Whittle, N. v Australian Miniature Pony Society Inc

[1992] FCA 961

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
) LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY )
) No NG 863 of 1992
GENERAL DIVISION	)

BETWEEN:	NORMA WHITTLE and DAVID JOHN WHITTLE
Applicants

m:	AUSTRALIAN MINIATURE PONY SOCIETY INCORPORATED
Respondent

CORAM: HILL J PLACE: SYDNEY DATED: 30 NOVEMBER 1992

15 DEC 1192

MINUTES OF ORDER

THE COURT NOTES:

1.    The applicants give the usual undertaking to the Court as to damages.

1. The applicants undertake to the Court not to attend any meetings of the respondent.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

3.    Until further order the respondent restore the names of the appllcants to the respondent's register of members.

or before 4 March 1993.

4.   Until further order the respondent reinstate the appllcants' deregistered ponies to the adult register of the society if they have been removed from it.

5.    Costs reserved.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

1. The applicant file and serve all affidavits on which they propose to rely on or before 15 January 1993.

7.    The respondent file and serve all affidavits on which it proposes to rely on or before 19 February 1993.

1. The applicants file and serve any affidavits in reply on

9.    Matter stood over to 5 March 1993 for mention and return of subpoenas.

10. Liberty to apply on 48 hours notice.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:

11.  If any party shall fail to comply with these orders and that failure shall continue for a period of seven (7) days the party not in default shall notify the Associate to Hill J. forthwith when the matter may be relisted without prejudice to any party's liberty to apply.

Note:  Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY )	NO NG 863 of 1992
GENERAL DIVISION	)

BETWEEN	:	NORMA WHITTLE and DAVID JOHN WHITTLE
Applicants

m: AUSTRALIAN MINIATURE PONY

SOCIETY INCORPORATED
Respondent

CORAM: HILL J PLACE: SYDNEY DATED: 30 NOVEMBER 1992

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The respondent, the Australian Miniature Pony Society Incorporated ("the Society"), is an association of breeders or owners of the Australian Miniature Pony and of persons interested in the Australian Miniature Pony. It 1s incorporated under the provisions of the Associations Incor~oration Act 1984 (NSW). Although it may be more accurate to refer to it as a "helght" society, it is what is

of registration for foals and adult ponies entitled to	commonly known as a "breed society". It issues certificates
registration and maintains a register in which ponies registered with it are entered. One of the qualifications for a pony being an Australian Miniature Pony is that, at all times, its height must not exceed 87 centimetres, irrespective of age. One of the conditions for transfer of ponies on the register .is that both vendor and purchaser be financial members of the respondent.
The Constitution of the Society consists mainly of the Model Rules under the Associations Incor~oration Act as modified by a number of resolutions which have been passed. Relevant to the present dispute between the parties are the following Rules:

"4.1 A person ceases to be a member of the

Society if the person -

d) a member of the Society who has not renewed their annual membership with the Society wlthin a three (3) month period of membership fees being due from the l August will no longer be deemed a member of the Soclety. It wlll be necessary to re apply for membership and a loining fee will be applicable.

10.1 Where the committee is of the opinion

that a member of the Society -

a) has persistently refused or neglected to comply wlth a provision or provisions of these

rules; or

b) has persistently and wilfully acted in a manner preludicial to the interests of the Soclety,

the committee may, by resolution -

c)	expel the member from the Society; or
d)	suspend the member from membership of the Society for a specified period.

10.2 A resolution of the committee under clause (1) is of no effect unless the committee at a meeting held not earlier than fourteen (14) days and not later than twenty eight (28) days after servlce on the member of a notice under clause (3), confirms the resolution in accordance with this rule.

10.3 Where the committee passes a resolution under clause (1 ) the secretary shall, as soon as practicable cause a notice in writing to be served on the member -

a)	settlng out the resolution of the committee and the grounds on which it is based;
b)	stating that the member may address the committee at a meetlng to be held not earlier than fourteen (14) days and not later than twenty eight (28) days after service of the notice;
c)	stating the date, place and tlme of that meeting and;
d)	informing the member that the member may do either or both of the following -
i) attend and speak at that meetlng;

11) submit to the commlttee at

or prior to the date of

that meeting written representations relating to the resolution.

10.4 At a meetlng of the commlttee held as referred to in clause (3) the commlttee shall -

a) give t o the member an

opportunity t	o make oral
representations;

b)	give due consideration to any written representations submitted to the committee by the member at or prior to the meetlng; and
c)	by resolution determine whether
t o confirm or t o revoke the resol U t ion.

