Wicks and Australian Postal Corporation

[2004] AATA 401

Administrative

Appeals

Tribunal

 

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2004] AATA 401

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No N2002/535
  )          No N2003/599

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION		)
Re		DEBBIE ANN WICKS

Applicant

And AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Michael Sassella, Senior Member

Date21 April 2004

PlaceSydney

Decision

The reviewable decision dated 18 March 2002 is set aside and the tribunal substitutes its own decision that the applicant continued to suffer an injury under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (“the Act”) on and from 31 December 2000.

The reviewable decision dated 3 April 2003 is set aside and the tribunal substitutes its own decision that the applicant is entitled to lump sum compensation for a 10% whole person impairment under the Act.

The tribunal remits these matters to the respondent for it to calculate the quantum of any compensation payable to the applicant in respect of permanent impairment, incapacity for work (in accordance with the findings in paragraph [38] of these reasons) and medical treatment subject to production of appropriate receipts and records.

The applicant qualifies for her party and party costs associated with both applications in accordance with the tribunal’s general practice direction.

[sgd] M J Sassella

Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – dermatitis on hands – atopic dermatitis aggravated by friction on hands from mail sorting and by workplace stress – work-related aggravation caused ongoing susceptibility to flare-ups of dermatitis – employee suffered stress from failure to obtain benefit as an employee – employee not excluded from compensation because of failure to obtain benefit because other workplace factors applied in addition - 10% whole person impairment established for skin condition – employee qualifies for application of formula in s 19(2) of Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1998 to see whether incapacity payments due – decisions set aside

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 4(1) (“aggravation”, “ailment”, “disease”, ”impairment”, “injury, “permanent”), (8), (9), 7(6), 14(1), 16, 19(1), (2), (4)(a)-(e), 24(1)-(7A), (9), 27, 28

Australian Postal Corporation v Bessey (2001) 32 AAR 508

Asioty v Canberra Abattoir Pty Ltd (1989) 87 ALR 385

Trewin v Comcare (1998) 84 FCR 171

Re Prica and Comcare (1996) 44 ALD 46

REASONS FOR DECISION

21 April 2004 Michael Sassella, Senior Member

RESULT

The tribunal has found that Ms Wicks has an ongoing injury under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 and that this results in a 10% permanent impairment and an incapacity for work. It will, of course, also result in compensation for the reasonable cost of medical treatment for the injury reasonably obtained by Ms Wicks. It will be a matter for Australia Post to calculate the lump sum compensation amount payable to Ms Wicks and the quantum of her weekly incapacity payments, if any, payable under the Act.

BACKGROUND

1.      Debbie Ann Wicks (“the applicant”), born 30 July 1959, was working at the Hamilton Delivery Centre near Newcastle for the Australian Postal Corporation (“Australia Post”, “the respondent”) sorting mail on 27 September 2000 when she developed dermatitis on both hands.  The cause was thought to be the introduction of red coloured rubber bands into the mail sorting process.  She claimed workers’ compensation in accordance with the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (“the Act”)[1].  Australia Post rejected the claim but reconsidered that rejection twice, deciding the second time to accept liability for the period from 6 November to 31 December 2000.  The condition was described as “aggravation of contact dermatitis both hands”.  Compensation in the form of weekly incapacity payments for the period of liability plus compensation for reasonable medical expenses was paid.  Ms Wicks appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the tribunal”) against the decision that liability ceased on 31 December 2000[2] and another decision to refuse her claim for lump sum compensation for a permanent impairment[3]. 

[1] Application N2002/535.

[3] Application N2003/599.

