Wiegele v Thomson as Executrix for Walter George Thomson
[2019] WASC 12
•22 JANUARY 2019
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: WIEGELE -v- THOMSON AS EXECUTRIX FOR WALTER GEORGE THOMSON [2019] WASC 12
CORAM: MASTER SANDERSON
HEARD: 20 SEPTEMBER 2018
DELIVERED : 22 JANUARY 2019
FILE NO/S: CIV 2536 of 2018
BETWEEN: BERNADETTE JANE WIEGELE
MICHELLE LILA BECKTON
Plaintiffs
AND
CAROLYN GENT THOMSON AS EXECUTRIX FOR WALTER GEORGE THOMSON
First Defendant
CAROLYN GENT THOMSON AS EXECUTRIX FOR RUSSELL GEORGE THOMSON
Second Defendant
JACK WALTER THOMSON
DYLAN KEVIN THOMSON
Third Defendants
CLARE MONICA THOMSON
Fourth Defendant
Catchwords:
Wills - Death of person who was to benefit on termination of beneficiaries interest - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Administration Act 1903 (WA)
Result:
Directions given
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiffs | : | Mr D Stewart |
| First Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Second Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Third Defendants | : | No apperanace |
| Fourth Defendant | : | Mr T Pepper |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiffs | : | Esteem Legal |
| First Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Second Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Third Defendants | : | No appearance |
| Fourth Defendant | : | Robertson Hayles Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Boraston's Case (1587) 3 Co Rep 16a
Collins v Equity Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd [1997] 2 VR 166
Douglas' Will Trust, Re Lloyds v Nelson [1959] 1 WLR 1212
Duffield v Duffield (1829) 1 Dow & Cl 268
Hamersley v Newton [2005] WASC 221
Hancock v Watson [1902] AC 14
Kenna v Conolly (1938) 60 CLR 583
Monds v Stackhouse (1948) 77 CLR 232
Pead v Pead (1912) 15 CLR 510
Phipps v Ackers (1842) 9 CL & Fin 583; 8 ER 539
Re Bowen‑Buscarlet [1972] Ch 463
Re Butler [1980] QdR 601
Re Hoppe (dec); Hoppe v McDavitt [1961] VR 381
Re Mallinson Consolidated Trusts; Mallinson v Gooley [1974] 1 WLR 1120
Re McKee (1931) 2 Ch 145
Re Tompson; Rhoden v Wicking [1947] VLR 60
Re Wynn [1984] 1 WLR 237
Sciacca v Ghidella [2001] QSC 134
Tyson v Tyson (1891) 12 LR(NSW) Eq 73
Weavers v Dawson [2001] NSWSC 907
Will of Zimmerman (dec) [1999] QSC 15
Wyatt v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1917) 23 CLR 14
MASTER SANDERSON:
This action concerned the estates of the late Walter George Thomson (Walter) and his son, Russell George Thomson (Russell). On 20 September 2018, I made the following orders:
Substitution of Originating Claim
1. The Amended Originating Summons attached hereto stand as the Originating Summons in these proceedings.
Revocation of Grants
2.That the grant of probate no. 2953/71 dated 11 June 1971 of the last Will and Testament of Walter George Thomson late of "Keelocking" Pingelly, Western Australia, Farmer, who died on 27 December 1970, as amended by Order of this Court made on or about 13 February 1978 in CIV 5493 of 1974 by which probate was granted to Carolyn Gent Thomson, be and is hereby revoked.
3.That the grant of probate no. 2038/2012, dated 15 May 2012 of the last Will And Testament of Russell George Thomson late of Keelocking Farm, 1040 Walwalling Road, West Pingelly, Western Australia, Farmer, who died on 29 July 2011, to Carolyn Gent Thomson be and is hereby revoked.
4.That Carolyn Gent Thomson cause such original grants of probate in the estates of Walter George Thomson and Russell George Thomson as are under her possession or control to be delivered to the registry of this Court for cancellation within 10 days of these orders.
Estate of Walter George Thomson
5.That Letters of Administration with the Will annexed in the estate of Walter George Thomson late of "Keelocking" Pingelly, Western Australia, Farmer, who died on 27 December 1970 be granted to the Plaintiffs.
