Whittle & Whittle (No 2)
[2025] FedCFamC1F 140
•6 March 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Whittle & Whittle (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 140
File number: HBC 252 of 2023 Judgment of: MCGUIRE J Date of judgment: 6 March 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Binding Financial Agreement – Where the wife seeks a declaration that the Financial Agreement between the parties is not binding – Where neither party received independent legal advice – Where wife is a professional and prepared the Financial Agreement – Whether it would be unjust and inequitable if the Financial Agreement was not declared binding on the parties – Declaration that the Financial Agreement signed by the husband and wife is binding within the meaning of s 90G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 90G(1), 90G(1A) and (1B)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Cases cited: Hoult & Hoult [2013] FamCAFC 109, (2013) FLC 93-546
Kaimal & Kaimal [2020] FamCA 971
Parker & Parker [2012] FamCAFC 33, (2012) FLC 93-499
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 69 Date of hearing: 27 February 2025 Place: Hobart, delivered Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Trezise Solicitors for the Applicant: Murdoch Clark Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Dixon SC and Mr McKenna, direct brief ORDERS
HBC 252 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS WHITTLE
Applicant
AND: MR WHITTLE
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MCGUIRE J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.It is declared that the Financial Agreement signed by the husband, Mr Whittle (“the husband”), and the wife, Ms Whittle (“the wife”), on 31 May 2021 is binding within the meaning of s 90G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
2.The husband make, file and serve any application for costs supported by written submissions within 14 days from the date of these Orders.
3.The wife make file and serve written submissions in response within 14 days of receiving the husband’s written submissions.
4.The matter otherwise be reserved on the issue of costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym of Whittle & Whittle (No 2) has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
McGUIRE J:
APPLICATION
On 21 March 2023 the wife, Ms Whittle, filed an application initiating proceedings seeking orders for an alteration of property interests pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
In his Response filed 16 May 2023 the husband, Mr Whittle, sought orders inter alia:
1.That the Initiating Application filed 21 March 2023 be dismissed on the ground that by virtue of the terms of the Financial Agreement between the Parties dated 31 May 2021, having been executed as a Deed, the Applicant is estopped from making any claim for property adjustive Orders, pursuant to Section 79 of the Family Law Act, or otherwise.
2.That, in the alternative to 1, pursuant to S90G(1A) and S90G(1B) of the Family Law Act 1975, an Order be made declaring the Financial Agreement between the Parties and dated 31 May 2021, is binding.
By order of 5 June 2023 and pursuant to Rule 10.10 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), Judge Taglieri ordered the hearing of the issue as to whether the Financial Agreement be binding be bifurcated as a preliminary hearing from the wife’s substantive application and that the matter be transferred to Division 1 of this Court.
The applicant wife now seeks a declaration that the Financial Agreement signed by the husband and the wife on 31 May 2021 is not binding within the meaning of s 90G of the Act.
ISSUES
The issue for the Court is therefore a discrete one where:
(i)it is uncontroversial that neither party obtained independent legal advice and that the relevant Agreement of 31 May 2021 is not therefore compliant with the provisions of s 90G(1) of the Act which provides:
(1)Subject to subsection (1A), a financial agreement is binding on the parties to the agreement if, and only if:
(a)the agreement is signed by all parties; and
(b)before signing the agreement, each spouse party was provided with independent legal advice from a legal practitioner about the effect of the agreement on the rights of that party and about the advantages and disadvantages, at the time that the advice was provided, to that party of making the agreement; and
(c)either before or after signing the agreement, each spouse party was provided with a signed statement by the legal practitioner stating that the advice referred to in paragraph (b) was provided to that party (whether or not the statement is annexed to the agreement); and
(ca)a copy of the statement referred to in paragraph (c) that was provided to a spouse party is given to the other spouse party or to a legal practitioner for the other spouse party; and
(d)the agreement has not been terminated and has not been set aside by a court.