ISSUES

2. Ms Wicks must have suffered an injury, as defined in s 4(1) of the Act, if she is to receive any compensation under the Act. An injury is defined in s4(1) as:

(a) a disease suffered by an employee; or

(b) an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, being a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment; or

(c) an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment), being an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment;

but does not include any such disease, injury or aggravation suffered by an employee as a result of reasonable disciplinary action taken against the employee or failure by the employee to obtain a promotion, transfer or benefit in connection with his or her employment;

3. Where a disease is involved, as the disease of dermatitis is here, it must satisfy the definition of a disease in s 4(1):

disease means:

(a) any ailment suffered by an employee; or

(b) the aggravation of any such ailment;

being an ailment or an aggravation that was contributed to in a material degree by the employee's employment by the Commonwealth or a licensed corporation;

4. The definition of a disease refers to an ailment and an aggravation as relevant concepts. These are defined also in s 4(1):

aggravation includes acceleration or recurrence;

ailment means any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition (whether of sudden onset or gradual development);

5. An aggravation may also be present where the conditions set out in s 7(6) of the Act are met:

(6) An incapacity for work or impairment of an employee shall be taken, for the purposes of this Act, to have resulted from a disease, or an aggravation of a disease, if, but for that disease or aggravation, as the case may be:

(a) the incapacity or impairment would not have occurred;

(b) the incapacity would have commenced, or the impairment would have occurred, at a significantly later time; or

(c) the extent of the incapacity or impairment would have been significantly less.

Australia Post accepted that an injury in the form of aggravation of dermatitis had occurred and was compensable.

6. If an injury is present then s 14(1) of the Act provides that Comcare is liable to pay compensation to the employee:

Compensation for injuries

14. (1) Subject to this Part, Comcare is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment.

7. In the present case the applicant is seeking a lump sum payment of compensation in respect of permanent impairment. An impairment is defined in s 4(1) of the Act:

impairment means the loss, the loss of the use, or the damage or malfunction, of any part of the body or of any bodily system or function or part of such system or function;

An impairment is permanent in accordance with the definition of “permanent” in s 4(1) where it is:

likely to continue indefinitely;

8. For an employee to succeed in a claim for an alleged permanent impairment the requirements in s 24 of the Act must be satisfied:

Compensation for injuries resulting in permanent impairment

24. (1) Where an injury to an employee results in a permanent impairment, Comcare is liable to pay compensation to the employee in respect of the injury.

(2) For the purpose of determining whether an impairment is permanent, Comcare shall have regard to:

(a) the duration of the impairment;

(b) the likelihood of improvement in the employee's condition;

(c) whether the employee has undertaken all reasonable rehabilitative treatment for the impairment; and

(d) any other relevant matters.

(3) Subject to this section, the amount of compensation payable to the employee is such amount, as is assessed by Comcare under subsection (4), being an amount not exceeding the maximum amount at the date of the assessment.

(4) The amount assessed by Comcare shall be an amount that is the same percentage of the maximum amount as the percentage determined by Comcare under subsection (5).

(5) Comcare shall determine the degree of permanent impairment of the employee resulting from an injury under the provisions of the approved Guide.

(6) The degree of permanent impairment shall be expressed as a percentage.

(7)       Subject to section 25, if:

(a)       the employee has a permanent impairment other than a hearing loss; and

(b)       Comcare determines that the degree of permanent impairment is less than 10%;

an amount of compensation is not payable to the employee under this section.

(7A)     Subject to section 25, if:

(a)       the employee has a permanent impairment that is a hearing loss; and

(b)       Comcare determines that the binaural hearing loss suffered by the employee is less than 5%;

an amount of compensation is not payable to the employee under this section.

…

(9) For the purposes of this section, the maximum amount is $80,000.

9. Section 4(8) of the Act makes abundantly clear that the “injury” referred to in s 24(1) must be one for which the respondent is liable under s 14(1) of the Act:

(8) A reference in this Act to an injury suffered by an employee is, unless the contrary intention appears, a reference to an injury suffered by the employee in respect of which compensation is payable under this Act.

10.     From this the following issues are relevant:

(a)Has Ms Wicks continued to suffer after 31 December 2000 from a compensable injury under s 14 of the Act?

(b)If the answer to (a) is yes, has Ms Wicks an impairment under the Act?

(c)If the answer to (b) is yes, is the impairment permanent?

(d)If the answer to (c) is yes, what is the degree of permanent impairment?

(e)If the answer to (a) is yes, has Ms Wicks an incapacity for work under s 19 of the Act?

