is commonly referred to as the Harman undertaking, which is how I refer to it in the balance of these reasons.
Initially, the defendant and the plaintiffs proceeded upon the basis that the documents and information in the Schedule were all documents and information subject to the obligation in s 26(1) of the Act that were disclosed in accordance with s 26(2) of the Act. This position was recalibrated and the defendant proceeded on the basis that the documents and information were subject to one or both of (a) the obligation under s 27(1) of the Act and (b) the obligation imposed by the Harman undertaking. This was understandably not contested by the plaintiffs and it is appropriate for the court to proceed on this basis for the purpose of this application.
Legal principles and related observations
Principles relevant to the application under s 27(3)(b) of the Act and applications to be released from the Harman undertaking have been addressed in numerous authorities, are well known, and were not the subject of any controversy.
The defendant relied upon the brief summary of Digby J in Williams, which I set out below:
[31] Section 27(1) of the CPA imposes an obligation upon any person to whom the overarching obligations apply and who receives information or documents provided by another person in a civil proceeding as a result of disclosure made in accordance with s 26 of the CPA, not to use the information or documents other than in connection with the civil proceeding in which the information or documents were produced.
[32] This obligation is the statutory equivalent of the common law obligation in the nature of an implied undertaking to the Court pursuant to which documents are produced, commonly referred to as the ‘Harman undertaking’, see Harman v Secretary of State for Home Affairs,[4] and recognised in Australia in Hearne v Street.[5]
[33] In considering whether to make an order under s 27(3)(b) of the CPA releasing a party from its obligation under s 27(1), the Court will generally be guided by principles developed in relation to granting release from a common law undertaking.[6]
[34] Both Williams and TT-Line rely on the Federal Court of Australia decision in Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd[7] (Springfield Nominees) as authority for the proposition that there must be ‘special circumstances’ which afford good reason for releasing a party from its obligation under s 27(1) of the CPA.
[35] Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion to release a party from the obligation not to disclose or use documents for purposes other than the proceedings in which they are produced or disclosed where ‘special circumstances’ are sufficiently identified.[8]
[36] In describing such ‘special circumstances’ in Springfield Nominees, Wilcox J observed that it was neither possible nor desirable to state an exhaustive list of matters that might justify the grant of release from the obligation under s 27(1), stating that:[9]
For ‘special circumstances’ to exist it is enough that there is a special feature of the case which affords a reason for modifying or releasing the undertaking and is not usually present. The matter then becomes one of the proper exercise of the Court’s discretion, many factors being relevant. It is neither possible nor desirable to propound an exhaustive list of those factors. But plainly they include the nature of the document, the circumstances under which it came into existence, the attitude of the author of the document and any prejudice the author may sustain, whether the document pre-existed litigation or was created for that purpose and therefore expected to enter the public domain, the nature of the information in the document (in particular whether it contains personal data or commercially sensitive information), the circumstances in which the document came into the hands of the applicant for leave and, perhaps most important of all, the likely contribution of the document to achieving justice in the second proceeding.
[4][1983] 1 AC 280.
[5](2008) 235 CLR 125.
[6]Barrow v McLernon [2012] VSC 134, [23]. See also Perez v Reynolds & Anor (Ruling No 2) [2020] VSC 298, [6]; Moodie v Perna (Ruling No 1) [2018] VSC 158, [8]; Ubertas Funds Management Pty Ltd v PwC (release from implied undertaking) [2017] VSC 735, [15].
[7](1992) 38 FCR 217. See Williams Submissions, [7]; TT-Line Submissions, [2]; TT-Line Supplementary Submissions, [7].
[8]Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125, [107].
[9](1992) 38 FCR 217, 225.
Without setting them out, I refer also to the observations regarding the relevant principles in Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd,[10] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Marshall Bell Hawkins Limited,[11] Hearne v Street,[12] Barrow v McLernon,[13] Clare Hazell-Wright v 32 Domain Pty Ltd (ACN 163 035 603),[14] Khoury v Kirwan (No 4),[15] and R v Silverstein.[16]
[10](1992) 38 FCR 217.
[11][2003] FCA 833.
[12](2008) 235 CLR 125.
[13][2012] VSC 134.
[14][2020] VSCA 129.
[15][2021] VSC 333.
[16][2020] VSCA 233.
Whilst questions may arise in a given case as to whether the obligations under one or both of s 27(1) of the Act or the Harman undertaking are engaged in relation to particular documents or items of information, it is not necessary for this issue to be addressed on this application and it was not suggested that the position was otherwise. This is because:
(a) as the authorities establish, when the court is considering whether to make an order under s 27(3)(b) of the Act releasing a party from its obligation under s 27(1) of the Act, the court will generally be guided by principles developed in relation to the granting of a release from the Harman undertaking. See, for example, Barrow v McLernon[17] and the observations of Digby J on the point in Williams;[18]
(b) the current application was conducted on the basis that all of the documents and information in the Schedule are subject to the obligations under one or both of s 27(1) of the Act or the Harman undertaking; and
(c) in any event, the grant of any release from the obligations under s 27(1) of the Act or the Harman undertaking can be expressed in the order in a way that appropriately covers the obligations under each — and removes the risk on this application of the defendant falling between two stools.
[17][2012] VSC 134, [23].
[18][2021] VSC 150, [33] and footnote 32.
Senior counsel for the defendant confirmed that he considered that this was an appropriate course to follow in the present case, as did the plaintiffs’ solicitor. Proceeding in this way is also efficient given the urgency, and well serves the court’s obligations under the Act.
In the context of the consideration of Harman undertakings, issues can also arise as to whether or not relevant documents and information the subject of an application of the kind before me were disclosed or produced by a party by compulsion. This issue was recently addressed by the Court of Appeal in R v Silverstein,[19] where Kyrou, Kaye and McLeish JJA undertook a detailed analysis of the cases on the topic, to which I refer but will not set out. The primary cases to which reference was made in this context (and to which I have had regard) included: Harman v Secretary of State of the Home Department;[20] Esso Australia Resources v Plowman;[21] Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd;[22] and Hearne v Street.[23]
[19][2020] VSCA 233.
[20][1983] 1 AC 280.
[21](1995) 183 CLR 10.
[22](1996) 2 VR 34, 37–38.
[23](2008) 235 CLR 125, [96]–[97].
In the present circumstances it is not necessary to address this ‘compulsion’ issue with respect to each of the relevant items in the Schedule. This is because the parties conducted the application and proceeded on the basis that each of the items in the Schedule were disclosed or produced pursuant to one of more of: the discovery obligations of the parties, the obligation under s 26(1) of the Act, or court orders and directions made in relation to the filing and service of various documents — including interrogatories, answers to interrogatories, expert reports and joint expert reports.[24]
[24]Senior counsel for the defendant also confirmed that this was so, noting also that item 6 was a document produced as part of a court-ordered inspection regime.
Consideration and disposition
The court was informed, and it was established on the evidence, that although there was no current direction in place requiring the defendant to file and serve its expert evidence in the Tasmanian Proceeding, the usual practice in the Magistrates’ Court of Tasmania is to file and serve the evidence as soon as possible and in sufficient time before the hearing. Consequently, Mr Vallely stated in his evidence that the defendant intended to file and serve its expert evidence in the Tasmanian Proceeding by 24 July 2022. Given that the summons the subject of this application was only filed and served on 19 July 2022, it was necessary for the application to be dealt with urgently, which is why it was brought on at short notice.
Senior counsel for the defendant informed the court that at a directions hearing in the Tasmanian Proceeding held on 20 July 2022, directions were made for a trial plan to be filed by the prosecution by 25 July 2022. Senior counsel explained that at this time it would be revealed to the defendant which witnesses the prosecution proposes to call. Consequently, senior counsel informed the court that the date by which expert evidence is now to be filed by the defendant in the Tasmanian Proceeding will be pushed out by a few days, subject to receipt of the prosecution’s trial plan. This small date change and the anticipated receipt of the trial plan and further particulars of the charges makes no difference to the hearing and disposition of the application before me.
Having regard to the evidence, the submissions, and applying the relevant principles, I am satisfied that, insofar as the obligations under s 27(1) of the Act or the Harman undertaking apply to the documents and the information in items 1, 3, 4 and 6 to 12 of the Schedule, the defendant should be released from those obligations to enable the documents to be provided to the Defendant’s Experts for the purpose of consulting with them to assist them in preparing such expert opinion evidence as the defendant may wish to rely upon in the Tasmanian Proceeding, and for the purpose of cross-examination and the making of submissions in that proceeding.