10.5 Where the committee confirms a

resolution	under	clause	( 4 )	t he
secretary	sha l l ,	within	seven	( 7 )

days a f t e r tha t confirmation by not ice i n writ ing inform the member o f the fact and o f the member's r ight o f appeal under rule 11.

1 0 . 6 A resolution confirmed by the

committee under clause ( 4 ) does not

take	e f f e c t -
a )	un t i l the expiration o f the perlod wlthin which the member i s en t l t l ed t o appeal against the resolution where the member does not exercise the right o f appeal withln that period; or
b )	where withln that period the member exercises the right o f appeal, unless and un t i l the Society conflrms the resolution
pursuant t o rule 1 1 . 4 .

11.1 A member may appeal t o the Society i n general meetlng agalnst a resolution o f the commlttee whlch i s confirmed under rule 10.4 wlthln seven ( 7 ) days a f t e r notlce o f the resolution i s

served on the member, by lodging wlth

the secretary a notice t o that

e f f e c t .

11.2 Upon receipt o f a notlce from a member under clause ( 1 ) the secretary shall n o t l f y the commlttee which shall convene a general meeting o f the Society t o be held withln twenty one (21) days a f t e r the date on which the secretary received the not ice .

11.3 A t a general meeting o f the Society convened under clause ( 2 ) -

a )	no buslness other than the questlon o f the appeal shall be transacted;
b)	the committee and the member shall be given the opportunity to state their respective cases orally or in writing or both; and
c)	the members present shall vote by secret ballot on the questlon of whether the resolution should be confirmed or revoked.

11.4 If at the general meetlng the Society passes a special resolution in favour of the confirmation of the resolutlon the resolutlon is confirmed.

19.5 Any three (3) members of the committee constitute a quorum for the transaction of the buslness of a meeting of the committee.

21.4 Any act or thlng done or suffered or purporting to have been done or suffered by the committee or by a sub committee appointed by the committee I S v a l i d a n d e f f e c t u a l notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in the appointment or qualification of any member of the committee or sub committee.

26.2 Five members present in person (being members entitled under these rules to vote at a general meeting) constitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of a general meeting.

30.1 A resolution of the Society is a

speclal resolutlon if -

a) it is passed by a majority which comprises not less than three quarters of such members of the Society as, being entitled under these rules so to do, vote by

postal b a l l o t a t a general meeting o f which not l e s s than twenty e i g h t ( 2 8 ) days w r l t t e n

n o t i c e s p e c i f y i n g t h e intention
t o propose t h e reso lu t ion a s a
spec ia l r e s o l u t i o n was given i n
accordance w i th t h e s e r u l e s .
b )	where i t i s made t o appear t o
t h e Commission t h a t i t i s not
poss ib le o r pract icable f o r t h e
reso lu t ion t o be passed i n t h e
manner s p e c i f i e d i n paragraph
( a ) - t h e reso lu t ion i s passed
In a manner s p e c i f i e d b y the

Commission.

3 1 . 4 A member i s not e n t l t l e d t o vo te a t

any general meeting o f t h e S o c l e t y

un les s a l l money due and payable b y

t h e	member	t o	t h e	S o c i e t y	has	been
p a i d	o ther	than	t h e	amount	o f	t h e

annual subscription payable i n

respec t o f t h e then current year."

The applicants, Mr and Mrs W h l t t l e , f i r s t became

members o f t h e respondent Soc ie ty i n or around 1986, when it was then unincorporated and upon i t s incorporat ion became

members o f t h e now incorporated body. By a s e r i e s o f

r e s o l u t i o n s	cu lmmat ing	i n resolutions	o f general	meetings	o f
t h e Soc ie t y held	on	18	October	1992,	each o f t h e app l i can t s

was expel led from membership o f t h e Soc le t y . The app l i can t s

c la im t h a t each o f t he reso lu t ions passed was i n v a l i d and o f

no	e f f e c t .	They	clalm	a l s o t h a t t h e r u l e s	o f t h e	S o c i e t y ,	o r
a t	l e a s t	such	o f them	as	are	concerned	w i t h t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n

o f ponies , are i n v a l i d e i t h e r as being i n contravent ion o f t h e

general law on r e s t r a i n t o f t r a d e , or a l t e r n a t i v e l y b y v i r t u e

o f t h e operat ion o f s.45 o f t h e Trade 1974.