FINDINGS ON MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT WITH REFERENCE TO THE EVIDENCE AND OTHER MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF THOSE FINDINGS

(a) Has Ms Wicks continued to suffer after 31 December 2000 from a compensable injury under s 14 of the Act?

11.     Ms Wicks says that the dermatitis has never gone away since 2000.  She was certified unfit for work from 5 November 2000 until 28 December 2000 except for 30 November 2000 to 11 December 2000 when she was certified fit for suitable duties.  She worked early in 2001, ceasing in February when her temporary contract ended.  Her hands had been better but not perfect from February to June 2001.  She tried a return to work in June 2001 at Hamilton.  This lasted two or three days before her hands erupted again.  She has not worked since. 

12.     Ms Wicks told the tribunal that she has to use barrier protection on her hands at home when cleaning, washing dishes, showering and washing her hair.  Her hand condition was said to have improved since 2001 but never to have totally resolved.

13.     In cross-examination Ms Wicks said that she sees her dermatologist, Dr A Watson, occasionally.  At the time he prepared a report dated 16 April 2003 it had been 12 months since she last saw Dr Watson.  She had last seen him in September 2003, she said at the hearing.  She said she sees general practitioner Dr Abery once or twice a year but she sees only Dr Watson for her hand condition.  She uses a medication called Advantan, active ingredient Methylprednisolone aceponate, irregularly when she has sores on her hands similar to those experienced at Australia Post in September 2000. 

14.     The medical experts were agreed that the cause of Ms Wicks’ dermatitis at Australia Post was the frictional effects on her hands from using rubber bands (Dr R J Gillespie, dermatologist, 2 August 2002; Dr R B Watchorn, dermatologist, 24 September 2001 and 13 September 2002) and Dr Watson in his oral evidence in the tribunal hearing.  Drs Gillespie and Watchorn saw a contribution also from Ms Wicks’s stress in her employment (13 September 2002).  In oral evidence Dr Watchorn said she thought that stress in employment caused the onset of the dermatitis while the frictional effects worsened it.  Dr Watson conceded that stress could be factor but he saw it as far less so than the contact with rubber bands. 

15.     Where the medical experts diverged related to the ongoing effects of the frictional effects.  Dr Watson said that the damage caused by the frictional effects produced an ongoing sensitivity which would be affected by minimal irritation.  Dr Watchorn saw the frictional effects as temporary and as not resulting in an enhanced susceptibility to dermatitis.  On 5 November 2001 she wrote that the aggravation would be expected to settle down within a week or two of cessation of mail sorting activities.  Dr Gillespie in his report said that the dermatitis had essentially resolved by August 2002 but that “exposure to physical and chemical irritants may cause a relapse as the hands may remain sensitive even after apparent recovery.  … [E]xposure to irritants either in the home or in the work place may continue to cause an exacerbation of dermatitis.” 

16.     Before I can make findings on the questions of cause and aggravation it is necessary to look further at Ms Wicks’s skin condition history.  Her evidence at the hearing was that she had atopic eczema affecting her arms and eyes as a child aged 10 or 11 but had never had problems affecting her hands.  Dr Watson in his oral evidence explained that an atopic dermatitis sufferer is more prone to contact dermatitis. 

17.     She had had Iodine treatment 15 years ago for a thyroid condition which resulted in a rash.  She said that that rash was different from the current dermatitis and she had last had it in 1997.  She had had a skin problem affecting her eyelids, face, stomach, legs and nipples over a five-year period with occasional later break outs.  These had been treated with medicinal creams and she had had no recurrences for a few years.  Dr Watson saw these effects as suggestive of continuing atopic dermatitis, although atopic dermatitis is unusual beyond childhood. 

18.     It is necessary to say a little about the stress caused to Ms Wicks by events at work.  Essentially these amounted to repeated disappointments caused by her failure to obtain a permanent position with Australia Post.  Ms Wicks worked for Australia Post as a casual part-timer from 15 September 1998.  She started by working 25 hours a week but from six months into the job worked a regular 50-hour week. 

