HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
WILLIAM KEVIN STONE v LES BRIEN & ITSHAK YOSEF [2009]
ACTSC 6 (18 February 2009)
APPEAL ─ appeal from decision of the Magistrates Court of the ACT ─ reasons for allowing appeal.
CRIMINAL LAW ─ sentencing principles ─ relevant considerations ─ s 33 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT).
CRIMINAL LAW ─ sentencing principles ─ re-sentencing for breach of good behaviour orders ─ need for accused to be advised before re-sentencing hearing for offences affected by breaches ─ s 108 Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT).
CRIMINAL LAW ─ sentencing principles ─ re-sentencing for breach of good behaviour orders ─ need for accused to be advised before re-sentencing hearing for offences affected by breaches ─ relevance of right to be told about the nature and reason for a charge ─ s 22 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
CRIMINAL LAW ─ sentencing principles ─ application of Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) on re-sentencing ─ whether Magistrate erred in failing to advert to nature and circumstances of offences for which appellant was being re-sentenced ─ s 108 Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT).
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ─ Magistrates Court charge mechanisms ─ manner in which breaches of good behaviour orders are notified.
Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), s 108
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), s 33
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), par 22(2)(a)
Thompson v Young [2008] ACTSC 11 (30 January 2008)
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
No. SCA 17 of 2008
Judge: Penfold J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 18 February 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SCA 17 of 2008
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
BETWEEN:WILLIAM KEVIN STONE
Appellant
AND:LES BRIEN
First Respondent
AND: ITSHAK YOSEF
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge: Penfold J
Date: 18 February 2009
Place: Canberra
Introduction
On 13 May 2008 I heard an appeal from two sentences of imprisonment imposed in the Magistrates Court on 29 February 2008. These were imposed as a result of breaches of good behaviour orders imposed for two offences, namely assault occasioning actual bodily harm (the assault offence), and failing to appear, without reasonable excuse, in the Magistrates Court (the fail to appear offence). The maximum penalties for these two offences include, for the assault offence, 5 years imprisonment and, for the fail to appear offence, 2 years imprisonment. Thus, the assault offence is considerably more serious.
At the end of the hearing I upheld the appeal on the basis that the learned Magistrate had erred in not engaging in a proper sentencing process when she re-sentenced the appellant, and remitted the matter to the Magistrates Court to be dealt with according to law. I indicated that I would provide written reasons for upholding the appeal.
I also noted that I considered it undesirable to call a person before a court to be dealt with for a breach of a good behaviour…
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- Case
- [2009] ACTSC 6
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court began by acknowledging that the re-sentencing power of the Magistrate was governed by section 108 of the ACT Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005, and that the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005, including section 33, applied to such re-sentencing. Section 33 of the Sentencing Act enumerates various factors to be considered in sentencing, with a specific requirement for the court to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offence." The court found that the Magistrate had not referred to or considered the nature and circumstances of the specific offences for which the appellant was being re-sentenced. Instead, her Honour had only referred to the generic titles of the offences as provided by the legislation. The court concluded that this omission constituted an error, as the nature and circumstances of the offences are fundamental to the sentencing process. Both counsel for the appellant and the Director of Public Prosecutions agreed that this error warranted allowing the appeal.
The appeal was upheld based on the error identified by the court in the Magistrate's failure to consider the nature and circumstances of the offences during the re-sentencing process. The court determined that this error was significant enough to require the re-sentencing to be reconsidered. The decision highlighted the importance of detailed information about the nature and circumstances of offences in the sentencing process, and underscored the necessity for a sentencing court to have adequate information to properly exercise its sentencing powers.
ORDERS:
The appeal was allowed, and the re-sentencing decision of the Magistrates Court was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the Magistrates Court for re-sentencing, with the instruction that the Magistrate must consider the nature and circumstances of the offences for which the appellant was being re-sentenced.
Orders
Orders of the court
(Reasons for upholding the appeal)
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Her Honour’s re-sentencing power was conferred by s 108 of the ACT Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (the Sentence Administration Act), which is set out in the Appendix to these reasons. It is clear that under subs 108(4) of that Act the ACT Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (the Sentencing Act), including of course s 33, applies to a re-sentencing under s 108 of the Sentence Administration Act (Thompson v Young [2008] ACTSC 11 (30 January 2008)). The separate question whether s 108 was available at all in respect of the assault offence is considered at [36] to [45] below. For the moment I consider only the effect of s 108 where it does apply. Section 33 of the Sentencing Act sets out a long list of matters to be considered in deciding how an offender should be sentenced. Not all of them are relevant in all cases, and the court is only required to consider those of the listed matters that are relevant and known to the court (subs 33(1)). The first matter that the court is required to consider is set out in par 33(1)(a), “the nature and circumstances of the offence”. This paragraph is covered by the introductory words of the subsection, and so to the extent that the court does not know the nature and circumstances of the offence, it is not required to consider those matters in sentencing. Commonly, the full nature and circumstances of an offence will not be available to a sentencing court, but this does not mean that such a court can legitimately ignore such information as is available on the court records, or fail to ask for such information if it is not put before the court. Indeed, without information that goes beyond the mere identification of an offence by reference to its generic title (eg “assault occasioning actual bodily harm”), it is hard to see that the sentencing court has an actual offence before it to enliven its sentencing power. Thus, detail about the nature and circumstances of an offence sufficient to identify the particular incident and distinguish it from any other example of the offence must be fundamental to the sentencing process, and the sentencing process cannot proceed without information about those matters. In this case, as indicated in the transcript of the learned Magistrate’s sentencing remarks set out at [22] above, her Honour apparently did not have access to any information about the nature or circumstances of the particular offences for which she was re-sentencing the appellant. All she referred to was the shorthand descriptions of the two offences as created by the legislation. She did not set out, even briefly, the circumstances of the particular offences, and nor did she suggest that she had seen any material setting out that information. Counsel for the appellant submitted that her Honour’s failure to advert to the nature and circumstances of the offences for which she re-sentenced the appellant constituted an appellable error. Counsel for the DPP conceded this, and I also agreed that this failure was an error sufficient to require the appeal to be allowed.