6.That to the extent that Carolyn Gent Thomson holds any assets of the estate of Walter George Thomson as a trustee on trust for the beneficiaries of the estate she be removed as trustee of the same pursuant to s77 of the Trustees Act 1962 (WA) and that the Plaintiffs be appointed in her place and that all assets of the estate vest in the Plaintiffs as trustees.
Estate of Russell George Thomson
7.Upon the renouncement of Henry Anthony Baxter of 'Hilton Park', 95 Baxter Road, Wagin, Western Australia, the named alternate executor in the Will of Russell George Thomson, Letters of Administration with the will annexed be granted to Clare Monica Thomson the wife of the deceased.
8.That to the extent that Carolyn Gent Thomson holds any assets of the estate of Russell George Thomson as a trustee on trust for the beneficiaries of the estate she be removed as trustee of the same pursuant to section 77 of the Trustees Act 1962 and that Clare Monica Thomson be appointed in her place and that all assets of the estate vest in Clare Monica Thomson as trustee.
Service
9. That the Plaintiffs serve a copy of these orders and the amended Originating Summons upon each Defendant named in the amended Originating Summons within 7 days of these orders.
Determination of Issue Arising - Declaratory relief pursuant to s45 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA) and s92 of the Trustees Act 1962 (WA) as follows:
10. That for the purpose of determining what effect, if any, the death of Russell George Thomson has upon the gifts set out in clause 2 of the Will of Walter George Thomson (the Interpretation Question), the following orders are made:
(i)the Plaintiffs and the Fourth Defendant file a Statement of Agreed Facts relating to the Interpretation Question by no later than 31 October 2018; and
(ii)any party wishing to make submissions in relation to the Interpretation Question file and serve a copy of such submissions upon each other party by no later than 14 November 2018;
(iii)the Interpretation Question be determined by the Court in the absence of the parties.
11.The matter be adjourned sine die with liberty for the parties to apply.
12.The costs of today be reserved.
Pursuant to O 10, on 1 November 2018, the parties filed a statement of agreed facts. Those agreed facts read as follows:
Family
1. Walter George Thomson (Walter) married Carolyn Gent Thomson (nee Baxter) (Carolyn) on or about 2 October 1958.
2. There were three children of the relationship.
2.1 Russell George Thomson (Russell) born 1 November 1959;
2.2 Bernadette Jane Wiegele (nee Thomson) (Bernadette) born 10 December 1961;
2.3 Michelle Lila Beckton (nee Thomson) (Michelle) born 27 September 1965.
3. Walter died on 27 December 1970.
4. Russell died 29 July 2011 leaving his wife Clare Monica Thomson (Clare) born 8 August 1965 and two surviving children Jack Walter Thomson (Jack) born 7 February 2003 and Dylan Kevin Thomson (Dylan) born 15 August 2005.
Walter's Estate
5. Probate of Walter's estate was originally granted to his brother Douglas Sewell Thomson on 11 June 1971.
6. On 13 February 1978 by Court Order in CIV 5493/1974 Douglas Sewell Thomson was discharged and Carolyn was appointed as executor and trustee of Walter’s will.
7. That grant was later revoked by these proceedings and Letters of Administration with the Will Annexed was granted to Bernadette and Michelle.
8. The remaining asset of the Walter's estate is an interest in farmland at Pingelly, being that land / those interests set out in Annexure A (Walter's Farmland).
9. Some of Walter's Farmland consists of a half share of one or more lots. Where that is the case, the other half share of the lot or lots is owned by Lavinia Pty Ltd ATFT CG Thomson Family Trust.
10. The farmland at Pingelly is leased collectively and provides an income to Carolyn.
11. Carolyn has been in a de facto relationship with Terrence Francis Young for more than 25 years.
Russell's Estate
12.Russell died leaving a will dated 16 August 2009.
13.Probate of Russell’s will was granted to Carolyn on 15 May 2012.
14.On 20 September 2018 Master Sanderson made orders revoking the grant of probate in favour of Carolyn and granted Letters of Administration with the Will Annexed to Clare.
15.Clare is the sole beneficiary of Russell's will.
Question
16.The parties agree that Walter's will provides for a gift of income from the estate to Carolyn for her lifetime or until she remarries.
17. The interpretation of the will as to the distribution of the balance of the estate, and the timing of that distribution, is in dispute. The administrators of Walter's estate seek directions as to how and when the balance of Walter’s estate is to be distributed.
ANNEXURE A
1.AN UNDIVIDED HALF SHARE IN THE FOLLOWING:
EXTENT VOLUME FOLIO AREA VALUE
(ACRES)
LOT 5476 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 111052 WHOLE 1591 301 75.1 TBA
LOT 5320 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 111051 WHOLE 1591 302 100.0 TBA
LOT 5319 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 111048 WHOLE 1591 303 50.0 TBA
LOT 12312 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 131419 WHOLE 1591 304 93.5 TBA
AND LOT 6037 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 115553
LOT 263 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 206979 WHOLE 1591 305 1.2 TBA
LOT 8433 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 124763 WHOLE 1591 306 53.3 TBA
LOT 5321 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 111049 WHOLE 1591 307 159.6 TBA
LOT 3133 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 102186 WHOLE 1591 308 363.9 TBA
AND LOT 2303 ON DEPOSITED PLAN256093
LOT 4674 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 108606 WHOLE 1591 309 80.0 TBA
TOTAL 976.6
NB: CERTIFICATES OF TITLE ARE FOR HALF SHARES ONLY; AREAS SHOWN ARE HALF OF ACTUAL LAND AREA
2.THE WHOLE OF THE FOLLOWING:
EXTENT VOLUME FOLIO AREA VALUE
(ACRES)
LOT 28048 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 167964 WHOLE 1293 894 19.3 TBA
LOT 28049 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 167963 WHOLE 1318 666 38.2 TBA
LOT 28050 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 167965 WHOLE 1318 344 53.1 TBA
LOT 28051 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 167966 WHOLE 1318 667 19.1 TBA
LOT 28130 ON DEPOSITED PLAN 168674 WHOLE 1293 740 21.2 TBA
TOTAL150.9
The fourth defendant lodged submissions dated 13 November 2018. The plaintiffs lodged submissions dated 19 November 2018. By reference to these submissions, I will set out the position of the parties. It is convenient to begin with the submissions filed on behalf of the plaintiffs.
Walter executed a will dated 26 March 1964 (Walter's will). Clause 2 of Walter's will provides as follows:
2.I DEVISE AND BEQUEATH all my real and personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever to my Trustee UPON TRUST to sell call in and convert the same into money (with power in his discretion to postpone the sale calling in and conversion of the whole or any part of my estate for such time as he shall deem fit and in this connection I request my Trustee if possible to retain my farming lands in their present form to the intent that they may ultimately become the property of my son RUSSELL GEORGE THOMSON) and out of the proceeds of such sale calling in and conversion to pay my debts funeral and testamentary expenses and all state Probate Duty and Federal Estate Duty and all other (if any) duties costs charges and expenses payable upon or by reason of my death in respect of my estate whatsoever and TO INVEST the residue thereof in investments authorised by law for the investment of trust funds and to STAND POSSESSED thereof and of the investments representing the same UPON TRUST:-
(a) To pay the income thereof to my wife CAROLYN GENT THOMSON during her life or until her remarriage she maintaining thereout our children until they respectively attain the age of twenty one years and
(b)After the death or remarriage of my said wife whichever shall first occur UPON TRUST for my son RUSSELL GEORGE THOMSON absolutely.
Walter's will does not include a residuary clause. Walter's brother, Douglas Sewell Thomson (Douglas), is the named executor. There is no substitute executor named in the will. Douglas obtained a grant of probate of Walter's will on 11 June 1971. By order dated 13 February 1978, Douglas was discharged as executor of Walter's will and Walter's wife, Carolyn Gent Thomson (Carolyn), was granted probate of Walter's will.
The remaining assets in Walter's estate are interests in farming land (the farming land) as set out in Annexure A to the statement of agreed facts. Certain of the interests in the farming land comprises an undivided half share as a tenant in common in certain of the lots. In each case, the other undivided half share as a tenant in common of the relevant lot is owned by Lavinia Pty Ltd as the trustee for the CG Thomson Family Trust. The farming land is leased collectively and provides an income to Carolyn. By transfer dated 19 January 1979, a change in proprietorship of the lands forming part of Walter's estate was registered to show Carolyn Gent Thomson as holder of 'an estate for the life or remarriage of Carolyn Gent Thomson …' and Russell George Thomson as holder of '… an estate in fee simple in remainder expectant upon the death or remarriage of Carolyn Gent Thomson …'.[1]
[1] Plaintiffs submissions filed 19 November 2018 par 18.
The plaintiffs seek the following declarations with respect to Walter's will:
(1)the gift to Russell in cl 2 of that will vested on Walter's death;
(2)such gift was divested upon Russell's death, he having predeceased Carol, the holder of the life interest set out in cl 2 of Walter's will;
(3)the result of that divestment is an intestacy in Walter's estate as to the residue; and
(4)the beneficiaries of such intestacy are those entitled pursuant to s 14 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA) at the date of death or remarriage of Carol or upon her earlier surrender of her life interest set out in cl 2 of Walter's will.[2]
[2] Plaintiffs submissions filed 19 November 2019 par 19(h).
Counsel for the plaintiffs analysed the position in this way. He submitted the use of the word 'reside' rather than 'use and occupy' will be construed to indicate a personal right of residence: Re Hoppe (dec); Hoppe v McDavitt [1961] VR 381 at 387. However, a direction to a trustee to hold property and use income from it for a particular person points to a life interest: Sciacca v Ghidella [2001] QSC 134 [29]. Most life interests are absolute in their nature and provide tenure for the life tenant until his or her death. Such life interest may, however, depending on the testamentary words, be determined before death and upon the occurrence of some event: Pead v Pead (1912) 15 CLR 510 at 515. An example of such life interests is a gift to a person during widowhood which determines on remarriage.
In this State, legislation permits the accumulation of income for the period of time allowed by the rule against perpetuities. The rule is one against remoteness of vesting in that no interest is valid or good unless it must vest no later than a period of 21 years after the date of a life or lives in being plus a period of gestation: Hancock v Watson [1902] AC 14 at 17. The rule does not apply to an interest which is vested at the date of creation of the interest: Monds v Stackhouse (1948) 77 CLR 232 at 248. If, however, a will creates a contingent remainder interest in property, the rule may apply.
The word 'vest' has no single clear meaning. It may apply to interests which are 'vested in interest' or 'vested in possession' depending on the nature of the gift. The word may be used directly by a testator or on a proper construction of the terms of the will, there may be an intention on the part of the testator that a gift is to vest on the happening of an event or contingency. A gift which is vested cannot be defeated by the death of the donee. Property vests absolutely when it is no longer liable to be divested.
A gift which is contingent fails if the contingency does not occur before the donee's death or the happening of some other event: Re Tompson; Rhoden v Wicking [1947] VLR 60 at 64. In order to establish whether an interest conferred by a will is vested or contingent, the intention of the testator is to be ascertained from the instrument as a whole and not merely the words of a particular gift: Tyson v Tyson (1891) 12 LR(NSW) Eq 73 at 75.
There is a presumption in favour of early vesting: Kenna v Conolly (1938) 60 CLR 583 at 595. In cases where there is doubt as to the date or timing of vesting, the presumption favours an early vesting. The gift vests either at the date of the testator's death or the earliest date after that date which accords with the words of the will: Wyatt v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1917) 23 CLR 14 at 19.
There is a further presumption which may assist in the early vesting of a gift. That is the presumption in favour of postponement of enjoyment. Courts are inclined, if possible, to construe words in a will in such a way as to lead to a postponement of enjoyment in possession of an interest vesting at the date of death of the testator. The authority for this presumption is limited. Counsel made reference in his submissions to the decision of Ambrose J in Will of Zimmerman (dec) [1999] QSC 15, and the decision of Duffield v Duffield (1829) 1 Dow & Cl 268. There is no recent authority to support this proposition and it must I think be treated with some caution.
