Williams v Milotin

The case of *Williams v Milotin* involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The plaintiff, Ettore Milotin, an infant suing by his next friend, sought damages for personal injuries sustained when he was struck by a motor truck driven by the defendant, Derek John Williams. The collision occurred on 7 May 1952, and the action was commenced on 19 July 1955, meaning it was brought more than three years but less than six years after the cause of action accrued. The defendant argued that the action was barred by section 36 of the *Limitation of Actions Act 1936-1948* (S.A.), which prescribes a three-year limitation period for actions for trespass to the person.

The central legal issue before the High Court was to determine the applicable period of limitation for the plaintiff's claim. This required the Court to interpret sections 35 and 36 of the *Limitation of Actions Act 1936-1948* (S.A.). Section 35 generally provides a six-year limitation period for actions that "formerly might have been brought in the form of actions called actions on the case" or "would formerly have been brought in the form of actions called trespass on the case," subject to the qualification "save as otherwise provided in this Act." Section 36, conversely, imposes a three-year limitation period for actions for assault, trespass to the person, menace, battery, wounding, or imprisonment. The Court had to decide whether the plaintiff's action, arising from a negligent collision on a public road, fell within the six-year period of section 35 or the three-year period of section 36.

The High Court reasoned that while the facts of the case could have supported a cause of action in trespass to the person, which would ordinarily fall under the three-year limitation period of section 36, the plaintiff had framed his action in negligence. The Court held that the phrase "save as otherwise provided in this Act" in section 35 was not intended to override the six-year limitation period simply because the same facts might also support a cause of action falling under section 36. Instead, these words were interpreted as referring to other provisions within the Act that might extend or modify limitation periods, such as those relating to disability or absence from the state. The Court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the six-year limitation period applicable to actions on the case, which encompassed negligence claims for personal injury, as this was the cause of action he elected to pursue.

Consequently, the High Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia, holding that the plaintiff's action was not barred by section 36. The appeal was dismissed, and the defendant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.