I am satisfied that there are special circumstances which afford good reason for releasing the defendant from these obligations insofar as they apply to one or more of the documents or items of information the subject of the application. I make the following further observations regarding the factors and circumstances which have caused me to be so satisfied.
First, the defendant is subject to criminal charges that if established will expose it to a serious penalty and other consequences. As I have said, the trial in respect of those charges is due to commence in early August 2022, which is not far away.
Second, the charges relate to substantially the same subject matter as are the subject of many of the allegations in this proceeding — which was common ground and established on the evidence in any event.
Third, although there has been delay in bringing this application that has resulted in the need for it to be dealt with urgently, having regard to other considerations this does not weigh heavily against the defendant as a discretionary factor. The fact is that the application has been made and has been able to be dealt with by the court in a time frame that will facilitate the defendant being able properly to pursue its defence in the Tasmanian Proceeding.
Fourth, the defendant is proposing to file and serve any expert opinion evidence in the Tasmanian Proceeding in late July 2022, subject to the receipt of the revised particulars of charge due on 20 July 2022, and receipt of the trial plan that is to be filed and served by 25 July 2022. It is evident that if relief is to be granted it needs to occur urgently.
Fifth, and as was submitted by the defendant and observed by Digby J in Williams, I accept that it is an important feature of a fair criminal trial in Australia that the accused be permitted to prepare, be allowed to assemble a defence, and if so decided, be permitted to gather rebutting and other evidence to answer criminal charges.[25]
[25]See, for example, HML v R; SB v R; OAE v R (2008) 235 CLR 334, [57] (Kirby J).
Sixth, it was submitted by senior counsel for the defendant, and I accept, that the defendant seeks to defend aspects of the charges by potentially obtaining expert evidence from Dr Dunn regarding the suitability of the vehicle used by the first plaintiff to transport the Horses, and expert evidence from Mr Kneller in relation to the defendant’s practices and procedures regarding the carriage of livestock at that time. The court was also informed, and the evidence supported this, that the provision of the documents and information will assist Dr Dunn and Mr Kneller to provide expert opinions on these matters and assist the defendant to obtain expert evidence from Professor Slocombe and Mr Bransden on the matters that they have addressed by way of opinion evidence in this proceeding.
Seventh, Dr Dunn, Mr Kneller, Professor Slocombe and Mr Bransden have each been engaged by the defendant in the past in connection with this proceeding and are currently due to appear as witnesses when this proceeding goes to trial next year.
Eighth, I accept that the documents and information are likely to assist in achieving justice in the Tasmanian Proceeding by assisting the defendant to obtain expert evidence in support of its defence to the charges, which I have mentioned carry serious financial and reputational consequences for the defendant if it is found guilty. In this context I refer also to the observations made in Springfield and the observations made by Digby J in Williams.
Ninth, I was informed by senior counsel, and it was confirmed by email sent to the court during the hearing, that none of the expert reports in question are qualified by disclaimers or statements that seek to impose a requirement upon the recipient of the reports that they not be used for any purpose other than this civil proceeding unless the consent of the expert is first obtained.
Tenth, the plaintiffs do not oppose the application or make any submissions against the course proposed. Whilst this was of course a matter for the plaintiffs, I add for completeness that, based upon the material before the court, this appeared to be an understandable position for the plaintiffs to take.
Eleventh, the plaintiffs’ solicitor responsibly confirmed that he was not aware of any prejudice that might be raised or suffered as a result of Dr Leadon’s reports or other related documents being used in the way sought to be used by the defendant.
Twelfth, senior counsel for the defendant confirmed that in the Tasmanian Proceeding the defendant is only seeking (potentially) to obtain expert opinion evidence from the Defendant’s Experts. It is not proposed by the defendant to seek to obtain expert evidence from expert witnesses called by the plaintiffs in this proceeding.
Thirteenth, if leave was not to be granted then, on the evidence before me, it appears likely that this will impact on the defendant’s ability fully to explore and prepare its defence to the charges the subject of the Tasmanian Proceeding.
Fourteenth, the documents and information in question largely comprise documents and information prepared subsequent to the commencement of this proceeding, with the exception of certain documents forming other parts of, or annexures to, expert reports. Although this is not a significant factor in the present circumstances, it is a matter that has been referred to in many of the authorities — although the outcome of the application would be no different if this matter was put to one side.
