Williams v The Queen - [2013] HCATrans 247

[2013] HCATrans 247

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S130 of 2013

B e t w e e n -
MICHELLE DOROTHY VERA WILLIAMS
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

KIEFEL J
BELL J
KEANE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 11 OCTOBER 2013, AT 10.45 AM

MR T.A. GAME, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant with MS G.A. BASHIR. (instructed by Legal Aid (NSW))

MR J.H. PICKERING, SC: I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW))

KIEFEL J: Yes, Mr Game.

MR GAME: If the Court pleases, first we need an extension of time and I do not think that is ‑ ‑ ‑

KIEFEL J: Is that opposed?

MR PICKERING: It is not opposed, your Honour.

MR GAME: Your Honours, the statutory provision in question requires that in the commission of the offence the vehicle driven be involved in an impact and the driver at the time of the impact be driving the vehicle. We say that this case raises two questions of significance that warrant a grant of special leave, the first concerning whether or not driving is limited or can be limited to some aspect of control or whether or not it requires the means to control a vehicle, and the second concerns what happens - how can you look at, shall I say, the antecedent driving leading to the deceased’s action if the Crown, as it were, fails on the first question in relation to control in focusing on the actions after the deceased’s own steps in taking hold of the wheel.

Now, there are three judgments which all speak, in our submission, in different ways and we say that Justice Adams’ judgment is correct and I will explain why in a minute, although we have set that out in our submissions. I am going to take your Honours through aspects of the judgments briefly and then come to the directions.

First, I will say a word about Justice Basten’s judgment at page 81. At the top of the page, his Honour sets out how the Crown put its case. It is important to understand that the Crown case on, shall I say, the earlier driving or the driving just before the point at which the deceased - did not depend on loss of control. In fact, one of the formulations was the deceased taking hold of the steering wheel for whatever reason. The second is that in terms of ability to control a vehicle, which appears in (c), that was not put in terms of ability to control a vehicle in terms of having the means to control. It was put in terms of what I would describe as facility, or aspect of some facility of control.

Now, in respect of what appears in paragraph 10, the applicant’s case was that she was…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Williams v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Williams v The Queen [2013] HCATrans 247
Case: [2013] HCATrans 247
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of Williams against the conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during a police investigation and its impact on the fairness of the trial.

The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence that was obtained in circumstances where the appellant was under a legal disability, specifically, that he was a child and therefore unable to give a valid consent to the search of his property. The court also considered whether the admission of this evidence, if improperly obtained, rendered the trial unfair.

The Court reasoned that the common law does not permit a child to give a valid consent to a search of their property. Therefore, the search conducted by police was unlawful. However, the Court held that the admission of evidence obtained through an unlawful search does not automatically render a trial unfair. The question of fairness is a matter for the trial judge to determine, considering all the circumstances, including the nature of the illegality, the importance of the evidence, and the potential prejudice to the accused. In this instance, the High Court found that the trial judge had properly exercised their discretion in admitting the evidence, and the trial had been conducted fairly.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders