[2011] HCATrans 198
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S307 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
RONALD WILLIAMS
Plaintiff
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Defendant
MINISTER FOR SCHOOL EDUCATION, EARLY CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH
Second Defendant
MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Third Defendant
SCRIPTURE UNION QUEENSLAND
Fourth Defendant
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 9 AUGUST 2011, AT 10.18 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR G.E.S. NG, for the plaintiff. (instructed by Horowitz & Bilinsky)
MR S.J. GAGELER, SC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR G.R. KENNETT, SC and MR S.J. FREE for the first, second and third defendants. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR R. MERKEL, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friends, MR G.A. HILL and MR J.A. THOMSON, for the fourth defendant. (instructed by Norton Rose Australia)
MR M.G. SEXTON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of New South Wales: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS N.L. SHARP, for the Attorney‑General for New South Wales intervening. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))
MR W. SOFRONOFF, QC, Solicitor‑General of the State of Queensland: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR G.P. SAMMON and MR G.J.D. DEL VILLAR, for the Attorney‑General for Queensland intervening. (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))
MR G.L. SEALY, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Tasmania: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR S.D. GATES, on behalf of the Attorney‑General of Tasmania intervening. (instructed by Solicitor‑General for Tasmania)
MR M.G. HINTON, QC, Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.J. WAIT, for the Attorney‑General for South Australia intervening. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (SA))
MR S.G.E. McLEISH, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Victoria: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friends, MS R.J. ORR and MR N.M. WOOD, for the Attorney‑General for Victoria intervening. (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)
MR R.M. MITCHELL, SC, Acting Solicitor‑General for the State of Western Australia: May it please the Court, with my learned friend, MS F.B. SEAWARD, I appear for the Attorney‑General for Western Australia intervening. (instructed by State Solicitor for Western Australia)
MR P.D. QUINLAN, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS K.E. FOLEY, and we seek leave to intervene in these proceedings on behalf of the Churches’ Commission on Education Incorporated. (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)
FRENCH CJ: As an amicus curiae?
MR QUINLAN: Yes, your Honour.
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Quinlan, you will have…
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- Case
- [2011] HCATrans 198
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal question before the Court was whether the DFDA, in purporting to allow for the prosecution and punishment of former service members for offences committed during their service, was constitutionally valid. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the provisions of the DFDA infringed upon the separation of judicial power under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, by vesting judicial power in a non-judicial body or by otherwise contravening constitutional principles concerning the exercise of judicial power.
The High Court ultimately held that the provisions of the DFDA that allowed for the conviction and punishment of former service members for offences committed while they were serving members were invalid. The majority reasoned that the exercise of judicial power, as contemplated by Chapter III of the Constitution, is confined to courts established under that Chapter. They found that the DFDA, by empowering a disciplinary body to impose punishments for past offences after discharge, effectively allowed for the exercise of judicial power by a non-judicial entity, thereby impermissibly encroaching upon the exclusive domain of the courts. The Court distinguished between the power to enforce discipline within the Defence Force during service and the power to adjudicate and punish for offences after discharge, finding the latter to be a function reserved for the judiciary.
Consequently, the High Court made orders in favour of Mr. Williams, quashing his convictions and setting aside the penalties imposed under the impugned provisions of the DFDA.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter came before the High Court of Australia on an appeal from the Federal Court of Australia. The Federal Court had previously dismissed the plaintiff's claim that the Commonwealth's School Chaplaincy Program was unlawful. The plaintiff, Ronald Williams, argued that the program violated several provisions of the Australian Constitution, including the requirement that there be no religious test for any office under the Commonwealth (s 116), the requirement that money be appropriated by law for the ordinary annual services of the Government (s 81), and the limits on the Commonwealth's legislative power under s 51. The Federal Court held that the program was authorised by s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution and did not involve a religious test. Williams then appealed to the High Court, which granted special leave to appeal. The High Court heard arguments from both sides over two days, focusing on the constitutional validity of the program under ss 51, 61, 81 and 116 of the Constitution.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Commonwealth's School Chaplaincy Program was validly appropriated for under the relevant Appropriation Acts.
2. Whether the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to enter into the School Chaplaincy Program, and if so, under what constitutional provision(s).
3. Whether the Commonwealth's School Chaplaincy Program infringes Section 116 of the Constitution by imposing a religious test for the appointment of chaplains.
4. Whether the respondents have standing to bring this action despite the program being set to expire.
Held
1. The Court concluded that the Commonwealth's School Chaplaincy Program was not validly appropriated for under the relevant Appropriation Acts. Result: Appropriation for the program was deemed invalid.
2. The Court found that the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to enter into the School Chaplaincy Program under Section 61 of the Constitution, intersecting with Section 51(xxiiiA), which pertains to the provision of benefits to students. Result: Program is constitutionally valid under these provisions.
3. The Court determined that the Commonwealth's School Chaplaincy Program infringes Section 116 of the Constitution by imposing a religious test for the appointment of chaplains. Result: Program infringes Section 116.
4. The Court held that the respondents have standing to bring this action despite the program being set to expire, as the issues raised are of a continuing nature and not merely historical. Result: Respondents have standing to proceed with the action.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court considered several issues concerning the validity of the Commonwealth's School Chaplaincy Program. First, the Court examined whether the program was validly appropriated for under the relevant Appropriation Acts. The plaintiff argued that the program was not included in the appropriation for ordinary annual services of the government, and thus, the funds allocated for the program were not legally appropriated. The Court found in favor of the Commonwealth, holding that the program was indeed appropriated for under the Acts. The Court's reasoning was based on interpreting the Appropriation Acts in accordance with the parliamentary practice, which allowed for the appropriation of funds for new programs.
Second, the Court deliberated on whether the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to enter into the School Chaplaincy Program, and if so, under what constitutional provision(s). The plaintiff contended that the program did not fall under any express head of legislative power in section 51 of the Constitution. However, the Court found that the program could be justified under the incidental executive power derived from the Commonwealth's status as the National Executive. The Court also considered the power to provide benefits to students under section 51(xxiiiA) and held that the program could be supported by this provision.
Third, the Court addressed whether the Commonwealth's School Chaplaincy Program infringes Section 116 of the Constitution by imposing a religious test for the appointment of chaplains. The Court held that the program did indeed impose a religious test, as it required chaplains to belong to a recognized religion, thus infringing upon Section 116. However, the Court found that the infringement was not sufficient to invalidate the entire program, and instead, the offending parts of the program could be severed.
Lastly, the Court examined whether the respondents have standing to bring this action despite the program being set to expire. The Court held that the respondents had standing to bring the action, as they could demonstrate a current or threatened expenditure related to the program. The Court also noted that the expiration of the program did not necessarily deprive the respondents of standing, as long as there was a justiciable controversy.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to enter into the School Chaplaincy Program under its incidental executive power and the power to provide benefits to students under section 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution. However, the program must not impose a religious test for the appointment of chaplains, as it infringes Section 116 of the Constitution. If such an infringement occurs, the offending parts of the program can be severed without invalidating the entire program. Additionally, the respondents have standing to bring an action concerning the program, as long as there is a current or threatened expenditure related to the program and a justiciable controversy remains.