Wightman and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration)

The case of *Wightman and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs* concerned an application for review of a delegate of the Minister's decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the applicant's visa. The applicant had failed the character test due to being sentenced to three years imprisonment for stealing as a servant. The central dispute revolved around whether there was an "another reason" to revoke the mandatory cancellation, as required by section 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), in light of Ministerial Direction 90.

The court was required to determine the proper construction of paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(ii) of Direction 90, which lists considerations for revoking a mandatory visa cancellation. Specifically, the court had to decide whether the applicant's corporate employer, which was the victim of the theft, could be considered a "vulnerable person" for the purposes of this paragraph. This involved interpreting the scope of "vulnerable person" within the context of the Direction and applying the doctrine of *ejusdem generis* to ascertain the intended meaning of the words used.

The court reasoned that the phrase "vulnerable person" in paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(ii) of Direction 90, when read in context with the examples provided, referred to individuals with inherent personal characteristics that made them more susceptible to harm, such as age or disability. The court applied the *ejusdem generis* rule to limit the general words "vulnerable person" to the same kind as the specific examples given. It concluded that while the corporate employer was exposed to the crime due to the applicant's position of trust, this did not render it a "vulnerable member of the community" in the sense contemplated by the Direction. The court found that the corporate victim's insurance against financial loss was irrelevant to its vulnerability in the context of the Direction.

Consequently, the court set aside the delegate's decision and substituted it with a decision to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the applicant's visa.