Pending the trial of the proceedings, they claim interlocutory relief by way of an order that their names be restored to the register of members of the respondent and that their ponies be restored to the adult register of the Society.

There was no contest between the parties as to the proper test to be applied in the interlocutory proceedings. It is that set out in Australian Coarse Grain Pool Ptv Ltd v Barlev Marketina Board of Oueensland (1982) 46 ALR 398; Tableland Peanuts Ptv Ltd v Peanut Marketina Board (1984) 52 ALR 651 and EDltoma Ptv Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Em~lovees' Union (No. 2 1 (1984) 54 ALR 730. The Court must determine, on the evidence as it stands, whether there is a serious issue to be tried and where the balance of convenience lies. Those two matters are not independent of each other: Trade Practices Commission v Santos Ltd (unreported, 2 November 1992 per Sweeney and Hill JJ at 5).

The facts as presented show a history of dispute between Mr and Mrs Whittle, on the one hand, and certaln members of the committee of the Society, on the other. I should, at this point, emphasise that in the discussion of facts which follows, it is not my task to make findings of fact as between the parties. That is a matter which must await the final trial of the proceedings.

While the interpretation of many of the facts deposed to in the affidavits before me may be the subject of dispute, the underlying facts themselves, at least so far as they are relevant to the present proceedings, seem relatively simple. Mrs Whittle was, at some time, a Victorian reglonal delegate to the Society. She was also a committee member of the Society and its vice-president from 29 June 1991 to 16 November 1991. She and her husband breed ponies eligible for registration and she claims that one of her ponies, "Pee Wee" (also known as "Wandella Park Pee Wee"), is of the highest standard. They have not, in fact, sold any ponies for some 14

months. They have been, however, developing a line of ponies and intend to foal down 12 mares this coming season.

Mrs Whittle deposes that she has three registered fillies and 14 unregistered mares. Their progeny consists of two, as yet unregistered, fillies under six months and two, as yet unregistered, colts also under six months old. These

was a registered miniature. She also has two two-year-old	could become registered miniatures because the sire, Pee Wee,	colts, registered, and two one-year-old colts, registered. She has one gelding and four mares due to foal between now and February 1993, as well as Pee Wee and five colts. She estimates the market value of these animals to be, at least if they are able to be registered, in the order of $50,000. The evldence suggests that an unregistered animal is worth approximately 10 percent of the value of a registered animal. Mrs Whittle claims that Pee Wee is the best performing pony in Victoria. It has been Champion twlce and Reserve Champlon three times at five Royal shows under five different judges.
The differences of opinion, if I may neutrally call them that, between the Whittles, on the one hand, and certaln members of the commlttee of the Society, on the other, seem to have originated some time prior to October 1991. The matters that gave rise to the dispute at that time are presently ~rrelevant. Suffice it to say, that the Whittles sought to circulate to members a letter dated 14 October 1991, as an insert in the Society's magazine: "Small Talk". The letter
was never circulated and the decision not to do so seems apparently to have been a decision of the commlttee. The bad feellng between the parties grew until, on 28 March 1992, a Mr Bllght, a commlttee member, moved, as a resolution at a Speclal General Meeting of the Society, the following:

wilfully acted in a manner preludlclal to	"As N and D Whittle have persistently and
the interests of the Assoclatlon, that the committee of management institute disciplinary action as per Rule 10(1)(b)
[and] (c) of the Model Rules."
That motion was carried.

Accordingly, on 5 April 1992, the Secretary of the Society wrote to both Mr and Mrs Whittle informing them of the resolutions which were purported to have been passed at that General Meeting of the Society and invited them either to attend in person to speak, or to submit in writing representations pertaining to the resolution, at a meeting to be held on 26 April. Mrs Whittle replied by letter dated 20 April 1992, pointing out a number of defects in the procedure adopted. A letter concerning defects of the procedure was also sent by Mr Whittle on 15 April 1992.

On 30 April 1992, the solicitors for Mrs Whlttle sought reimbursement of various expenses incurred by her in her capacity as vice-president, totalling $998.31. The Society dld not agree to such reimbursement and Mrs Whittle has commenced proceedings to recover the amount from the it.