(ii)the wife does not, at this stage, mount any argument in respect of setting aside the Financial Agreement pursuant to s 90K of the Act although it is clear that she reserves her right to do so.
Consequently, where the parties agree non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of s 90G(1), the issue rests with the exercise of the discretion available to the Court under s 90G(1A) and (1B) of the Act which provide:
(1A) A financial agreement is binding on the parties to the agreement if:
(a)the agreement is signed by all parties; and
(b)one or more of paragraphs (1)(b), (c) and (ca) are not satisfied in relation to the agreement; and
(c)a court is satisfied that it would be unjust and inequitable if the agreement were not binding on the spouse parties to the agreement (disregarding any changes in circumstances from the time the agreement was made); and
(d)the court makes an order under subsection (1B) declaring that the agreement is binding on the parties to the agreement; and
(e)the agreement has not been terminated and has not been set aside by a court.
(1B)For the purposes of paragraph (1A)(d), a court may make an order declaring that a financial agreement is binding on the parties to the agreement, upon application (the enforcement application) by a spouse party seeking to enforce the agreement.
BACKGROUND
The wife is 47 years of age. She is employed as a professional and has completed a degree.
The husband is 54 years old. He is a group director effectively operating an upmarket business. In effect he holds an overall 28 per cent interest in the entities with the remainder being held by one other person.
The parties commenced cohabitation in 2000 in Melbourne and moved to City E in 2006. They married in late 2006.
The parties finally separated on 25 May 2021 after a previous separation and a trial reconciliation. They were divorced in mid-2022.
There are two children of the marriage X (aged 17 years) and Y (aged 14 years). The children live by agreement between their parents.
It is clear that prior to the final separation the parties had negotiated as to a financial settlement and the wife searched the Internet and obtained a template for a financial agreement.
By email of 10 May 2021 the wife corresponded with the husband and provided the husband with a first draft of a financial agreement and the email states:
Hi [the husband]
Here is the agreement I mentioned I was working on. I’ve tried to make it as basic as possible but compliant with the law.
It only deals with [F Street] so that the new mortgage can be taken out and no stamp duty on transfer. You might be pleased to know that though that I’ve specifically excluded everything else (like business property, super, etc). I’ve also left out the car as I do trust that we will work something out. Trying to keep it simple.
Please let me know your thoughts.
Thanks.
[The wife]
By email of the same date the husband responded:
Hi There,
I think that’s a good start and obviously I’m not a Lawyer but there are some points that confuse me;
F.This Agreement excludes other property held by the Parties, spousal maintenance, and superannuation arrangements.
I think this could be interpreted as excluding all other assets from the Deed, so the house becomes yours and everything else is up for debate?
I think it needs to be more specific, IE;
House = [the wife]
Furniture, fixtures, fittings etc = [the wife] (other than a few things that are personal to me like the […] Dresser)
[The wife’s] super = [the wife]
[The wife’s] bank account balance = [the wife]
Super, bank balances and other [the husband] or [the husband] Entities assets = [the husband]
[The husband] agrees to pay school fees.
[The husband] agrees to supply a vehicle etc
Just my thoughts…
[The husband]
By further email of 25 May 2021 the wife again corresponded with the husband thus and providing a second draft:
Hi there
Sorry it has taken me a while to get back into this. The lender just followed me up about it today as it is the only thing they are waiting on.
I’ve tried to address each of your concerns, as follows:
F.This Agreement excludes other property held by the Parties, spousal maintenance, and superannuation arrangements.
I think this could be interpreted as excluding all other assets from the Deed, so the house becomes yours and everything else is up for debate?
I’ve made it much clearer now that I am not entitled to make any claim against those business entities or you personally – see clause 6.1 and 6.2. Can you please add any other business entities, trust accounts etc that you control to section 6.2 so that it is clear?