19.     In September 1999 Ms Wicks was told by her supervisor that five permanent part-time positions (“PPTPs”) in Hamilton were coming up and she would get one of them.  She had been told of another vacancy at Metford but was advised that she would do better to apply for Hamilton.  She was not told that applications were opened for the Hamilton jobs and so did not make a formal application.  Late in 1999 or early in 2000 Ms Wicks discovered that the five PPTPs in Hamilton had been filled and that it was too late for her to appeal.  She was told that others more senior than her had been given the jobs.  She said she was upset for a long time, probably six months. 

20.     She worked on at Hamilton as a night sorter.  In September 2000 her dermatitis developed and she was off work with that when she was informed of a number of PPTPs vacant at Gateshead Delivery Centre.  She applied and was interviewed.  She was told the process was informal and references not required.  She discovered a formal interview was to take place when she arrived for her session.  She was not appointed to a position because others had “better references” than her.  She found out that the successful candidates had worked for Australia Post for shorter periods than her. 

21.     As noted earlier, the medical experts tend to think that these disappointments and the stress flowing from them may have contributed to her dermatitis outbreak.

22.     Based on this evidence, the position appears to me to be:

·     That, while Ms Wicks had a propensity to suffer from dermatitis stemming from her history of atopic dermatitis, she had not experienced an outbreak since 1997 when she exhibited the disease at Australia Post in September 2000. 

·     That the work she did for Australia Post as a mail sorter in September 2000 caused her underlying condition to flare up.  Australia Post accepted this much in its decision of 18 March 2002, the reviewable decision in N2002/535.  The medical experts agree that an immediate cause was a change in work methods involving Ms Wicks in exposure to friction from rubber banding bundles of mail.

·     That the fact that Australia Post passed Ms Wicks over for a PPTP on two occasions contributed to a stress condition that, in turn, contributed to her suffering a flare-up of dermatitis. 

·     That the first instance of dermatitis on Ms Wicks’s hands had occurred in September 2000 and had been the result of a material contribution by employment at Australia Post. 

·     That the better view, based on the opinions of Drs Gillespie and Watson, is that Ms Wicks’s hands have a greater sensitivity to the effects of minimal irritation from chemical or physical causes flowing from this original instance.  I preferred the majority evidence of these two experts to the minority evidence from Dr Watchorn on this matter.  I was unable to distinguish between the experts as regards their qualifications or credibility and the fact that two of them agreed, albeit using different phraseology, that there was an ongoing effect from the September 2000 flare-up meant that I was satisfied on balance that this must be the case.

23.     These findings of fact have the following legal resonances.  First, as regards the ongoing effectiveness of an aggravation of an underlying disease, the authorities suggest that the aggravation will be only temporary and will attract compensation only for the duration of the pain where the pain ceases after a time and leaves the underlying condition no worse than before (Australian Postal Corporation v Bessey (2001) 32 AAR 508). In Asioty v Canberra Abattoir Pty Ltd (1989) 87 ALR 385 the High Court accepted that where an employee experiences symptoms only when at work, but the employee has become more susceptible to a disease, eg dermatitis, because of his or her employment, that enhanced susceptibility constitutes an aggravation of the disease.

24. Second, to the extent that Ms Wicks’s condition is associated with her disappointed expectations of a PPTP, it may not be an injury according to the definition of “injury” in s 4(1) of the Act because the injury has resulted from Ms Wicks’s failure as an employee to obtain a promotion, transfer or benefit in connection with his or her employment (see [2] above).

25.     On the basis of the material in [23] I find prima facie that Ms Wicks has an ongoing injury in accordance with the definition of “injury” in s 4(1) of the Act in the form of aggravation of underlying dermatitis affecting her hands because her susceptibility to developing dermatitis in her hands has been increased as a result of her Australia Post work.

