SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)
WHITWORTH v CHRISTIAN BROTHERS COLLEGE ADELAIDE
[2019] SASC 154
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Doyle
29 August 2019
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The defendant appeals from a decision of a Magistrate dismissing her applications to set aside a default judgment entered in favour of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff school sued the defendant for the school fees it claimed were owing in respect of her son’s tuition from late 2016 through to 2018. No defence was filed within the prescribed time, and the plaintiff obtained default judgment in the amount of $14,836.63 in its favour. The defendant brought two applications to set aside the default judgment, both of which were dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that the material relied upon by the defendant did not disclose an arguable defence.
Held (per Doyle J):
1. The Magistrate erred in declining to set aside the default judgment obtained by the plaintiff. The material relied upon by the defendant disclosed an arguable defence to the effect that the relationship between the parties was governed by annual contracts and that, in the relatively unique circumstances where the defendant had no control over whether her son attended the plaintiff school, an agreement between the parties cannot be inferred in respect of the 2017 and/or 2018 school years.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. The default judgment in favour of the plaintiff is set aside.
Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA) r 87, referred to.
Sandery v Kowalski [2016] SASC 175; Cubelic v T & D Lock Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 397; Watson v Anderson (1976) 13 SASR 329; C E Heath Underwriting & Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd v Edwards Dunlop & Co Ltd (1993) 176 CLR 535, considered.
WHITWORTH v CHRISTIAN BROTHERS COLLEGE ADELAIDE
[2019] SASC 154Magistrates Appeal: Civil
DOYLE J: The plaintiff school (the School) sued the defendant (Ms Whitworth) for the school fees it claimed were owing in respect of her son’s tuition at the School from late 2016 through to 2018. No defence was filed within the prescribed time, and the School obtained default judgment in the amount of $14,836.63 in its favour.
Ms Whitworth subsequently brought two applications to set aside the default judgment, both of which were dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that the material relied upon by Ms Whitworth did not disclose an arguable defence.
Ms Whitworth now appeals from the orders of the Magistrate dismissing her applications to set aside the default judgment. She contends that the Magistrate erred in concluding that her affidavits did not disclose an arguable defence. In particular, she contends that those affidavits disclosed an arguable case that she did not owe the school fees claimed on the basis either that she terminated her contract with…
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- Case
- [2019] SASC 154
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the Magistrate had erred in focusing solely on whether Ms. Whitworth had terminated the contract in late 2016, without considering her alternative contention that the relationship between the parties was governed by a series of annual contracts. The Court held that if Ms. Whitworth could establish that the relationship was one of annual contracts, it would be sufficient to argue that she did not enter into any contract for the 2017 or 2018 school years. The Court found that Ms. Whitworth's affidavits, while not entirely satisfactory, did provide sufficient evidence to establish an arguable defence in this regard. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the default judgment in favour of the College was set aside.
The Court's reasoning highlights the importance of carefully considering the nature of the contract between the parties when determining whether an arguable defence has been established. In this case, the Court found that the Magistrate's failure to consider the possibility of annual contracts led to an error in the appeal decision. The outcome underscores the need for a thorough analysis of the evidence and a proper application of the legal principles governing arguable defences.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In his reasons dated 15 April 2019 the Magistrate reached the same conclusion. His Honour did not accept that Ms Whitworth’s third affidavit advanced her contention that she had terminated the contract. The Magistrate reiterated that while the evidence revealed complaints to, and about, the School about her son, the evidence did not support any termination of the contract. His Honour said:As already noted, the defendant was at liberty at any time to cancel the contract between the school and herself by withdrawing her child. She did not do that. What is clear from the correspondence is she was using the threat of non-payment of fees as a lever to get the school to become pro-active in returning the child home.The defendant has failed to satisfy the test that she must establish an arguable defence before judgment can be set aside. There is no arguable defence against the claim for school fees.Consideration On appeal, counsel for Ms Whitworth contended that the Magistrate erred in confining his consideration to whether or not it was arguable that she had terminated her contract with the School. He contended that the Magistrate’s analysis assumed there was a single contract between the School and Ms Whitworth in relation to her son’s tuition at the School; that is, a contract that commenced upon the son’s enrolment in 2009 and continued from year to year until terminated. He contended that this overlooked Ms Whitworth’s (primary) case that in fact there was a series of annual contracts; and that, if the relationship between the parties was governed by annual contracts, then it would be sufficient to establish that it was arguable that Ms Whitworth did not enter into any contract for the 2017 or 2018 school years. Accordingly, as developed in argument before me, Ms Whitworth contended that she should succeed on appeal on the basis that it is arguable either:· that her relationship with the School was one of annual contracts or renewals, and that she did not agree any contract or renewal in 2017 or 2018; or· that even if there was only one contract she nevertheless terminated that contract in late 2016 (or at some point thereafter). Taking these in reverse order, I share the Magistrate’s difficulty in identifying any reasonable basis for a defence founded upon a late 2016 termination of a single contract between the parties. I do not think that Ms Whitworth has pointed to any communication which was arguably a termination of any such contract. Termination of a contract requires some unequivocal communication or conduct indicating that the contract is at an end. While the evidence does reveal a number of complaints by Ms Whitworth about the School’s handling of the situation with her son, and expressions of a desire that he go to a different school, I do not think these provide an arguable basis for Ms Whitworth’s contention that there was a late 2016 termination of the contract between Ms Whitworth and the School. It may be that there was some communication sufficient to constitute a termination. However, the problem for the defendant is that it has not been sufficiently identified in the affidavit material that has been filed.