I think it needs to be more specific, IE;
House = [the wife]
Furniture, fixtures, fittings etc = [the wife] (other than a few things that are personal to me like the […] Dresser)
[The wife’s] super = [the wife]
[The wife’s] bank account balance = [the wife]
Super, bank balances and other [the husband] or [the husband] Entities assets = [the husband]
I think I’ve now addressed each of these. Didn’t put in joint bank account as I don’t mind you using cash in that. I’ll close it once I move to the new lender anyway.
[The husband] agrees to pay school fees. Done
[The husband] agrees to supply vehicle etc. Done
Please let me know your thoughts.
Thanks
[The wife]
(Original emphasis)
Neither of the drafts provided by the wife to the husband contained the Solicitors’ certificates of independent legal advice. Each of the drafts did, however, include in the Operative Provisions a statement:
8.3The Parties have obtained independent legal advice prior to signing this Agreement, in accordance with section 90G(1)(b) of the Act.
Again, it is uncontroversial that neither party obtained advice or certificates pursuant to s 90G(1) of the Act.
The Financial Agreement is dated May 2021. It is signed by the parties and witnessed. It contains a Separation Declaration pursuant to s 90DA of the Act.
On 21 March 2023 the wife initiated proceedings for property settlement pursuant to s 79 of the Act.
THE FINANCIAL AGREEMENT
The relevant financial agreement is dated May 2021. It is signed by the parties and witnessed. Recitals D and E of the Financial Agreement state:
D.In order to arrange their property affairs and avoid litigation the parties have agreed to enter into this agreement under the provisions of section 90 C of the Act to deal with the division of their property, and their financial resources.
E.The property of the Parties that this Agreement deals with is the matrimonial home of the parties located at [F Street Suburb G] [Volume …, Folio …] (“Primary Residence”) and other financial assets and resources of the Parties.
The Operative Provisions of the Financial Agreement provide inter alia:
1.1As soon as reasonably practicable after the Separation Date, the Parties will transfer title to the Primary Residence [the former matrimonial home] to [the wife] …
1.2The transfer of the property is subject to [the wife] arranging for all current mortgages over the property to be released, and a new mortgage over the property taken out by [the wife] in her personal capacity.
1.3[The wife] is responsible for paying and any duties, taxes (including CGT), Insurance, fees and other costs associated with the change of mortgage and transfer of title. [The wife] will also ensure that [the husband] is removed from all rates notices, utilities bills etc as soon as practicable after the transfer of title.
The transfer of the former matrimonial home to the wife was subject to her obtaining releases for the husband from all encumbrances and the wife refinancing.
The husband was to provide the wife with a fully maintained motor vehicle of a particular type for a period of three years with the transfer of ownership of that vehicle to the wife after three years.
At 5.1 of the Operative Provisions of the Agreement state:
The Parties acknowledge that they have agreed upon a division of all assets, owned or possessed by them as matrimonial property or separate property. The Parties are in possession of all of those assets to which he or she is respectively entitled. Accordingly, neither makes any claim to any assets in the possession of the other.
At 5.2 is a particularised distribution of the furniture and chattels.
At 6.1 of the Operative Provisions:
The Parties expressly waive any claim to any other assets or property held by the other Party either personally or held by any other entity, trust or investment vehicle that a Party controls or of which a Party is a trustee, owner or beneficiary.
At 7.4 of the Operative Provisions the husband is to be solely responsible for the payment of the children’s ongoing school fees until the conclusion of Year 12 of each child.
The Operative Provisions at 8.1 provide:
The Recitals are taken to be included in the Operative Provisions of this Agreement and are therefore binding in effect.
THE WIFE’S CASE
It is common ground that none of s 90G(1)(b), (c), or (ca) of the Act were satisfied and that the Financial Agreement is not therefore prima facie binding.
The onus is on the party seeking to satisfy the Court that it would be unjust and inequitable if the Agreement is not binding. The onus therefore rests with the husband, rather than the wife, and the wife says that he has not discharged that onus.
The wife says that the requirement for persons to obtain independent legal advice is a crucial legal safeguard given a binding financial agreement ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to make property orders.
The wife argues that the distinction between a mere technical error and statutory non‑compliance, as was the case here, is a clear and important one given the extent of the breach together with the fact that it occurred in respect of both parties and therefore requires “compelling evidence and persuasive reasons” for a court to be satisfied that it would be unjust and inequitable if the agreement were not binding.
Further, the wife says that the thrust of the husband’s evidence is directed at his own financial situation rather than as to how it would be unjust and inequitable if the Agreement were not binding and he does not therefore discharge his onus to persuade the exercise of the Court’s discretion.
THE HUSBAND’S CASE
The husband says that the Court has a broad discretion as to a declaration of a financial agreement being binding and without restriction of the matters that might inform that discretion.
He says that whilst admitting a breach by both parties of the statutory requirements of s 90G(1), the exercise of the discretion is not limited to technical breaches.
The husband argues that the parties intended the Financial Agreement to be comprehensive and binding and such is clear from the wording of the Agreement itself and from contemporaneous correspondence between the parties.
The husband emphasises that the wife herself initiated the preparation of the Agreement and the parties each then contributed to settling the final form of the Financial Agreement.
The husband says that there is no evidence of pressure, duress or inducement on either party towards the execution of the Agreement.
The husband says that the husband has fully carried out his obligations under the Agreement and specifically therefore the wife has received the particular benefits available to her under the Agreement being prominently the transfer of the former matrimonial home into her sole name and the provision of a motor vehicle. Further, the husband has complied with his obligations under the Agreement to pay the children’s school fees.
In correspondence since the making of the Agreement, the wife herself has asserted her entitlements under the Agreement and its binding nature.
The husband argues that it was unambiguously the intention of the parties on the signing of the Financial Agreement to oust the jurisdiction of the Court at s 79 of the Act.
The husband notes that the wife represented to the husband that she had drafted the Financial Agreement so as to comply with the law.
The wife commenced s 79 proceedings one year, nine months and 21 days after the execution of the Financial Agreement notwithstanding that she had received the benefits available to her under the Agreement.
The husband says that he is and has been entitled to rely on the Financial Agreement and the parties have acted on the Financial Agreement such that the wife is estopped from utilising the jurisdiction of the Court at s 79 of the Act.
THE RELEVANT LAW
The rationale of s 90G(1)(b) – (ca) of the Act is to permit adults to contract out of the jurisdiction of the Family Law Act so as to reach full and final property settlement without the overseeing role of the Court and for the requirement of “justice and equity”. As the Full Court in Hoult & Hoult[1] said with reference to the remedial provisions of s 90G(1A):
305.We are firmly of the view that the content of the bargain has no relevance to the exercise of discretion under s 90G(1A)(c) …
306.We do not accept that because the enquiry in paragraph (c) is as to injustice and inequity, the content of the bargain must have some relevance. The issue of injustice and inequity can far more easily be seen as directed to whether, given the nature and extent of the non-compliance with the s 90G(1) requirements, it would be unjust and inequitable if the agreement was not binding.
[1] [2013] FamCAFC 109; (2013) FLC 93-546.
It would be to fall into error, therefore, to somehow conflate notions of “justice and equity” with the consideration of injustice and inequity referenced at s 90G(1A).
The relief available under s 90G(1A) for a non-compliant financial agreement is not limited to technical breaches. Specifically, the Full Court in Hoult (supra) at [181] confirmed this:
181.…Thus, Parker & Parker is authority for the proposition that the fact that a party has not received the prescribed legal advice (which could not be called a “technical” breach) does not alone render s 90G(1A) inapplicable.
Section 90G(1A) is by its nature remedial and should not be ascribed a narrow interpretation.[2]
[2] Parker & Parker [2012] FamCAFC 33; (2012) FLC 93-499 at [147] per Murphy J.