26.     As regards Ms Wicks’s failure to obtain a benefit Mr Perry, counsel for Ms Wicks, submitted that the situation was not properly so characterised.  Rather, he said, the problem was Australia Post misleading and keeping Ms Wicks in the dark about how best to present herself to obtain a PPTP.  It was Australia Post’s bad management practices that were said to have caused Ms Wicks’s stress.  Mr Perry referred me to the decision of Heerey J in the Federal Court of Australia in Trewin v Comcare (1998) 84 FCR 171. In dicta in that decision at page 176 Heerey J said that, “if there were four contributing and employment-related factors, of which three were exclusionary [eg because of failure to obtain benefit, transfer or promotion] and one was not, and if the requirement of ‘injury’ were satisfied, the claim would succeed”. In the present case there are two employment-related contributing factors. One, a failure to obtain a benefit in employment, namely a PPTP, is exclusionary. The other, the physical effects of friction on the hand in doing mail sorting, is not exclusionary. The presence of the second of these two causes assists Ms Wicks and permits a finding that she has a compensable ongoing injury. I so find.

(b) If the answer to (a) is yes, has Ms Wicks an impairment under the Act?

27.     Applying the definition of “impairment” in [7] above, I find that Ms Wicks has an impairment in the form of a malfunction of a part of the body, ie dermatitis of the hands.

(c) If the answer to (b) is yes, is the impairment permanent?

28.     Applying the definition of “permanent” in [7] above, I find that Ms Wicks’s impairment is likely to continue indefinitely and so is permanent.  I take such a finding to be supported by Drs Gillespie and Watson. 

29. Further, I note that s 24(1) of the Act requires that a permanent impairment must result from a compensable injury if it is to attract compensation for permanent impairment. I find that the impairment is connected to the dermatitis aggravation injury.

30. I find that the requirements in s 24(2) of the Act are satisfied:

·     The impairment has had a duration commencing in September 2000 and continuing.  Drs Gillespie and Watson see it as continuing indefinitely (s 24(2)(a)).

·     There is no likelihood of a substantial improvement in Ms Wicks’s condition (s 24(2)(b)).  Again I rely on Drs Gillespie and Watson for this finding.

·     There has been no treatment or reasonable rehabilitation suggested to me for Ms Wicks to undertake that would cause the impairment to go into remission (s 24(2)(c)).

(d) If the answer to (c) is yes, what is the degree of permanent impairment?

31. Section 24(4) and (5) governs the assessment of the degree of permanent impairment. Section 24(5) refers to the Comcare Guide to the Assessment of the Degree of Permanent Impairment (“the Comcare guide”)[4] which is a statutory instrument under s 28 of the Act.

[4] 4.1 of the Comcare guide deals with skin disorders.  Drs Watson and Watchorn suggested that a 10% assessment was appropriate.  The descriptor in the Comcare guide for 10% is:

“The condition is absent on examination or if present can easily be reversed by appropriate medication or treatment AND causes minor interference with activities of daily living.”

33. These are balanced and appropriate assessments. The tenor of the evidence was that Ms Wicks has occasional flare-ups of the condition that are controllable by topical application of medicinal creams. There was oral evidence of problems with the activities of daily living (see [12] above). I find that Ms Wicks qualifies for lump sum compensation for a 10% whole person impairment under the Act. It will be a matter for Australia Post to calculate the sum payable to Ms Wicks under ss 24 and 27 of the Act.

(e) If the answer to (a) is yes, has Ms Wicks an incapacity for work under s 19 of the Act?

34. I find that Ms Wicks has an incapacity for work under the Act. Section 4(9) of the Act defines an incapacity for work as “an incapacity suffered by an employee as a result of an injury being: … (b) an incapacity to engage in work at the same level at which he or she was engaged by … a licensed corporation in that work or any other work immediately before the injury happened”. In Re Prica and Comcare (1996) 44 ALD 46 the tribunal said at page 51 that the phrase, “at the same level”, in paragraph (b) of the definition is a reference to the nature of the work in the sense of its characteristics, which will include its degree of difficulty. The medical experts agree that Ms Wicks cannot return to mail sorting or she will experience a fresh flare-up of her dermatitis symptoms. She thus cannot return to a job having the same characteristics as the job she did before September 2000. This constitutes an incapacity for work for the purposes of s 19 of the Act. It may mean that Ms Wicks qualifies for ongoing incapacity payments. However, as the tribunal said in Prica, again at page 51, “A finding of an incapacity itself does not necessarily result in any entitlement to periodic or lump sum compensation under the Act. There are additional requirements in ss 19, 24 and 27 concerning those issues”.

