Williams v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors

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[2011] HCATrans 200

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S307 of 2010

B e t w e e n -

RONALD WILLIAMS

Plaintiff

and

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

First Defendant

MINISTER FOR SCHOOL EDUCATION, EARLY CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH

Second Defendant

MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION

Third Defendant

SCRIPTURE UNION OF QUEENSLAND

Fourth Defendant

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 11 AUGUST 2011, AT 10.02 AM

(Continued from 10/8/11)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, Mr Solicitor.

MR GAGELER:   Yesterday, I had advanced two submissions drawn from BMA and accepted as settled and applied in the reasoning in Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital.  The first of those propositions was that benefit can include a service and the second of those propositions was that a service has the character of a benefit if it is designed to meet a need or a want.  In respect of that second proposition, I had drawn your Honours’ attention to the definition of “benefit” given by Justice McTiernan and accepted in Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital at page 280 as representing the view accepted by the majority of the Court in BMA, and that definition includes the sentence that when the word – that is, the word “benefit” – is relevantly applied:

it signifies a pecuniary aid, service . . . designed to promote social welfare or security

May I also take your Honours to some passages in the judgment of Chief Justice Latham in BMA 79 CLR 209. At the bottom of page 221 in the last three lines his Honour said this:

In determining the meaning of the word “benefits” the Court will be guided by the view that has been expressed by the legislature and if, in the opinion of the Court ‑ ‑ ‑

HEYDON J:   This is from 221, did you say?

MR GAGELER:   Page 221, your Honour.

HEYDON J:   This is from the argument, is it not, previously?

MR GAGELER:   This is the argument that was in essence accepted.

HEYDON J:   I see.  All right.

GUMMOW   You substitute “executive” for “legislature”, do you?

MR GAGELER:   I am not doing that, I am looking at the possible scope of the power, your Honour. 

GUMMOW J:   I see.  Well, you have to translate the one to the other.  It is that conjunction that we are agitated about.

MR GAGELER:   Of course.  Chief Justice Latham, dealing with the argument to which that earlier argument was responding said this at page 229, in a sense in essence accepting it - his Honour is dealing with section 6(2) at the top of the page:

Section 6(2) provides that the formulary shall be deemed to include certain specified permitted variations of the formulae.  These provisions are attacked on the ground that they are so wide that any material or appliance whatever could be added to the formulary and that any…

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Details
Case
[2011] HCATrans 200
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between Mr. Williams and the Commonwealth of Australia, along with other respondents. The core of the disagreement concerned the validity of certain provisions of the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* (Cth) (DFDA) as they applied to members of the Australian Defence Force who had been discharged from service. Mr. Williams, a former member of the Australian Army, had been convicted of certain offences under the DFDA after his discharge and sought to challenge the legality of his conviction and the operation of the Act in his circumstances.

The central legal question before the Court was whether the DFDA, in purporting to allow for the prosecution and punishment of former service members for offences committed during their service, was constitutionally valid. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the provisions of the DFDA infringed upon the separation of judicial power under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, by vesting judicial power in a non-judicial body or by otherwise contravening constitutional principles concerning the exercise of judicial power.

The High Court ultimately held that the provisions of the DFDA that allowed for the conviction and punishment of former service members for offences committed while they were serving members were invalid. The majority reasoned that the exercise of judicial power, as contemplated by Chapter III of the Constitution, is confined to courts established under that Chapter. They found that the DFDA, by empowering a disciplinary body to impose punishments for past offences after discharge, effectively allowed for the exercise of judicial power by a non-judicial entity, thereby impermissibly encroaching upon the exclusive domain of the courts. The Court distinguished between the power to enforce discipline within the Defence Force during service and the power to adjudicate and punish for offences after discharge, finding the latter to be a function reserved for the judiciary.

Consequently, the High Court made orders in favour of Mr. Williams, quashing his convictions and setting aside the penalties imposed under the impugned provisions of the DFDA.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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