Murphy J in Parker & Parker[3] at [231] emphasised the discretion available to the Court to being a broad one:
231.… The plain words of s 90G(1A)(c) evidence a clear meaning. They envisage a broad discretion vested in the Court in circumstances where the pre-conditions to the exercise of that discretion prescribed otherwise in s 90G(1A)(a) to (e) are established. Once that discretion is enlivened, nothing within the section suggests, in terms, any restriction on the matters that might inform it.
[3] [2012] FamCAFC 33; (2012) FLC 93-499.
Importantly, however, are the facts and circumstances surrounding the making and performance of the agreement which are relevant rather than a broader enquiry as to the financial circumstances of the parties, for instance, which may more properly and relevantly be the province of the “justice and equity of the bargain if considered by a court under s 79 of the Act but here is not a relevant consideration.
The Court to in Parker (supra) at [147] – [149] confirmed s 90G(1A) by its nature to be remedial and should therefore be ascribed a broad interpretation. Murphy J continues:
149.The amending legislation’s purpose is stated to be, in part, to prevent people who have made an informed decision to enter a financial agreement “later avoid[ing] or get[ting] out of the agreement on a mere technicality, resulting in court battles that the agreement was designed to prevent”. It would, to my mind, be a curious result of the legislation if the central remedial section in those amendments (i.e. s 90G(1A)) was defeated because of a failure in the form of the application. That is all the more so when it is considered that the issues to which s 90G(1), and s 90G(1A) in particular, relate, very frequently arise (as here) in the context of a s 79 application which is met by a responsive pleading that a financial agreement is binding and, as a result, Part VIII is rendered inapplicable to the matters to which the agreement pertains.
Whilst the discretion, therefore, is a broad one, the Full Court in Hoult (supra) further assisted in stating at [307]:
… but if there is to be a list of factors identified we would prefer the following, …
•The terms of the section, the nature of a financial agreement as a creature of the Act, and the place of Part VIIIA within the overall scheme of the Act.
•The nature and extent of the non-compliance with the requirements of s 90G(1).
•The facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement including, in particular, if one of the parties has complied with all of the mandatory requirements necessary to render the agreement binding.
•How the parties have acted subsequently in relation to the agreement (bearing in mind that changes of circumstances cannot be considered).
The onus rests with the party seeking to have the financial agreement declared binding and specifically therefore to give and adduce evidence to satisfy the Court that it would be unjust and inequitable if the agreement were not binding.
The standard of proof is that at s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth):
Civil proceedings: standard of proof
(1)In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
(2)Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a)the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b)the nature of the subject - matter of the proceeding; and
(c)the gravity of the matters alleged.
CONSIDERATION
I generally accept the submission of counsel for the wife that the statutory requirement at s90G(1) of the Act should not be understated. Specifically, where the section gives the ability for adults to contract out of the justice and equity requirement at s79 and therefore requiring independent legal advice as to the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed agreement and a signed statement by the legal adviser such demonstrates the importance placed by the drafters of the legislation on the provision for independent legal advice. In Kaimal & Kaimal[4] Chief Justice Alstergren at first instance noted the rationale of the section as follows at [20]:
It is clear that, in order to be able to advise a party of the advantages and disadvantages of entering into a financial agreement and of how that financial agreement will affect their rights, it is necessary that those advantages, disadvantages and rights are first identified.[5]
[4] [2020] FamCA 971.
[5] See Abrum & Abrum [2013] FamCA 897 at [38] – [43] per Aldridge J.
His Honour in Kaimal (supra) at [50] – [51] exercised his discretion against finding the financial agreement binding with some highlight on the requirement for legal advice noting as follows:
50.Although I have found that the requirement for legal advice in s 90G(1)(b) has not been satisfied, the Financial Agreement can nevertheless be declared binding under s 90G(1A)(c) on the basis that it would be unjust and inequitable if the agreement were not binding on the parties.
51.Given the inadequate legal advice provided to the wife under s 90G(1)(b), the importance that is placed on such legal advice by the legislation, and the blatant errors in the Financial Agreement, I consider that it would be unjust and inequitable if I were to declare that the Financial Agreement was binding on the parties.