A future interest expressed to take effect on the happening of a contingency may be a vested gift subject to being divested if the contingency is not satisfied. This rule applies to conditions other than the attaining of a particular age: Collins v Equity Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd [1997] 2 VR 166 at 169. This rule was originally propounded in Boraston's Case (1587) 3 Co Rep 16a and was subsequently adopted by the House of Lords in Phipps v Ackers (1842) 9 CL & Fin 583; 8 ER 339. The rule in Phipps v Ackers is accepted law in Australia: Weavers v Dawson [2001] NSWSC 907 [5]. It operates in two well‑defined classes of cases. First, where there is some immediate, or interim, gift so that the words of futurity may be explained as being words of futurity only as in a gift in remainder. Second, where there is as gift over if the primary beneficiary does not attain the age.
In counsel's submission, the remainderman's interest then is not contingent upon attaining of a specific age. Rather, it is vested at the date the gift becomes effective subject to being divested if the remainderman dies before that age: see Hamersley v Newton [2005] WASC 221 [56] - [57]. The rule only operates if there is a gift over: Re Mallinson Consolidated Trusts; Mallinson v Gooley [1974] 1 WLR 1120 at 1123. The rule applies to real estate, personalty or a combination of both: Re Butler [1980] QdR 601 at 603. The rule does not apply where the will provides that a gift is not to vest until the donee actually attains an age dictated by the testator. Thus, a gift to A with a condition that he or she shall not take any interest in it until attaining the age of 18 is an indication a gift is not to vest until that age is reached: Re Butler (supra) at 604. The will further provides that if A dies before attaining the age of 18, his or her interest is to revert to form part of the residuary estate, that will support the conclusion that A is to attain the relevant age before the vesting of the gift.
Where a gift is divested and therefore fails, that gift falls into the residue (Hamersley (supra) at [58]). This is subject to a contrary intention in the will that there is an alternative gift and the interest passes to a named substitute: Kenna v Conolly (1938) 60 CLR 583. Where a gift fails and there is no residuary clause in the relevant will, a resulting trust arises in favour of the testator and there is a partial intestacy. Where a person dies leaving a will effectively disposing of part of his or her property, the will is the controlling instrument: Re Wynn [1984] 1 WLR 237. Accordingly, an express trust for sale in a will excludes any statutory trust with the power to sell. However, neither an express trust nor a statutory trust will be construed as applying to a reversionary interest created by a will but undisposed of. Such interests are not to be sold, nor are the testamentary expenses payable out of such interest, nor can a next of kin claim immediate payment: Re McKee (1931) 2 Ch 145 at 148.
Where a gift over fails and there is a partial intestacy subject to a life interest, the English authorities are to the effect that the life interest in the statutory legacy merge with the result that the statutory legatee is entitled to immediate payment of the statutory legacy. In other words, if a widow has a life interest under a will but reversionary interest arising after her death is undisposed of, she can claim payment of her capital sum forthwith because the life interest merges with it: Re Bowen‑Buscarlet [1972] Ch 463 and Douglas' Will Trust, Re Lloyds v Nelson [1959] 1 WLR 1212. The English legislation provides that the actuarial value of the life interest is to be deducted from the statutory legacy.
It would appear that there is no Australian authority on point. The Administration Act in this State does not include a legislative equivalent as to the deduction for the actuarial value of the relevant life interest. Moreover, the authorities, both English and Australian, are silent as to the position where the relevant statutory legatee is entitled only to a proportion of the residuary estate. For example, where a widow has a life interest in the residuary estate, subject to a gift over, which fails. The widow is entitled to a statutory legacy together with other statutory legatees. That being so, it would seem the position would be:
(a)the widow's life interest merges in her statutory legacy which is payable immediately. There is no deduction for the actuarial value of her life interest which so merges. She is entitled to her life interest over the balance of the residuary estate. That life interest takes precedence over other statutory legacies in favour of others; and
(b)the other statutory legatees are entitled to their statutory legacies on termination of the widow's life interest over the balance of the residuary estate; that is, on the widow's death or any circumstances provided for in the relevant will such as remarriage.
There would appear to be no doubt that the gift provided to Russell in cl 2(b) of Walter's will vested in possession on Carolyn's death or remarriage. It is the plaintiffs' contention that there was a vesting prior to the happening of such contingency. Counsel relies on the presumption in favour of early vesting to support that submission. He further points to the fact that there does not appear to be anything in the words of Walter's will to preclude that conclusion.
