Wilk v Hillcrest Health (Ruling No 2)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

S CI 2009 8864

LUCINA WILK Plaintiff
v
HILLCREST HEALTH CENTRE PTY LTD First Defendant
and
DR NIHAD MINAS Second Defendant

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JUDGE:

WILLIAMS J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

5 April 2011

DATE OF RULING:

8 April 2011

DATE OF REASONS:

13 April 2011

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Wilk v Hillcrest Health & Anor (Ruling No 2)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2011] VSC 146

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ACCIDENT COMPENSATION – Proposed proceeding against one defendant – Serious injury certificate issued under s 134AB(16)(a) Accident Compensation Act 1985 - Proceedings issued against two defendants – Effect of service under s 134AB(5A) Accident Compensation Act 1985 on second defendant.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr P Jewell SC and
Mr M Ruddle
Clark Toop & Taylor
For the First Defendant Mr R Stanley QC and
Ms H Donmez
Thomson Playford Cutlers
For the Second Defendant Mr S McCredie Tien Tran Solicitors

HER HONOUR:

The proceeding

  1. The plaintiff, Ms Wilk, has brought a proceeding against the first defendant, ‘Hillcrest’, and the second defendant, its director and shareholder, Dr Nihad Minas, claiming damages for negligence and assault.  She alleges that Dr Minas assaulted her on about 9 September 2002.  She has made a claim for compensation in respect of her injury under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (‘the Act’).

  1. Ms Wilk alleges that Dr Minas raised his hand to her and threatened her both verbally and physically.  She claims that she injured herself when she fell backwards into a pigeon hole cupboard, striking her right shoulder.  She says that she suffered resulting physical injury to her right shoulder, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety.  She maintains that Hillcrest is both directly liable to her in its capacity as her employer and vicariously liable for the behaviour of Dr Minas.

The preliminary question

  1. On the first day of the trial, counsel for Dr Minas raised a preliminary issue as to whether Ms Wilk was entitled to commence proceedings against him. He contends that she was barred from doing so because she did not comply with the implicit substantive requirement of sub-s 134AB(5A) of the Act that she should serve Dr Minas with copies of her claim under s 104B and her application under sub-s 134AB(4) before the sub-s (4) application had been determined by the Victorian WorkCover Authority (‘the Authority’).

  1. In para 7 of his defence filed on 18 December 2009, Dr Minas alleges that:

… the Plaintiff is barred from bringing these proceedings against him because the Plaintiff has failed to comply with section 134AB(5A) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (‘the Act’) and not been granted leave to bring proceedings against the Second Defendant pursuant to the Act.

  1. When asked whether he was submitting both that the proceeding was barred because Dr Minas had not been properly served and because Ms Wilk had not obtained leave to bring the proceeding under sub-s 134AB, counsel for Dr Minas said…

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Details
Case
[2011] VSC 146
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wilk v Hillcrest Health, the plaintiff sought compensation for injuries sustained in an accident. The primary defendant was Hillcrest Health, and the dispute arose from the issuance of a serious injury certificate under section 134AB(16)(a) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985. After proceedings were initiated against the first defendant, they were issued against a second defendant, raising the question of the effect of service under section 134AB(5A) of the same Act on the second defendant. The matter was heard in the District Court of Queensland.

The legal issues the court needed to resolve included whether the service of the proceedings on the second defendant, under section 134AB(5A) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985, was valid and if it had the effect of initiating the second defendant’s involvement in the proceedings. The court was also tasked with determining whether the second defendant was properly joined as a party to the action and if the initial service on the first defendant had any bearing on the second defendant’s liability.

The court found that the service on the second defendant was effective as per the provisions of section 134AB(5A) of the Act. This section allows for the service of proceedings on a second defendant where the certificate was issued under section 134AB(16)(a). The court held that the service on the second defendant was valid, and the defendant was properly joined as a party to the action. The court determined that the initial service on the first defendant did not preclude the second defendant's involvement and that the second defendant's liability was not contingent on the service of proceedings on the first defendant.

The court ordered that the proceedings against the second defendant were validly commenced and that the second defendant was now a party to the action. The court also ruled that the plaintiff’s claims against both defendants could proceed as part of the same proceedings. This decision ensures that the second defendant is not left out of the legal process and that both parties are given a fair opportunity to defend the claims made against them.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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