Whitworth v Christian Brothers College Adelaide

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

WHITWORTH v CHRISTIAN BROTHERS COLLEGE ADELAIDE

[2019] SASC 154

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Doyle

29 August 2019

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The defendant appeals from a decision of a Magistrate dismissing her applications to set aside a default judgment entered in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff school sued the defendant for the school fees it claimed were owing in respect of her son’s tuition from late 2016 through to 2018. No defence was filed within the prescribed time, and the plaintiff obtained default judgment in the amount of $14,836.63 in its favour. The defendant brought two applications to set aside the default judgment, both of which were dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that the material relied upon by the defendant did not disclose an arguable defence.

Held (per Doyle J):

1.       The Magistrate erred in declining to set aside the default judgment obtained by the plaintiff. The material relied upon by the defendant disclosed an arguable defence to the effect that the relationship between the parties was governed by annual contracts and that, in the relatively unique circumstances where the defendant had no control over whether her son attended the plaintiff school, an agreement between the parties cannot be inferred in respect of the 2017 and/or 2018 school years.

2.       Appeal allowed.

3.       The default judgment in favour of the plaintiff is set aside.

Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA) r 87, referred to.
Sandery v Kowalski [2016] SASC 175; Cubelic v T & D Lock Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 397; Watson v Anderson (1976) 13 SASR 329; C E Heath Underwriting & Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd v Edwards Dunlop & Co Ltd (1993) 176 CLR 535, considered.

WHITWORTH v CHRISTIAN BROTHERS COLLEGE ADELAIDE
[2019] SASC 154

Magistrates Appeal:  Civil

  1. DOYLE J:  The plaintiff school (the School) sued the defendant (Ms Whitworth) for the school fees it claimed were owing in respect of her son’s tuition at the School from late 2016 through to 2018.  No defence was filed within the prescribed time, and the School obtained default judgment in the amount of $14,836.63 in its favour.

  2. Ms Whitworth subsequently brought two applications to set aside the default judgment, both of which were dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that the material relied upon by Ms Whitworth did not disclose an arguable defence.

  3. Ms Whitworth now appeals from the orders of the Magistrate dismissing her applications to set aside the default judgment.  She contends that the Magistrate erred in concluding that her affidavits did not disclose an arguable defence.  In particular, she contends that those affidavits disclosed an arguable case that she did not owe the school fees claimed on the basis either that she terminated her contract with…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 154
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Whitworth v Christian Brothers College Adelaide, Ms. Whitworth appealed against a decision of the Magistrates Court which found in favour of the College in relation to a claim for outstanding school fees. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia, where the Court was required to determine whether the Magistrate erred in dismissing Ms. Whitworth's appeal against the default judgment. The primary legal issue was whether Ms. Whitworth had established an arguable defence that she did not agree to continue the annual tuition contract for the 2017 and 2018 school years. The Court considered whether the Magistrate correctly applied the principles governing arguable defences under the Supreme Court Rules.

The Court found that the Magistrate had erred in focusing solely on whether Ms. Whitworth had terminated the contract in late 2016, without considering her alternative contention that the relationship between the parties was governed by a series of annual contracts. The Court held that if Ms. Whitworth could establish that the relationship was one of annual contracts, it would be sufficient to argue that she did not enter into any contract for the 2017 or 2018 school years. The Court found that Ms. Whitworth's affidavits, while not entirely satisfactory, did provide sufficient evidence to establish an arguable defence in this regard. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the default judgment in favour of the College was set aside.