35. Section 19 of the Act operates as follows in determining whether Ms Wicks qualifies for incapacity payments:

· Section 19(2) would allow her to receive weekly payments at the level of her normal weekly Australia Post earnings minus her current ability to earn in suitable employment.

· Section 19(4) deems as Ms Wicks’s ability to earn such remuneration that would come her way if she is in employment (s 19(4)(a)). However, Ms Wicks has not worked since she left Australia Post.

· Section 19(4)(b) deems her able to earn an amount per week she would have earned had she accepted an offer made to her of suitable employment. There is no evidence that Ms Wicks has rejected any offer of suitable employment. No offers appear to have been made.

· Section 19(4)(c) deems her able to earn an amount she would have earned had she engaged in suitable employment which she accepted but did not take up. There is no evidence that Ms Wicks has rejected any offer of suitable employment. No offers appear to have been made.

· Section 19(4)(d) deems her able to earn an amount she would have earned had she received an offer of suitable employment on condition that she engaged in rehabilitation but which she failed to take up because she failed to engage in the rehabilitation. Again, no such offer appears on the evidence to have come Ms Wicks’s way.

· Section 19(4)(e) deems Ms Wicks able to earn an amount she would have earned in suitable employment where she has failed to seek suitable employment. This provision was said by Miss Henderson for Australia Post to have an application here. I agree with Miss Henderson that this provision applies.

36.     Ms Wicks told the tribunal she had looked for work in telephone call centres, the Road Traffic Authority, the Water Board and AAMI insurance.  She had made applications but received no invitations to interviews.  The first application was late in 2001.  She has computer skills and can touch type.  She said she had made fewer than a dozen job applications since she left Australia Post.  In cross-examination Ms Wicks agreed that she had not done these types of work before.  She had not mentioned her workers’ compensation history in applications.  She had not applied for sales jobs or jobs such as she had done in the past.  Ms Wicks had a lengthy work history.  She had worked as a check out operator, a clothing machinist, a night packer for Woolworths, a waitress, a worker in a lock manufacturer company, a cleaner, operator of a take-away food shop, a door to door sales person and a sales assistant. 

37.     Mr Perry submitted that Ms Wicks should be regarded as having the same ability to earn as a shop assistant.  This was eminently reasonable given Ms Wicks’s work history.

38.     In view of this material I find that Ms Wicks is entitled to incapacity payments based on her Australia Post normal weekly earnings less the ability to earn of a shop assistant.

CONCLUSION

39. The tribunal has found that Ms Wicks has an ongoing injury under the Act and that this results in a 10% permanent impairment and an incapacity for work. It will, of course, also result in compensation under s 16 of the Act for the reasonable cost of medical treatment for the injury reasonably obtained by Ms Wicks. It will be a matter for Australia Post to calculate the lump sum compensation amount payable to Ms Wicks and the quantum of her weekly incapacity payments, if any, payable under the Act.

DECISION

40.     The reviewable decision dated 18 March 2002 is set aside and the tribunal substitutes its own decision that the applicant continued to suffer an injury under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (“the Act”) on and from 31 December 2000.

41. The reviewable decision dated 3 April 2003 is set aside and the tribunal substitutes its own decision that the applicant is entitled to lump sum compensation for a 10% whole person impairment under the Act.

42.     The tribunal remits these matters to the respondent for it to calculate the quantum of any compensation payable to the applicant in respect of permanent impairment, incapacity for work (in accordance with the findings in paragraph [38] of these reasons) and medical treatment subject to production of appropriate receipts and records.

43.     The applicant qualifies for her party and party costs associated with both applications in accordance with the tribunal’s general practice direction.

I certify that the 43 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Michael Sassella, Senior Member

Signed:         .....................................................................................
  Associate

Dates of hearing  22 & 23 January 2004
Date of decision  21 April 2004
Counsel for the Applicant         Mr Michael Perry
Solicitor for the Applicant          Moroney Rutter & Mantach Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondent     Miss Rhonda Henderson
Solicitor for the Respondent     Australian Government Solicitor