The committee of the Society passed a resolution on 26 April 1992, expelling the Whittles. That precipitated legal proceedings brought in the Supreme Court of New South Wales by Mr and Mrs Whittle, against the Society, seeklng

was ultimately concluded by an undertaking being given by the	declarations that the resolutions were void. That litigation	Society to rescind the motion passed on 26 April 1992. A rescission motlon was, in fact, passed by the committee of the Society at its meeting on 31 May 1992. The Committee of the Society saw the success of Mr and Mrs Whittle in the legal proceedings as involving but a technical defect in the disciplinary proceedings. Accordingly, at the meeting of the committee on 31 May 1992, it was resolved that the Society's solicitors be instructed to prepare a timetable and
appropriate motions to discipline both Mr and Mrs Whittle.
Meanwhile, on 6 May 1992, Mrs Whittle commenced defamation proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against Mr Blight, Mr Goulding, the then President of the Soclety, and Mrs Goulding. One of those proceedings was discontinued by Mrs Whittle on legal advice, the remaining two were transferred to the District Court and are presently awaitlng hearlng. The committee of the Soclety actively promoted a fighting fund to fund the costs of the defamation proceedings against the three committee members.
It was a term of the settlement of the Supreme Court proceedings that the Society pay the Whittle's legal costs of them. The Whittles had, in the previous year, brought other proceedings against the Society, concerning the registration of Wandella Park Pee Wee, which proceedings were also settled
Whittle's legal costs up to a limit of $9,000. In the result, on the basls, inter alia, that the Society agreed to pay the the Society became indebted in a considerable sum to the applicants.
On 16 August 1992, a committee meeting was held at Ourimbah in New South Wales. At that meeting, at which were present Mr Goulding, and Mr and Mrs Blight, as well as four other committee members, it was moved by Mr Elliott and seconded by MS Chalmers, that Mrs Whittle be expelled from the Society "under Rule 10.1 b) - c) of the Model Rules" llsting 12 grounds for the expulsion. The resolution suggests that the list had been drawn up by the Society's solicitor. It was also moved by P. Walsh and seconded by A. Chalmers that Mr Whittle be expelled. Seven grounds were listed for his expulsion. It was thereafter moved that the Secretary be instructed to write to Mr and Mrs Whittle informing each of them of the resolutions. On 24 August 1992, the Society sent a notice to each of Mr and Mrs Whittle advising them of the resolutlons and the grounds upon which the resolutlons were passed. It is not necessary here to detail the various grounds presumably drafted by the Society's solicltors. Included among those grounds were allegations that Mr and Mrs Whlttle had attempted to lntimldate members of the Soclety and that they had caused members of the Society to expend large amounts of time and money dealing wlth complaints, criticisms or allegations. The letter informed each of the addressees
which was to be held at Bringelly, New South Wales, at the that he or she could address the committee at the next meeting residence of Mrs Walsh on 20 September 1992.
On 29 August 1992, Mr Whittle sought particulars of the charges made against him. He sought a reply no later than 2 September 1992, to enable him to prepare a defence. Mrs Whittle, .by a letter dated 31 August 1992, also sought detailed particulars before 4 September. Mrs Whittle also asked as to the availability of public transport to the meeting at Brlngelly. It may be noted that Bringelly is not near a capital city. On 2 September 1992, the solicitors for Mr and Mrs Whittle, in a letter faxed to the solicitors for the Society, sought detailed particulars on behalf of thelr clients. A letter in reply, dated 10 September 1992, was, in due course, sent.
A meeting was ultimately held at Bringelly on 20 September 1992. Neither of Mr and Mrs Whittle were present. At this meeting, the resolution concerning each of Mr and Mrs Whittle was confirmed.
Two letters, bearlng date 21 September 1992, were then sent, signed by Mrs Chalmers, to each of Mr and Mrs Whittle, informing them of the conflrmatlon of the resolution and further, that they had a right of appeal to members at a special General Meetlng. The letters indicated that a reply
was requlred withln 7 days of receipt of the notlce.
The letter to Mr Whittle was, it would seem, received by him on 28 September 1992, outside the time required by r.10.5 of the Model Rules. Mr Whittle, however, in a letter of the same date, indicated that he was prepared to overlook that breach and wished to appeal to members at the special General Meeting, in accordance with r . . of the Rules. The letter to Mrs Whittle was apparently received by her on 25 September 1992 and that date was within the time permitted by the Rules for the forwarding of the letter. She too advised that she wished to exercise her rights. Both Mr and Mrs Whittle complained that the questions they had asked had not be adequately answered.
Two General Meetings were accordingly convened to be held on 18 October, to consider the confirmation or otherwise of the committee's resolutions. Neither of Mr and Mrs Whittle attended these meetings. Resolutions were passed by each of the meetings, after a secret ballot, in favour of confirming the resolutions expelling the Whittles from the Society. In the case of Mr Whittle, the resolution was passed by 25 votes to 3. In the case of Mrs Whittle, the resolution was passed by 26 votes to 3. It may be noted that the Constitution of the Society does not provide for proxy voting, although the Rules dealing with speclal resolutions appear to provide for voting by postal ballot. No argument was addressed to this
matter, but the documentation does not suggest that members were given the opportunity to vote by postal ballot and, in
any event, a question may arise as to the applicability of the rule relating to special resolutions, on the one hand, and its relationship to r.11.3 which requires the members present to vote by secret ballot. There 1s clearly enough an inconsistency between rr.l.3 and 11.4 on the one hand, and r.30 defining special resolution, on the other. As this matter was not argued, I do not explore it further.
The urgency of the present application is said to relate to the fact that applications for showing miniature ponies at the next Royal Easter Show in Sydney are required to be lodged by 2 December 1992. Under the Rules of the Royal Agricultural Soclety of New South Wales, under which the Sydney Royal Easter Show is held, it is necessary for a person showlng a pony to be a member of the Society and not to have been expelled. There is also to be a Royal Show in Melbourne in January, at which Mrs Whittle has entered at least one pony, Pee Wee.
One final matter of evidence should be noted. The Soclety is a non-profit organisation, by which I mean that all of its committee members and office bearers are voluntary. According to its profit and loss account, the Society had income, for the year ended 30 June 1992, of $35,300, made up of membership fees, registration fees, and fees for transfer. It also received a small amount of money for advertising in
the journal "Horse News". In the year to 30 June 1992, it
made a net proflt of $5,780. It received also interest on moneys invested by the Society. It made a small amount of money by promotional sales of items such as T shirts and key- rings, largely to members but not exclusively.
A number of attacks were made by the Whittles on the validity of the procedure adopted by the Society. It is unnecessary here to discuss all the submissions made. One of them concerned the fact that the resolutions passed at the committee meeting were moved, seconded or voted upon by one or more of three committee members whose appointment was defective because they were unfinancial. These committee members had been appointed life members. There does not appear to be any category of life members under the present Constitution, although under the Constitution prior to an amendment there was such a category. The committee members in question had, presumably because they believed they were life members, not paid any subscriptions. In the result, it would seem that their subscriptions were in arrears.
Under the Rules of the Society, committee members are required to be financial members. Thus r.13.5 provides:

"Any offlce bearer or committee of management posltlon holder can stand for re electlon to any posltlon within the Society whenever nominations are called for and are correctly nominated and seconded by full financial members while

bein

[Emphasis added]

Further, r.4.1 provides that a member ceases to be a member after the membership subscription is in arrears for three months. It was said that the defect in appointment of the committee members operated to void the resolutions passed at the meeting. This was so, notwithstanding that a quorum of three was adequate to pass a resolution and without the committee members invalidly appointed, there was still a quorum of three.

The Rules also provide, in r.21.4:

"Any act or thing done or suffered or purporting to have been done or suffered by the committee... is valld and effectual notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in the appointment or quallflcation of any member

of the committee.. . "

There is an arguable issue as to whether the fact that committee members are unfinancial, operates to invalidate a resolution passed by them, or whether, for the purposes of r.21.4, the resolution itself, rather than some act or matter done pursuant to that resolution, is saved by r.21.4. Although I do not think the argument particularly strong, it can not be said to be unarguable.

It was also submitted that, as three of the committee members present and voting on the resolutions were defendants in the defamation proceedings brought by the applicants, there was apparent bias on their part in passing the resolution and that this could operate to invalidate the resolutions. The argument was put in various ways. On the whole I do not think that this argument is likely to succeed. I say no more about it.

Of greater significance, is the argument advanced by

senior counsel for the applicants under s.45 of the ZZads
Practices Act 1974.

Put shortly, it was submitted that the Society was, for the purposes of that Act, "a Corporation" and that its Constltution, or at least that part of the Constltution which affected registration of ponies, affected the market in registered ponles and had the effect of substantially lessening competltlon in that market.

