WILCOX & DE SANTIS

[2015] FamCA 820

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WILCOX & DE SANTIS [2015] FamCA 820

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY - All extant applications dismissed – where there was no appearance by either party – where trial was adjourned and parties were invited to enter consent orders – where discontinuance filed post trial.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Ms Wilcox

RESPONDENT: Mr De Santis

FILE NUMBER: BRC 3997 of 2013

DATE DELIVERED: 29 September 2015

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Tree J

HEARING DATE: 29 September 2015

REPRESENTATION

THE APPLICANT: No appearance

THE RESPONDENT: No appearance

Orders

1. All extant Applications be dismissed and the matter is removed from the list of active pending cases.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Wilcox & De Santis has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 3997 of 2013

Ms Wilcox

Applicant

And

Mr De Santis

Respondent

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. When this matter was last before me for trial on 9 July, it was then anticipated that after about 30 days had expired, the matter might resolve by way of signed consent orders being sent to my associate for my consideration in chambers, without the need for further appearance.  On that basis the matter adjourned, to be listed today unless the consent orders had been previously provided to me.  In fact, since then although no proposed consent orders have been provided to me, a notice of discontinuance has been filed by the applicant on 26 August 2015.  I should note that the applicant was a judgment creditor of the first respondent who, during the course of the litigation which led to that judgment in favour of the applicant, had transferred to the second respondent (his former wife) most of his property, and then proceeded to make himself bankrupt, the trustee in bankruptcy being the third respondent.

2. The only moving party, it appears, in those circumstances, was the applicant, and therefore the discontinuance probably puts the matter wholly to an end.  However, to cover the eventuality that there is some extant application on foot by any of the respondents by way of affirmative order sought in their response, it seems appropriate that I should make a further order that all extant applications are dismissed.  In so ordering, I am mindful that the application by the applicant does not fall within that order, as any relief which she seeks has already been effectively disposed of by her discontinuance.

3. Therefore, the only order which I will make is that all extant applications are dismissed.

I certify that the preceding three (3) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Tree delivered on 29 September 2015.

Associate:

Date: 29 September 2015