On behalf of the fourth defendant it was submitted that Russell received a vested interest which has not divested. That proposition was supported in the following way. Currently in accordance with Walter's will Russell's estate has an indefeasibly vested remainder in fee simple absolute. Walter did not include in the terms of his will provision of a gift over in the event of Russell's death. Walter did not include in the terms of his will any specific provision or occasion that, in the event of which, would cause a divesting of Russell's vested interest. For example, there was no clause that Russell attain a certain age or satisfy a certain condition relating to his use of property. Further, the will provides that Russell takes the whole of Walter's estate 'absolutely' which express intention is inconsistent with a divesting of Russell's vested interest.
Based upon that analysis the fourth defendant seeks a declaration that in accordance with the terms of Walter's will his real and personal estate vested in Russell on Walter's death subject to the life interest of Carolyn. On Russell's death such interest passes to the executor of Russell's estate to be administered according to the terms of Russell's will.
On behalf of the plaintiffs it was submitted the gift provided to Russell in cl 2(b) of Walter's will vested in possession on Carolyn's death or remarriage. The question then is whether there was any vesting prior to the happening of such event or contingency. It was submitted that presumption in favour of early vesting supports a vesting in interest. It is submitted that there does not appear to be anything in the words of Walter's will to preclude that conclusion.
The further question then is what is the effect of Russell predeceasing Carolyn who has not remarried? Where a gift has vested in interest to be vested in possession on the happening of an event or contingency the gift is subject to be divested if the contingency is not satisfied. That is the application of the rule in Phipps v Ackers. The effect of the application of the rule in this case is that the interest vested in interest on Walter's death in favour of Russell divested on Russell's predeceasing Carolyn, Carolyn not having remarried. Where a gift is divested and as a result fails the gift falls into the residue of the estate.
There is no contrary intention expressed in Walter's will. Where there is no residuary clause as is the case in Walter's will a resulting trust arises in favour of the testator with a partial intestacy.
On behalf of the plaintiffs it was submitted the reversionary interest in favour of Russell is disposed of as on intestacy. In other words someone in Carolyn's position has been entitled from the date of Walter's death to an interest on intestacy and a life interest in the assets. It would be inappropriate for her interest on intestacy to be postponed to her death and to be available only to her estate. Counsel submits the English authorities ought be followed and the interest on intestacy and the life interest be regarded as merged on Russell's death.
While the position is not free from doubt, in my view the reasoning put by counsel for the plaintiffs is compelling. It leads to an outcome which reflects the court's predisposition in favour of early vesting and apart from anything else produces a fair outcome.
Accordingly, and subject to hearing from the parties I would propose to make the following orders:
(a)the plaintiffs be joined as administrators of the estate of Walter George Thomson;
(b)the first defendant and second defendant be removed as a party and that Carolyn Gent Thomson be joined as the first defendant in her personal capacity;
(c)Clare Monica Thomson be joined as the second defendant as the administrator of the estate of Russell George Thomson;
(d)there be a declaration that the gift to Russell in cl 2(b) of Walter's will has failed;
(e)there be a declaration that pursuant to that failure there is a partial intestacy as to the residuary estate of the late Walter George Thomson and that:
(i)Carolyn Gent Thomson is entitled to immediate payment from the residuary estate of the late Walter George Thomson of a widows statutory legacy calculated pursuant to the provisions of s 14 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA) as at the date of the late Walter George Thomson's death (Carolyn's statutory legacy);
(ii)Carolyn Gent Thomson is until her death or remarriage entitled to a life interest over that part of the residuary estate of the late Walter George Thomson remaining after payment of Carolyn's statutory legacy (the remainder);
(iii)as to the remainder Bernadette Jane Wiegele, Michelle Lila Beckton and Clare Monica Thomson as administrator of the estate of the late Russell George Thomson are each entitled to:
Aa child's statutory legacy calculated pursuant to the provisions of s 14 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA) as at the death of the late Walter George Thomson; and
Beach such statutory legacy is subject to Carolyn Gent Thomson's life interest over the remainder and is payable on Carolyn Gent Thomson's death or remarriage.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
DG
Associate to Master Sanderson22 JANUARY 2019
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