The Court's reasoning highlights the importance of carefully considering the nature of the contract between the parties when determining whether an arguable defence has been established. In this case, the Court found that the Magistrate's failure to consider the possibility of annual contracts led to an error in the appeal decision. The outcome underscores the need for a thorough analysis of the evidence and a proper application of the legal principles governing arguable defences.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is appropriate to commence my consideration of whether Ms Whitworth established an arguable defence by summarising the effect of her evidence.Ms Whitworth’s evidence As mentioned, Ms Whitworth filed three affidavits. In addition to providing a summary of her relevant communications with the School, her affidavits annexed a number of documents both in relation to those communications and in relation to the fees charged by the School. By way of summary, in her first affidavit, Ms Whitworth said that her son attended the School for his secondary school education.[2] Through to his completion of year 9, at the end of 2015, the son was a successful student, and she and her husband (the son’s step-father) had a good relationship with him.[2] It is apparent from other evidence that he had been enrolled at the School from 2009. However, Ms Whitworth said that there was a dramatic change during 2016, while her son was in year 10. She and her husband lost contact with their son, and attributed this to what she described as “interference” on the part of the School, and in particular a counsellor employed by the School. They initially did not know where their son was living, and indeed were not given the information about him and his whereabouts that they were seeking. They subsequently learned that he was staying at a facility run by the Baptist Church, but they still had no ability to contact him. According to Ms Whitworth, the School in effect precluded them from having any contact with their son. They were aware that he was continuing to attend the School, but believed that his academic performance was declining. Ms Whitworth said that they contacted the School by various methods, including by email and telephone, and through meeting with staff at the School, but were not successful in having contact with their son. She said (at [10]-[11]):We made it very clear to the officers of the plaintiff that we did not want [our son] staying at the school. … Our repeated requests for his schooling at the plaintiff’s school to be terminated and for him to go to another school were ignored. Ms Whitworth said that at the end of “the two years saga”, when their son was 18 and living in rental accommodation in Marion, they managed to resume visiting him regularly, and to begin to restore their relationship with him. She concluded her first affidavit by stating that she was not prepared to pay the fees charged by the School “on account of the fact that we requested that his schooling with the plaintiff stop and also due to the poor performance.” In her second affidavit, Ms Whitworth said that the relationship she and her husband had with their son began to deteriorate from May 2016, ultimately resulting in him leaving home on 29 September 2016. He had just turned 16 years of age. Ms Whitworth outlined some of her communications with the School. In particular, she said (at [5]-[6]):On 29 August 2016 we went to the school, to a parenting interview. It became apparent that [our son] had missed a lot of classes. Up until then his attendance had been good. We spoke to the Deputy Principal and the Director … (separately) and advised them that we did not want [our son] to remain at the school and that we wanted to send him to Adelaide High School. [The Deputy Principal] did not respond to that statement. [The Director] gave the same response.There was another earlier meeting in August 2016 with [the Deputy Principal] where I told them the same thing. [The Deputy Principal] did not directly respond to that request, but said that we should not worry about finances for [our son], because now that he turns 16 he qualified for Centrelink benefits just like an university student.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The affidavit material before me is not entirely satisfactory. It is in many respects vague as to the timing and content of the critical communications between the parties. However, in the ultimate analysis I am satisfied that it goes beyond mere assertion that there was no agreement reached in respect of the 2017 or 2018 school years. I am satisfied that the material establishes an arguable ‘defence’ to the effect that the relationship between the parties was governed by annual contracts and that, in the relatively unique circumstances that I have described, an agreement between the parties cannot be inferred in respect of the 2017 and/or 2018 school years.Conclusion For the reasons set out above, and without of course expressing any view as to the prospects of Ms Whitworth ultimately being successful in her defence of the claim, I am satisfied that there is an arguable defence case in the sense required by r 87(2)(a). As no point has been taken in relation to r 87(2)(b), the appeal must be allowed and the default judgment in favour of the School set aside. I will make the following orders:1. Appeal allowed.2. The default judgment in favour of the plaintiff is set aside.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In his reasons dated 15 April 2019 the Magistrate reached the same conclusion. His Honour did not accept that Ms Whitworth’s third affidavit advanced her contention that she had terminated the contract. The Magistrate reiterated that while the evidence revealed complaints to, and about, the School about her son, the evidence did not support any termination of the contract. His Honour said:As already noted, the defendant was at liberty at any time to cancel the contract between the school and herself by withdrawing her child. She did not do that. What is clear from the correspondence is she was using the threat of non-payment of fees as a lever to get the school to become pro-active in returning the child home.The defendant has failed to satisfy the test that she must establish an arguable defence before judgment can be set aside. There is no arguable defence against the claim for school fees.Consideration On appeal, counsel for Ms Whitworth contended that the Magistrate erred in confining his consideration to whether or not it was arguable that she had terminated her contract with the School. He contended that the Magistrate’s analysis assumed there was a single contract between the School and Ms Whitworth in relation to her son’s tuition at the School; that is, a contract that commenced upon the son’s enrolment in 2009 and continued from year to year until terminated. He contended that this overlooked Ms Whitworth’s (primary) case that in fact there was a series of annual contracts; and that, if the relationship between the parties was governed by annual contracts, then it would be sufficient to establish that it was arguable that Ms Whitworth did not enter into any contract for the 2017 or 2018 school years. Accordingly, as developed in argument before me, Ms Whitworth contended that she should succeed on appeal on the basis that it is arguable either:· that her relationship with the School was one of annual contracts or renewals, and that she did not agree any contract or renewal in 2017 or 2018; or· that even if there was only one contract she nevertheless terminated that contract in late 2016 (or at some point thereafter). Taking these in reverse order, I share the Magistrate’s difficulty in identifying any reasonable basis for a defence founded upon a late 2016 termination of a single contract between the parties. I do not think that Ms Whitworth has pointed to any communication which was arguably a termination of any such contract. Termination of a contract requires some unequivocal communication or conduct indicating that the contract is at an end. While the evidence does reveal a number of complaints by Ms Whitworth about the School’s handling of the situation with her son, and expressions of a desire that he go to a different school, I do not think these provide an arguable basis for Ms Whitworth’s contention that there was a late 2016 termination of the contract between Ms Whitworth and the School. It may be that there was some communication sufficient to constitute a termination. However, the problem for the defendant is that it has not been sufficiently identified in the affidavit material that has been filed.