Fifteenth, no risk of prejudice to others was identified or raised by the defendant or the plaintiffs.
Sixteenth, it was confirmed by senior counsel for the defendant that the documents and the information in question are not the subject of any confidentiality orders.
Seventeenth, the Defendant’s Experts are aware of the application being made and are aware that they may be asked to provide expert opinion evidence in connection with the Tasmanian Proceeding. The fact that it was not established on the evidence that express notice of the application had been given to Dr Leadon, when considered with all the other circumstances, including the urgency and the position of the plaintiffs, does not weigh against the success of the application in the circumstances.[26]
[26]Noting again that Dr Leadon was and is an expert engaged by the plaintiffs in this proceeding.
Lastly, and for completeness, I add that senior counsel for the defendant responsibly confirmed that the Defendant’s Experts are currently in possession of the other expert reports and the measurements document in question because they were provided with them in connection with this proceeding. Senior counsel for the defendant also informed the court that, although the Defendant’s Experts are in possession of the material and are aware that expert evidence may be sought from them in relation to the defendant’s defence to the charges in the Tasmanian Proceeding, the documents and information have not yet been used by any of them for that purpose.
Conclusion and orders
For the reasons stated above I have determined that, insofar as the documents and information referred to in items 1, 3, 4 and 6 to 12 of the Schedule are subject to the defendant’s obligations under s 27(1) of the Act or the Harman undertaking, the defendant should be released from those obligations to enable the defendant to use the documents and information in connection with the obtaining of expert opinion evidence, cross-examination, and the making of submissions, in support of its defence in the Tasmanian Proceeding.
I will hear from the parties regarding the terms of the order and the question of costs.
Note: After hearing from the parties in relation to the terms of the orders and the question of costs, the orders made by the court were as follows:
1.The defendant has leave to amend its summons filed 19 July 2022 (Summons), to include an application to be released from the implied undertaking not to use the documents or information referred to in the schedule to the Summons for a purpose other than use in connection with this proceeding.
2.By 4:00pm on 22 July 2022, the defendant is to file and serve the amended summons referred to in paragraph 1 of this order.
3.Subject to further order:
a. Insofar as the documents and information described in items 1, 3, 4, and 6 to 12 (inclusive) of schedule A to this order (Documents and Information) are documents and information of the character described in s 26(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (Act), the defendant is released from its obligation under s 27(1) of the Act for the purpose of:
i. allowing the defendant to provide the Documents and Information to Dr Dunn, Professor Slocombe, Mr Kneller and Mr Bransden, for the purpose of those persons potentially providing expert opinion evidence in connection with the defendant’s defence to the charges brought against it in Magistrates’ Court of Tasmania proceeding 90840/19 (Tasmanian Proceeding); and
ii. use in cross-examination and the making of submissions in support of the defendant’s defence in the Tasmanian Proceeding.
b. Insofar as the Documents and Information are documents and information subject to an implied undertaking on the part of the defendant not to use the Documents and Information other than in connection with this proceeding, the defendant is released from the implied undertaking for the purpose of:
i. allowing the defendant to provide the Documents and Information to Dr Dunn, Professor Slocombe, Mr Kneller and Mr Bransden, for the purpose of those persons potentially providing expert opinion evidence in connection with the defendant’s defence to the charges brought against it in the Tasmanian Proceeding; and
ii. use in cross-examination and the making of submissions in support of the defendant’s defence in the Tasmanian Proceeding.
4.Liberty to apply is reserved.
5.The plaintiffs’ costs of and associated with the defendant’s application by the Summons are the plaintiffs’ costs in this proceeding.
6.Otherwise, there be no order as to the costs of the defendant’s application by the Summons.
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
S ECI 2018 0998
BETWEEN
| ANDREW MICHAEL WILLIAMS | Plaintiff |
| REBECCA ANN WILLIAMS | Second Plaintiff |
| TWYNAM INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (formerly TWYNAM AGRICULTURAL GROUP PTY LTD) | Third Plaintiff |
| WILLO POLO PTY LTD (ACN 149 110 412) | Fourth Plaintiff |
| - and - | |
| TT-LINE COMPANY PTY LTD (ACN 061 996 174) | Defendant |
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