For the respondent Society, the initial premise was denied. It was said that the Society clearly was not a "trading Corporation" and so was not a "Corporation" for the purposes of the Act. Wlth respect, on the facts as they stand, this conclusion is not so clear as was submitted. Reference may be made to Australian Beauty Trade Su~~liers Ltd v Conference and Exhlbltlon Organisers Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR

41-107 and Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, where a	company incorporated to become the trustee of a unit trust was
held to be a trading corporation. In my view, it is fairly arguable that the respondent is a trading corporation within the meaning of the Act.
It is inappropriate to discuss in detail the possible application of s.45. It is plain enough that the submission is a bold one. If it be right, then the Constitution of all breed societies, at least to the extent to which they require membership of the society for registratlon in the breed register book, would be invalid.
However, the argument is not an impossible one to advance. Certainly it is not an argument which I would outright reject as being unarguable. Thls is particularly so having regard to the view I hold as to the balance of convenience, which I shall now discuss.
The balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of granting interim relief to the applicants. Failure to grant that relief would lead to their not being able to show anlmals in the Royal East Show and, in all probability, in the Victorian Royal Show in January, and might cause them to suffer loss in that they would be unable to sell, at an appropriate value, ponies qualifying for registration with the Society. A mere glance at the balance sheet of the Soclety as
by the applicants, it would be unlikely that they could at 30 June 1992, would indicated that, if damage were suffered recover damages from the Society. The Society has liquid assets of approximately $22,000 and total assets, including assets such as office equipment, of $35,340. Amounts already clalmed to be due to Mrs Whittle are not shown as liabilities.
.On the other hand, there is no prejudice at all to the respondent Society in the event that an injunction is

granted to maintain the status quo pending the hearing of the proceedings. The Society will suffer no financial damage. At the worst, all it will suffer is a continuing relationship with the applicants. Thls may, perhaps, be irritating to those members of the Society who regard the Whittles as a nuisance. But that is all. I would indlcate that this problem is in part solved by the undertakings proposed by the applicants.

Some cross-examination was directed to showing that, because Mrs Whittle had not sold any animals for a considerable tlme prior to the hearing of the interlocutory application, it was unlikely that she would engage in any sales thereafter. Her explanation, which I accept, is that sales are made only when the animals reach a certain age and that that was the reason for her not undertaking any sales in the past year or so. A suggestion in the evidence that Mrs Whlttle had not sought, from the Royal Agricultural Society,

the application forms for entry into the Sydney Show and

therefore that she should not be believed when she said that

she wished to enter into the Show, was contradicted by Mrs Whittle, whose evldence I accept, that she had already received from the Royal Agricultural Society entry forms.

I am accordingly of the view that the balance of

convenience favours the grant of interim relief as sought by
Mrs Whittle.

I should note one final submission. Counsel for the respondent submitted that on discretionary grounds I should not grant interim relief, even if I were satisfied that the test for granting lnterim relief were otherwise satisfied. It was submitted that if, ultimately, the matter was sent back to the Society, the members of the Society would vote to expel the Whittles. This is not necessarily so. It may well be that more members will attend at a meeting, if the matter is ever returned for voting to them, or that some members may change their minds. At the hearing, Mr and Mrs Whittle proposed to argue that for a meetlng to be called at an out of the way place, such as Bringelly, involves an abuse of power

by the committee and that a meeting should be held in a place

more accessible to members. Were this argument to succeed, and I make no comment upon it, a larger number of members mlght attend than the relatively small numbers who participated in present circumstances. Further, should it be ultimately the case that voting need be by postal ballot, then

a great deal more members might participate in the process.

It is not for the Court to speculate as to the

ultimate outcome.

Accordingly, but subject to the applicants giving the usual undertaking as to damages, I would order that until further order the respondent restore the names of the applicants to the respondent's register of members and further, that the respondent reinstate the applicantsf deregistered ponies to the adult register of the Society, if they had been removed. I would reserve the costs of the interim hearing.

I will now make directions for the ultimate

disposition of the case.

I certify that this and the
preceding twenty-one (21) pages
are a true copy of the Reasons

for Judgment herein of his Honour

Mr Justice Hill.

Associate: v & w

Date: 30 November 1992

Counsel and Solicitors	M. Beazley Q.C. and Y. Holt
for Applicants:	instructed by Shailer Dawson &

Hickey

Counsel and Solicitors	P.J. Saidi instructed by
for Respondent:	Coode Scott & Corry
Date of Hearing:	27 November 1992

Date Judgment Delivered:  30 November 1992