It is clear, however, that the Chief Justice’s decision shows the broad discretion available to the Court and the matters to be taken into account on a case-to-case basis noting also a consideration there of errors in the financial agreement.
In the matter now before me the Agreement itself and the surrounding correspondence between the parties, now in evidence, suggests the parties themselves considered the Financial Agreement to be binding following its execution. Indeed clause 8.1 of the Agreement itself states as much. Further, and for example, in an email to the husband of 23 June 2021 and after the husband apparently consulted a solicitor generally, the wife says:
Re: the Financial Agreement. I’m not sure there is a need for (the solicitors) to amend. It has served its purpose (so maybe you save your money) and I stand by my promise and commitment that I have no interest in seeking any further financial benefit from you. …
Similarly, in an email of 25 May 2021 providing the final draft financial agreement to the husband, the wife says:
… I’ve made it much clearer now that I am not entitled to make any claim against those business entities or you personally…
The wife is a trained and experienced professional. The evidence suggests that she initiated the use of the tool of the financial agreement in that she searched the Internet for information as to the legislation and so as to obtain a template. She completed the drafts of the Agreement. The wife’s evidence to me as to why her templates at no time included the pages for independent legal advice was unsatisfactory.
I am satisfied that the husband was entitled to proceed on an understanding that the Financial Agreement finalised financial matters between he and the wife on the basis of the Recitals in the Agreement, the Operative Provisions, and the representations made to him by the wife.
The Financial Agreement purported to “cover the field” in respect of the parties’ property albeit without evidence of values but where, of course, the parties are perfectly entitled to enter a “bargain” on such terms as they agree and pursuant to s 90C and s 90G(1) of the Act so as to oust the jurisdiction of s 79 and hence the requirement for “justice and equity”.
The evidence is clear that the terms of the Agreement of 31 May 2021 have been fully put into effect and specifically in respect of the benefits accruing to the wife being:
(i)the former matrimonial home has been transferred to the wife;
(ii)the wife utilised the Agreement so as to obtain stamp duty relief on the transfer of the former matrimonial home to her;
(iii)the wife has been provided with a motor vehicle; and
(iv)the husband has discharged his obligations in solely being responsible for and meeting the ongoing school fees for the children.
The wife has been asserting and demanding compliance by the husband with the terms of the Agreement in correspondence since the making of the Agreement.
I find that the parties were open and communicative in negotiating the terms of the Agreement as evidenced by the correspondence between 10 May and 25 May set out above. Specifically, it is open for me to find that the husband by the amendments he sought to the Agreement was desirable of the Agreement “covering the field” and that the wife, in preparing the final draft of the Agreement, acceded the to the husband’s requests. In particular, the final draft of the Agreement included reference to the husband’s business interests and included, at the husband’s suggestion, being that which the wife now seeks to “alter” in her s 79 Application.
I am satisfied that by execution of the Agreement and consideration of the wording of the Recitals and Operative Provisions of the Agreement, both parties considered the Agreement to be “full and final” and “binding” at the time of its execution.
Where I accept the submission of the wife’s counsel that the wife was perhaps “the author of her own misfortune”, I find that she was an informed and trained instigator of the joint decision of the parties to use the tool of a financial agreement and hence opt out of the s 79 jurisdiction of the Court.
Where the exercise of the discretion is, as usual, a balance of considerations and evidence, I generally accept the submission of counsel for the wife that the balance primarily rests in the emphasis that the wife puts on the importance of the provision of legal advice and a consequent solicitors certificate against the thrust of the husband’s case being that the wife has achieved all of the benefits to accrue to her under the Agreement.
On balance I exercise my discretion to declare the Financial Agreement binding in finding on the balance of probabilities that it was the intention of the parties to finally settle their financial matters by agreement rather that by exercising the jurisdiction of the Court at s 79 of the Act together with the operative parts of the Agreement now being acted upon. I will make the declaration accordingly.
I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McGuire. Associate:
Dated: 6 March 2025
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